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Writing in 1962, Edwin Schur, a careful observer of drug policy in Britain
and the United States, characterized as “rather startling” the different paths taken
by the two countries with respect to the regulation of narcotics and the treatment
of narcotics addiction.1 At least until the latter decades of the twentieth century,
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1. EDWIN M. SCHUR, NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 69 (3d prtg. 1966).
In everyday discussion, the term “narcotics” is often used interchangeably with the term “drugs.”
TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND MORAL JUDGMENT 30
(1970). Technically, a narcotic is a substance that dulls the senses or produces sleep, SCHUR, supra,
at 17, but the term most often is used to refer “to opium and its derivatives, especially morphine and
heroin,” and to the active element of coca, which is cocaine. DUSTER, supra, at 30–31. Coffee,
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drug policy in Britain was heavily influenced by the recommendations contained
in a report issued in 1924 by a committee of medical experts led by Sir Humphry
Rolleston.2 The Rolleston Committee had advised that addiction to morphine
and heroin should “be regarded as a manifestation of disease and not as a mere
form[] of vicious indulgence.”3 The British “regarded [the addict] as a sick
person in need of medical care and not as a criminal to be hounded by the
Police.”4
Consistent with the Rolleston Committee’s perspective, the nature of legal
regulation and practice in the United Kingdom until fairly recently has been
pragmatic, therapeutic in its orientation, and respectful of the central role held by
physicians in dealing with the issue of drugs and drug abuse.5 By contrast, the
approach in the United States has been dominated by a criminal law enforcement
focus that has reposed responsibility largely in the hands of law enforcement
officials.6 In Schur’s words:
The medical profession in Britain, . . . has taken a positive stand in
support of its basic responsibility for the treatment of addiction. This
stand has been an important factor in the continuance of Britain’s
medical approach. In contrast, American doctors have by their relative
apathy contributed to the persistence of this country’s punitive
approach.7
The trajectory of drug policy in the United States was set by the passage of
the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914,8 which first brought criminal prohibitions
into this field,9 and by a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting that
statute to limit the discretion of physicians to treat addicts with maintenance

alcohol, tobacco, hemp, and other substances often used for therapeutic purposes such as
amphetamines, barbiturates, and anabolic steroids, are all drugs in the broad sense, but the drugs
that have “most dominated and colored the American conception of narcotics” are the opium-based
substances and cocaine, id. at 6, and that is the usage intended in this Article.
2. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 71.
3. U.K. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON MORPHINE & HEROIN
ADDICTION, REPORT 31 (1926) [hereinafter ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT].
4. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 71 (quoting Jeffrey Bishop, A Commentary on the Management
and Treatment of Drug Addicts in the United Kingdom, in MARIE NYSWANDER, THE DRUG ADDICT
AS A PATIENT 149, 150 (1956)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. See NORVAL MORRIS & GORDON HAWKINS, The Overreach of the Criminal Law, in THE
HONEST POLITICIAN’S GUIDE TO CRIME CONTROL 1, 9 (1970).
6. See id. at 8–9.
7. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 202.
8. Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785, repealed by
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
9. See JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 28 (2001) [hereinafter NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE].
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doses of narcotics.10 U.S. drug policy was also influenced by the hard-headed
perspective of government enforcement officials such as Harry J. Anslinger, who
served for decades as the Commissioner of Narcotics in the Treasury
Department.11 At the core of Anslinger’s philosophy was an “insistence on the
idea that addicts are bad characters and that addiction essentially is a police
problem . . . .”12 In light of this moral judgment about narcotics users, the
position of officials in the federal government that doctors should not be
permitted to prescribe narcotics to maintain addicts was also framed in moralistic
terms.13 Thus, a Senate committee report from the 1950s asserted that “it would
be absolutely immoral to give in to drug addiction” and that the government
“should not adopt any program to give the drug addict ‘sustaining’ doses of
narcotics.”14
Although moral disapproval may have been directed toward narcotics
misuse in the United States in the nineteenth century, such judgments probably
did not function as an absolute or totalizing moral characterization of users until
some time after passage of the Harrison Act.15 This intense moral disapproval
was reflected in drug policy adopted following World War II and in the “War on
Drugs” that began in the Nixon administration.16 That policy, in turn, has
reinforced and sustained the social opprobrium that has marked drug use and
drug users.
It may be tempting to think of the history of drug policy in Britain and the
United States as distinct perfect types, the former a nonjudgmental medical
approach and the latter a morally tinged criminal prohibition approach.

10. See Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 99–100 (1919); United States v. Doremus, 249
U.S. 86, 94 (1919); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 402 (1916).
11. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 43, 196–98 (quoting Stanley Meisler, Federal Narcotics
Czar, NATION, Feb. 20, 1960, at 159, 162).
12. Id. at 192.
13. The words “moral,” “morality,” and “moralistic” carry a wide range of different
meanings, depending upon the context in which they are used. Duster suggests that generally
“morality refers to the strong feelings which people have about right and wrong.” DUSTER, supra
note 1, at 4. These feelings (and beliefs) can be a function of the individual’s “personality system,”
the community or social group’s collective normative commitments, or the broader “cultural
system,” within which both the individual and the group are embedded. Id. at 80 (citing TOWARD A
GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION 116 (Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shils eds., Harper Torchbook
1962) (1951)). Moral judgments may be rooted in deontological commitments, or they may be
founded on consequentialist considerations, or both. See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
The enforcement of moral norms as positive legal obligations, in turn, can be seen in deontological
or consequentialist terms as well. See infra note 256 and accompanying text. A consideration of
the variety of deontological and consequentialist claims supporting the enforcement of legal
prohibitions against the use of narcotics is taken up in Part II.
14. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 195 (quoting S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON
IMPROVEMENTS IN THE FED. CRIMINAL CODE, 84TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION, REP. ON THE
TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF NARCOTIC ADDICTS 9, 12 (1956)).
15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.C.
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Throughout the twentieth century, however, the reality likely was somewhat
more complex and the similarities between the two more pronounced than might
have seemed the case.17 More recently, there has been something of a
convergence of the two systems. Perhaps out of moral, political, and fiscal
fatigue, the United States increasingly has signaled a willingness to declare at
least a partial truce in its war on drugs, and has begun very tentatively to adopt
some features of the pragmatic policy approach that long has dominated British
practice.18 In the United Kingdom, by contrast, commentators have been writing
about the “criminalization” of British drug policy and about the transplantation
of American ideas and practices familiar to those who have followed the U.S.
war on drugs.19
This Article suggests that this pattern of convergence is likely to be
incomplete. Even though actors in each country have been aware of
developments in the other (and have even borrowed policy prescriptions from
time to time), one critical difference in their parallel histories is likely to be
determinative. The American move toward pragmatism, if it is to occur, must be
executed against the inertial force generated by policy commitments and social
practices of more than seventy-five years in which the most dominant feature has
been an intense moral disapproval of drugs. The British, on the other hand, do
not have this history of demonizing drugs and those who use them. As a
consequence, their increasing reliance on criminal justice institutions is driven
more by a therapeutic impulse than by a punitive one.
Part I of this Article traces the legal and social history of drugs, drug abuse,
and drug control in the United States. It tells the story of the events leading to
the passage of the Harrison Act, the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation and
application of that statute, and the elaboration over time of the country’s
prohibitionist policy, which culminated in the “War on Drugs” and the dramatic
expansion of the criminal system in the 1980s. Part II considers the complex
relationship between formal legal prescription and the social negotiation of
norms, and addresses directly the question of how a drug policy that is centered

17. So, for example, in a special study of English drug policy undertaken by the New York
State Department of Health and the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene in 1960, the
authors concluded that the “British narcotic control system which appears superficially to be vastly
different from that of the United States is found on closer inspection to be not dissimilar.” Granville
W. Larimore & Henry Brill, The British Narcotic System: Report of Study, 60 N.Y. ST. J. MED. 107,
114 (1960).
18. See infra PART IV.A.
19. On the criminalization of British drug policy, see Karen Duke, Out of Crime and Into
Treatment?: The Criminalization of Contemporary Drug Policy Since Tackling Drugs Together, 13
DRUGS: EDUC., PREVENTION & POL’Y 409 (2006); Toby Seddon et al., Risk, Security and the
‘Criminalization’ of British Drug Policy, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 818 (2008). On the
transplantation of U.S. criminal enforcement measures to the United Kingdom, see JAMES L.
NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURT MOVEMENT 44–75 (2009).
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on prohibition and criminal enforcement might be supported on either
consequentialist or deontological grounds. The analysis here includes an
exploration of the basis for the strong moral disapproval that, in the United
States, consistently has been aimed at those who misuse narcotics. In Part III,
the focus shifts to the United Kingdom. First, the Article recounts the history of
the legal, medical, and social regulation of drugs that distinguished British from
American practice through most of the twentieth century and that more recently
has begun to migrate toward the U.S. approach. Then, in the second section it
examines the underlying cultural, economic, and political factors that have
contributed to the “criminalization” of British drug policy in recent years. Part
IV sets out some of the evidence of convergence and some of the contrary
evidence suggesting that the inertial effect of history is at play, inhibiting the
ability of advocates and policymakers in the United States to truly adopt a new
approach to the problem of narcotics and drug addiction. The analysis concludes
with a discussion of moral anchoring—the process by which fixed normative
understandings shape public discourse about risk and harm.
I.

THE LEGAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF DRUGS, DRUG ABUSE, AND DRUG
CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES

In thinking about the immediate and longer term future of U.S. drug policy,
it is helpful to start with a set of questions about how a morality-based
perspective came to dominate discourse and public policy in this area, what
precisely those moral claims are, and how they relate to more pragmatic
considerations. Our analysis of these interrelated questions begins in the
historical period preceding the adoption of the Harrison Act in 1914. Students of
this history have set out sharply divergent accounts of the causal and temporal
relationships between the development of a positive legal framework for drug
control policy in the United States on the one hand, and the public’s moral
disposition toward drug use and addiction on the other. One well-known
account has been offered by Troy Duster, who has argued that the enactment of
prohibitory legislation by Congress in the first decades of the twentieth century,
along with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of that law to preclude doctors
from providing medical maintenance treatment to narcotics addicts, led to a
broad societal “moral reassessment” of narcotics and narcotics addiction itself.20
Duster does not argue for a simple causal relationship between the enactment of
a specific legal provision and the development of widespread feelings of
disapprobation toward addicts in the United States, but he does suggest that the

20. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 14−17 (quoting ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND THE
LAW 6 (1965)) (citing Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96 (1919)).
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“legislation brought about the conditions that were conducive to a
reinterpretation of narcotics usage into almost purely moral terms.”21
Central to Duster’s history is his observation that a moral reappraisal of
narcotics addiction did not occur until patterns of use had shifted from the
middle and upper classes to those in the working classes and the poor, and
further that this change in the allocation of drug use by class was linked to the
passage of the Harrison Act.22 These claims have been challenged by James
Nolan, who argues that Duster’s account is contrary to the empirical evidence
regarding the moral stigma that attached to narcotics misuse in the first decade
and a half of the twentieth century, and implausible because it cannot explain
how political support for the Harrison Act could have been generated absent
such popular moral disapproval.23 Nolan asserts that “moral concerns were a
dominant force behind anti-narcotic efforts and served as an important
justificatory theme supporting passage of the legislation.”24
Notwithstanding their different takes on the pre-1914 history, a notable point
of agreement between Duster and Nolan is their shared view that for most of the
last century, strong moral disapproval has been directed toward those who use
narcotics, and has shaped America’s approach to drug use and addiction. Nolan
suggests that there are “three distinct ‘root metaphors’ or ‘legitimizing values’
that have informed efforts to socially control drug use in the United States.”25
While one perspective, the “therapeutic paradigm,” views drug users or abusers
not as immoral but as in need of treatment,26 and a second paradigm, the
“utilitarian perspective,” views users through either a prohibitionist or libertarian
lens depending on an assessment of the relative costs and benefits involved in
strictly limiting access to narcotics,27 the perspective that has dominated U.S.
thinking is the “moral or the religious perspective.”28 From this point of view,
the use of narcotics is understood to be a wrong that emanates from bad
character, poor individual decisionmaking, or some other attribute of the user for
which he or she is autonomously responsible.29
Duster’s analysis of this question begins with his apparently simple
observation that some features of daily life “take on moral character while others

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 22.
See id. at 9–10, 22–23.
NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23 (quoting DUSTER, supra note 1, at 3).
Id.
Id. at 15 (quoting HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
DEVIANCE 142 (1963); John M. Johnson & Linda Waletzko, Drugs and Crime: A Study in the
Medicalization of Crime Control, 3 PERSP. ON SOC. PROBS. 197, 199 (1992)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 16 (quoting BECKER, supra note 25, at 136; H. WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN
AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800−1980, at 37 (1981)).
28. Id. at 16.
29. See id.at 15–16; GEORGE FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL: THE DRUG WAR’S MORAL
ROOTS (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
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do not.”30 Following William Graham Sumner’s work, Duster argues that
communities typically develop one body of rules that are enforced as customs
but that are not “moral in their implications,”31 and another body of rules—
“mores” in Sumner’s account—whose enforcement is woven into the normative
character of the community.32 Taking this broad distinction as his framework,
Duster concludes that “drug use in the United States in the middle twentieth
century is one of those moral areas.”33 Significantly, whether the use of
narcotics is viewed as the product of psychological or characterological
weakness, Duster says that the moral disapproval associated with this conduct
has become so powerful over time that it has become totalizing, eclipsing all the
other otherwise morally significant features of an individual user of narcotics.34
He explains that “[a] person who exhibits this presumably obvious special kind
of behavior (immoral, in this instance) is identified in a complete sense through a
particular label; thus generating total identity.”35 But this has not always been
the case. In Duster’s telling of the story:
There was once a time when anyone could go to his corner druggist
and buy grams of morphine or heroin for just a few pennies. There was
no need to have a prescription from a physician. The middle and upper
classes purchased more than the lower and working classes, and there
was no moral stigma attached to such narcotics use. The year was 1900,
and the country was the United States.36
Duster likely is over-reading the historical record when he asserts that “no
moral stigma” was assigned to the use of morphine and other narcotics at the
start of the twentieth century, and Nolan does a good job of documenting some
examples of the kinds of disapprobation that apparently were typical.37 On the
other hand, the sort of totalizing moral judgment that came to characterize
popular perceptions of drug addiction probably did develop only gradually over
the first decades of the twentieth century, and in some fashion may have been
due to the shifting legal status of drug use that resulted from the passage of the
Harrison Act, other federal legislation in the area, and the Supreme Court
decisions interpreting this new positive law.38

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

DUSTER, supra note 1 at 87.
Id. at 86. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id. at 88.
See id. at 67, 91–92.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted).
See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23–25.
See infra Part I.A–B.
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James Bakalar and Lester Grinspoon have turned to a work of fiction,
Eugene O’Neill’s Long Day’s Journey into Night, a play set in the summer of
1912, for some evidence of how the misuse of morphine was understood in the
United States in the moment before the adoption of the Harrison Act.39 Readers
who know the play will recall that the story centers on four members of a New
England family, a mother and father and their two grown sons.40 The mother,
Mary Tyrone, is a morphine addict, and her husband and two sons are all prone
to alcohol misuse.41 The play rightly holds a central place in the pantheon of
great American literature of the twentieth century for its complex rendering of
character and relationship, but Bakalar and Grinspoon focus with special
attention on the ways in which Mary’s dependency on morphine is understood in
the context of the family system set out by O’Neill and in the broader context of
the community within which the action takes place.42 In some respects, Mary’s
addiction is regarded as a disease, not unlike the tuberculosis that afflicts her
younger son Edmund.43 She acquired her dependency as a consequence of her
doctor giving her too much morphine during childbirth (not an uncommon
scenario during this period), and although it is disruptive to her relationships
with her family, the addiction does not come to define Mary.44 All the same,
there are clear suggestions that Mary Tyrone’s misuse of morphine is
instrumental, a device by which she eludes intimacy with her family and avoids
confronting fully what her life has become.45 In this dimension, O’Neill seems
to suggest the basis for a moral judgment of her narcotics use, the wrongfulness
of her treating morphine as a means to “get beyond . . . [the] reach” of her
family.46 But what seems most important for our purposes, notwithstanding
Mary’s characterization of herself at one point as a “lying dope fiend,”47 is that
the moral assessment of her addiction made by her family—and perhaps by
Mary herself—is related to her presumed reasons for not fighting her cravings,
and is not a global judgment about the worthiness of her character.48 In this
sense, O’Neill does not treat narcotics addiction as a totalizing characteristic.
Mary Tyrone’s struggles with morphine were not atypical in the period in
which O’Neill’s play is set. Duster and Nolan agree that a high incidence of
physical dependency on narcotics was present in the United States from the
middle of the nineteenth century through the first decades of the twentieth

39.
(1984).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

JAMES B. BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE SOCIETY 61–62
See EUGENE O’NEIL, LONG DAY’S JOURNEY INTO NIGHT 12–13, 19 (1955).
See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 61.
BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 61–62.
Id.
See id. at 61–62.
See id.
Id. at 61 (quoting O’NEIL, supra note 40, at 139) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (quoting O’NEIL, supra note 40, at 107) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 61–62.
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century.49 They also agree that this period was characterized by a virtual
absence of legal regulation of narcotics and other drugs.50 Of course, this
regulatory vacuum did not persist beyond 1914.51 Such a dramatic shift in the
positive law certainly had to have had an effect on broader popular
understandings of drug use and addiction. In order to better understand the
moral judgments about narcotics use that developed over time and that have
operated under the general umbrella of Nolan’s moral/religious perspective, and
to gain some greater purchase on the question of the relationship between this
complex set of moral intuitions and the shifting legal landscape, a brief review of
the history of drug regulation and the social position of drug users in the United
States follows.
A. Early History
Tracing the history of the development of drug regulation in the United
States is a difficult task, in part because that history includes legal, political, and
medical elements that relate both to “ordinary” medical drugs and to “pleasure”
drugs.52 These two categories are neither mutually exclusive nor have they been
static over time, and within the category of “pleasure” drugs, the legal, political
and social narrative has not been consistent from one drug to the next.53 Bearing
all of this in mind, however, the drug that has “dominated and colored the
American conception of narcotics is opium.”54
During the early part of the nineteenth century, the consumption of opium
took place mostly in Asia and the “Far East.”55 In the second half of the 1800s,
however, opium use became more common in the United States, partly as a

49. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 8 (“From 1865 to 1900, . . . addiction to narcotics was
relatively widespread. . . . In proportion to the population, addiction was probably eight times more
prevalent then than now . . . .”); NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 18 (“[B]y the end
of the nineteenth century ‘approximately 200,000 Americans were addicted to opium in one form or
another.’” (quoting JOHN C. BURNHAM, BAD HABITS: DRINKING, SMOKING, TAKING DRUGS,
GAMBLING, SEXUAL MISBEHAVIOR, AND SWEARING IN AMERICAN HISTORY 114 (1993))).
50. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 12–14; NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 17.
51. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23 (quoting DUSTER, supra note 1,
at 23).
52. The terms “ordinary” and “pleasure” drugs are taken from Balkalar and Grinspoon, who
trace the development of this imperfect distinction to the passage of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics
Act of 1938, 24 U.S.C. § 301 (2006), which in effect established the category of prescription drugs.
See BALKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 29–30. The distinction is problematic in part
because most “pleasure” drugs also have therapeutic uses (e.g., marijuana), while most “ordinary
therapeutic drugs are dangerous enough to cause illness as well as cure it[,]” (e.g., chemotherapy).
Id. at 30.
53. See id. at 30–34.
54. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 6.
55. See id.
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consequence of immigration patterns,56 but more significantly because of the
increasing frequency with which the drug and its constituents were included as
an ingredient in patent medicines and other products widely available to the
general public.57 Physicians played an important role in supporting the increased
use of morphine during this period, especially following the invention of the
hypodermic needle in the 1850s.58 Doctors touted the benefits of morphine in
treating “female troubles”59 and as a painkiller more generally, and their reliance
on injected morphine during the Civil War to treat injured soldiers accelerated
the spread of narcotics use even more dramatically.60 Along with the
proliferation of patent medicines and other popular preparations containing
opium, the heavy reliance of doctors on morphine led to very high levels of
physical dependency.61 Duster estimates that as much as two to four percent of
the U.S. population was addicted to these substances by 1895.62
Even though the medical community had generally been aware of the
addictive qualities of opium (and especially of injected morphine), the dominant
judgment among doctors was that the medicinal benefits of the drug outweighed
these dangers.63 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, however, as the
number of physically dependent users grew,64 some within the medical
establishment became alarmed and eventually called for greater regulation of
patent medicines and other preparations that had been made available to users

56. See generally DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE 5–6 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE] (“In the nineteenth century addicts were identified with foreign
groups and internal minorities . . . . The Chinese and their custom of opium smoking were closely
watched after their entry into the United States about 1870.”).
57. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 7 (“[M]edical companies began to include morphine in a
vast number of medications that were sold directly to consumers as household remedies. This was
the period before governmental regulation, and the layman was subjected to a barrage of newspaper
and billboard advertisements claiming cures for everything from the common cold to cholera.
‘Soothing Syrups’ with morphine often contained no mention of their contents, and many men
moved along the path to the purer morphine through this route.”); CHARLES E. TERRY & MILDRED
PELLENS, THE OPIUM PROBLEM 74 (1970) (“It would be impossible to form any accurate estimate
of the influence exerted by the widespread sale and use of nostrums containing opium, but that this
influence was great and contributed in an appreciable degree to the habitual use of the drug is
undoubted.”).
58. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 6 (citing TERRY & PELLENS, supra note 57, at 66–67).
59. EDWARD M. BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS: THE CONSUMERS UNION REPORT ON
NARCOTICS, STIMULANTS, DEPRESSANTS, INHALANTS, HALLUCINOGENS, AND MARIJUANA—
INCLUDING CAFFEINE, NICOTINE, AND ALCOHOL 17 (1972) (internal quotation marks omited).
60. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 6–7 (citing TERRY & PELLENS, supra note 57, at 69);
NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 18 (citing WILLIAM BUTLER ELDRIDGE,
NARCOTICS AND THE LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 1967)).
61. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 6–7 (quoting TERRY & PELLENS, supra note 57, at 75);
ELDRIDGE, supra note 60, at 5.
62. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 7 (citing MARIE NYSWANDER, THE DRUG ADDICT AS A
PATIENT 1–13 (1956)).
63. See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 71–73.
64. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 8 (citing TERRY & PELLENS, supra note 57, at 53).
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outside of the context of professional medical practice.65 While medical journal
articles from this period demonstrate the medical community’s increasing
awareness that physicians also were contributing to the problem of addiction
through their overreliance on morphine, these initial calls for regulation did not
explicitly target that facet of the problem.66
At just about this point, heroin, an opiate derived from morphine, was first
produced by a German researcher.67 This new drug was made available by
Bayer Pharmaceuticals in the U.S. in 1898 as a “cough suppressant,”68 and was
also used for a time as a treatment for morphine withdrawal.69 Although heroin
was originally thought to be a promising therapy in part because it was believed
to be non-addicting, it did not take long for physicians to learn that it too
produced a powerful physical dependency.70
Notwithstanding the large and growing population of addicts produced by
these forces by the turn of the century, Duster argues that because there was a
ready supply of narcotics available to manage one’s addiction, middle-class
users were able to maintain relatively normal and productive lives.71 As a
consequence, he suggests, little or no moral stigma was associated with the
condition:
It was acknowledged in medical journals that a morphine addict
could not be detected as an addict so long as he maintained his supply.
Some of the most respectable citizens of the community, pillars of
middle-class morality, were addicted. In cases where this was known,
the victim was regarded as one afflicted with a physiological problem,
in much the same way as we presently regard the need of a diabetic for
insulin. Family histories later indicated that many went through their
daily tasks, their occupations, completely undetected by friends and
relatives.72
A series of shifts in the legal regulation of narcotics undertaken first by a
few states and then by the federal government changed this equation by, in
effect, limiting the supply of opium, morphine, and heroin that was easily and
legally available to users.73 Although there were several very early attempts by

65. See id. at 13 (citing NYSWANDER, supra note 62, at 2–3); id. at 22.
66. See NYSWANDER, supra note 62, at 2–3.
67. Id. at 8.
68. David T. Courtwright, The Roads to H: The Emergence of the American Heroin
Complex, 1898–1956, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF HEROIN 3, 3–4 (David F. Musto ed., 2002).
69. Id. at 5.
70. See id.
71. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 9 (citing C.S. Pearson, A Study of Degeneracy as Seen
Among Addicts, 1919 N.Y. MED. J. 805, 805–08).
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 13–15.
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states and localities to legislate in this area,74 there were no significant legal
restrictions on the distribution of narcotics until the 1890s.75 In the last decade
of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, a growing
concern within the medical community led a number of states to pass provisions
designed to limit the availability of narcotics and to place physicians in the
position of gatekeepers regulating access to these substances.76 Some states also
passed laws during this period that focused particularly on opium smoking,
which had become a highly visible issue in the popular press.77 The coalition
that advocated for these provisions was complex and included temperance
advocates, nativists, and others.78 Then, in 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food
and Drug Act, which required the labeling of food and drugs with their
ingredients.79 This federal legislation was supported by advocates within the
progressive movement often associated with the “muckraking” writing of
journalists like Upton Sinclair.80 The muckrakers’ concerns included not only
the dangers of adulterated foods and deplorable working conditions for laborers,
but also the scourge of patent medicines.81 As one writer put it: “Poisonous
substances provided an issue on which prohibitionists, social reformers and
proponents of federal intervention combined with enduring results.”82
The Pure Food and Drug Act did not contain any prohibitions or blanket
restrictions on the availability of particularly designated drugs,83 but it did signal
a new involvement by the federal government in the general arena of drug
policy.84 Over the next eight years, Congress considered a number of bills

74. In 1875, for example, San Francisco passed an ordinance clearly targeting Chinese
immigrants that prohibited the smoking of opium, but that left undisturbed the many other forms of
opium use by other citizens. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, DRUG POL’Y PROJECT, EFFECTIVE
DRUG CONTROL: TOWARD A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 14 (2005) [hereinafter KING CNTY. BAR
ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL], available at http://www.kcba.org/druglaw/pdf/effectivedrug
control.pdf.
75. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 12.
76. See id. at 13; KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 15.
The first comprehensive statute of this kind was the Boylan Act, passed by the New York
legislature in 1904. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 13. A number of states also passed legislation of this
kind. See id.
77. Id.
78. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 97 (“The more liberal drug bills were consistently opposed
by the liquor industry lobby, the police, and church and temperance groups—strange bed-fellows.”).
79. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 15.
80. Id.
81. See id.; RICHARD DAVENPORT-HINES, THE PURSUIT OF OBLIVION: A GLOBAL HISTORY
OF NARCOTICS 212 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2002) (2001).
82. DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 81, at 212.
83. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 15.
However, it did contain a provision that banned the importation of any drug that was “dangerous to
the health of the people of the United States.” See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note
56, at 34–35.
84. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 16.
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designed to limit in some fashion the public’s access to narcotics.85 This
multiyear legislative campaign—which culminated in the passage of the
Harrison Act in 1914—was undertaken against the backdrop of an even broader
effort to regulate the international distribution and sale of opium, coca, and other
narcotics.86 That broader effort began with the organization of an international
conference on opium, called at the initiative of the United States, in Shanghai in
1909.87 Like the domestic legislative campaign that resulted in the Harrison Act,
this international initiative likely was driven by a combination of pragmatic and
moralistic concerns.88
The very fact that the United States had called for and was planning to
convene an international meeting in order to encourage other nations to impose
strict legal limitations on the distribution and sale of narcotics only pressed into
greater focus the relative regulatory vacuum at home.89 In anticipation of the
conference and to “save face,” the organizers of the event pushed Congress for a
federal statute that would prohibit the importation into the United States of
opium prepared for smoking (and therefore, presumably, intended for nonmedical use).90 Strictly speaking, the legislation was unnecessary, given that the
Pure Food and Drug Act already contained language that would have permitted
the federal government to prohibit the importation of any drug deemed to be
“dangerous to the health of the people of the United States,”91 but the bill was
enacted in any event roughly a week after the Shanghai meeting had begun.92
A more important legislative proposal stimulated by the Shanghai gathering
was introduced in the House of Representatives a year later.93 The principal
author of the bill was Hamilton Wright, a physician who had served as an
American representative at the Shanghai Conference.94 Wright’s proposal was
introduced by Representative David Foster of Vermont, who was chariman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.95 The legislation, which would have
imposed a federal tax on the sale of narcotics and would have created an
extensive system of federal regulation and record keeping of drug transactions,
drew vigorous opposition from the drug industry.96 Spokespersons for drug
manufacturers testified that, while they were wholly in favor of sensible

85.
86.
87.
88.

See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23–29.
See id.
See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 13.
See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 13–14; NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 20–

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 14.
See id.
MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 34–35.
See id.
See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 21.
See id.
KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 18.
See id.

21.
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measures to limit the misuse of addictive drugs, the Foster Bill was not
practicable and would impose requirements that were “too cumbersome and
expensive.”97
The Foster Bill did not pass the House, and so U.S. representatives returned
to the next international meeting—which took place at The Hague in December
of 1911 and January of 1912—without new domestic legislation in place.98 The
American delegation again pushed for international agreements limiting the
production and sale of opium and cocaine.99 Two additional conferences were
held in the same location over the next two years, resulting in formal agreements
strictly limiting narcotics and narcotics trafficking worldwide.100 The Hague
Convention eventually was incorporated into the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.101
These international agreements were a significant “source of pressure on the
United States to intensify its own domestic drug policy”102 and also served as a
catalyst for the development of drug control regulations in the United
Kingdom.103
The most important legal development in the United States attributable to
this international pressure was the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914. This bill was
introduced by Representative Francis Burton Harrison of New York, who also
had served as Governor General of the Philippines.104 The legislation was
derived directly from the provisions contained in the Foster Bill, although the
Harrison Act’s supporters did agree to somewhat less onerous recordkeeping
requirements and to permitting the continued sale of some patent medicines
containing small amounts of narcotics.105 The legislation required manufacturers
and sellers of narcotics to register with the federal government and to pay a tax
on each transaction.106 In addition, and most significantly, the Harrison Act
made most narcotics unavailable except pursuant to a doctor’s prescription
provided “in good faith” and “in the course of [the physician’s] professional
practice.”107

97. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 25–26.
98. See id. at 26.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 70 (“[A]s a means of complying with the spirit and aims of
the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912[,] the [British] Government introduced the
Dangerous Drugs Act. This measure met with a largely favorable response in Parliament, and . . .
was promptly enacted into law [in 1920].”).
104. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 18.
105. See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 59.
106. See id. at 59–60.
107. NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27 (quoting Harrison Narcotics Act of
1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the
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Although the Harrison Act initially faced opposition from the American
Medical Association (as in the case of the Foster Bill) on pragmatic grounds
related to the expense and inconvenience associated with its rigorous
recordkeeping requirements, the overall perspective of the legislation once these
logistics issues were addressed was actually quite consistent with the views of
the established medical community.108 In this respect, the Harrison Act was
mostly understood by doctors as “a law for the orderly marketing of opium,
morphine, heroin, and other drugs—in small quantities over the counter and in
larger quantities on a physician’s prescription.”109 In general, physicians were
comfortable with the new federal provisions because they understood the
legislation, “which they had a hand in drafting,”110 as increasing the degree of
discretion and control that they and their professional colleagues would be able
to exert over the availability of these drugs.111
Importantly, the formal legislative history of the Harrison Act does not
contain much in the way of shrill moralisms about the evils of drug abuse or
addiction.112 Instead, the legislative record is taken up with more pragmatic
considerations relating to the workability of the bureaucracy that would be
required for the registration, recordkeeping, and revenue collecting provisions of
the Act.113 To the extent that broad rationales in support of the legislation were
offered by its advocates during the congressional debate, these arguments tended
either to relate to the obligations of the federal government to comply with
international treaties calling for participating countries to regulate the
manufacture and sale of narcotics, or to the utility of placing the medical
profession in a position of greater control and responsibility for the distribution
of these drugs.114 Duster makes much of this legislative record, suggesting that
the absence of more explicit morality-based arguments during the debates
supports his view that broad social stigma did not attach to narcotics use until
after the legal landscape had shifted.115
Nolan, on the other hand, while acknowledging the paucity of morality
claims in the record, has argued persuasively that popular moral disapprobation
directed toward drugs and drug abusers played a part in the broader campaign
that ultimately culminated in the Harrison Act.116 Nolan conjoins the more

Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 258–
59 (2008) (discussing the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914).
108. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 18–19.
109. See id. at 19 (quoting BRECHER, supra note 59, at 49).
110. KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 19.
111. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 15.
112. See 50 CONG. REC. 2191–2211 (1913).
113. Id. at 2201–11.
114. See MORGAN, supra note 27, at 107–08; NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at
27.
115. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 22–23.
116. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27–28.
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immediate legislative history of the 1914 legislation with the efforts that had
been undertaken in the House of Representatives in support of the Foster Bill in
1910, and suggests that the earlier debate set the stage for and was part of the
general advocacy that finally resulted in the later legislation.117 This broadened
time frame is important because it permits Nolan to plumb the legislative record
of the earlier proposal for examples of comments containing the kind of moral
disapproval that Duster believes only took root after the law had changed.118
Thus, Nolan cites to instances in the earlier committee hearings where
drug users were variously referred to as “dopes,” “fiends,” “dope
fiends,” and “habitués.” The “secret and vile habit” of drug use was
described as “nefarious and soul destroying,” as an “evil,” a “curse,” a
“vice,” and as that which led to “debauchery” and “crime.”119
Wrapped up in this moral condemnation of narcotics users was a related set
of judgments that Nolan associates with the “status politics thesis” developed by
Joseph Gusfield in his well-known history of alcohol prohibition120 and also
found in David Musto’s important work on the history of drug policy.121 It is
clear that some proponents of the Foster Bill sought to garner support for the
legislation on the basis of class and race biases, evoking popular myths and fears
about the role that drug use played in the supposed debauchery of some AfricanAmericans, Asian-Americans, and other groups outside of the white middle
class.122 Dr. Wright, for example, suggested that opium smoking had corrupted a
large number of proper white women, leading them into inappropriate sexual
relationships with Chinese men, while cocaine use among African-American
men in the South was said to have contributed to a high incidence of sexual
misconduct.123 Clearly, these provocative associations of drug use with other
morally charged conduct on the part of outsider groups must be understood as

117. See id.
118. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 22–23; NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23–
26.
119. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 23–24.
120. See JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT 4, 6, 7–8 (2d ed. 1986); NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at
22–23 (discussing “Joseph Gusfield’s 1963 analysis of the Prohibition effort”).
121. See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 5–6 (“[A]ddicts were identified
with foreign groups and internal minorities who were already actively feared and the objects of
elaborate and massive social and legal restraints.”).
122. See id. at 5–6.
123. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 18 n.113
(citing OPIUM PROBLEM: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, S. DOC. NO. 61377, at 45, 48–49 (2d Sess. 1910)); NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 24 (citing
Importation and Use of Opium: Hearing on H.R. 25240, H.R. 25241, H.R. 25242 and H.R. 28971
Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 61st Cong. 82–83 (1910–1911) (Statement of Mr.
Hamilton Wright)).
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morality-based arguments operating within the larger rhetorical structure of the
debates that took place at the time, but it is not at all evident that they constitute
the sort of clear assertions about the inherent immorality of drug use itself that
would become common in later decades.
Finally, Nolan identifies a set of negative moral judgments leveled by
supporters of the Foster Bill against drug manufacturers and wholesalers for
marketing narcotics “promiscuously,” for profiteering by taking advantage of the
weaknesses of addicts, and for generally failing to exercise “moral restraint” in
their businesses practices with respect to narcotics.124 Interestingly, these
judgments suggest that, while the supporters of anti-narcotics legislation viewed
addicts as weak and unfortunate characters, their more pointed moral
condemnation was reserved for those who exploited the mental and physical
shortcomings of users by aggressively manufacturing and distributing harmful
drugs. “Because of the manufacturer’s failure on ‘moral grounds’ to institute
‘sufficient safeguards’ against the indiscriminate distribution of narcotics,” the
argument went, “it was therefore ‘the duty of the Government to compel him to
do it by law.’”125
This reading of the expanded legislative record suggests that there may have
been a developing view, at least among some advocates for greater regulation,
that narcotics use was morally suspect because it led users to debauchery and
crime, and worked a corrosion of middle-class values.126 For some, drug use
also may have been seen as morally wrong on the ground that it disrupted
families and other social relationships and, perhaps, because it was thought to
debase and corrupt the essential human attributes of rationality and autonomy.127
But the record does not support a conclusion that narcotics addicts were reviled
generally, or that addiction was a category whose social meaning was totalizing
in the way that it came to be later in the twentieth century.128 Viewed in this
way, the Harrison Act likely was animated more by a concern that manufacturers
and sellers of narcotics were taking advantage of a regulatory vacuum, and that

124. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 25 (quoting Importation and Use of
Opium: Hearing on H.R. 25240, H.R. 25241, H.R. 25242 and H.R. 28971 Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 61st Cong. 86 (1910–1911) (Statement of Dr. Christopher Koch)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
125. Id. (quoting Importation and Use of Opium: Hearing on H.R. 25240, H.R. 25241, H.R.
25242 and H.R. 28971 Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 61st Cong. 86 (1910–1911)
(Statement of Dr. Christopher Koch)).
126. See generally MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 65 (“By 1914
prominent newspapers, physicians, pharmacists, and congressmen believed opiates and cocaine
predisposed habitués toward insanity and crime. They were widely seen as substances associated
with foreigners or alien subgroups.”).
127. See MORGAN, supra note 27, at 50; MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at
5.
128. See 50 CONG. REC. 2191–2211 (1913); DUSTER, supra note 1, at 22–23. During the
debate over the Harrison Act of 1914, Representative Sisson referred to addicts as “unfortunate
person[s].” 50 CONG. REC. 2203 (1913).
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the individual and societal dangers of drug misuse made those unregulated
business practices too costly for the government to ignore. Notwithstanding the
comments of some who sought to use class and race fears to gain support for
these bills, and notwithstanding the statements of others who characterized
addicts as depraved or weak or afflicted, the use of narcotics remained, as Duster
stresses, predominately a middle class phenomenon until after passage of the
Harrison Act. The enactment of that legislation may have been a seminal
moment in the development of a more active role for the federal government
(and later for the states) in regulating the availability of narcotics,129 but Duster
argues that the primary mechanism contemplated—although not stated
explicitly—for regularizing the distribution of harmful drugs was the
prescription of these substances by physicians.130 “As such,” he suggests, “the
bill was designed by its framers to place the addict completely in the hands of
the medical profession.”131
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In
In the decades that followed passage of the Harrison Act, the moral
meanings that attached to the use of narcotics in the United States underwent a
dramatic shift. As Duster points out, “there is nothing intrinsically moral or
immoral about injecting an opiate into the human body.”132 Conduct takes on a
particular moral character only in the context of a larger set of social practices
that makes that conduct comprehensible to members of the community.133 The
process of “common-sense theorizing” about morality involves looking at the
context within which an act is given social meaning to make sense of it as
“moral” (heroin use in 1900) or “immoral” (heroin use today).134
The set of explanations for the shift in the social conception of drug misuse
is complex. Bakalar and Grinspoon call our attention to the important role that
labeling drug addiction as a medical problem had in facilitating this change in
moral meaning.135 This is a surprising conclusion, given the tendency in much
drug policy literature to view criminal enforcement and medical approaches as
mutually exclusive perspectives,136 but it fits the historical data and provides a

129. See, e.g., NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27 (describing the Harrison
Act as “the most important legislative directive in the history of American legal efforts to control
narcotics”).
130. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 14–15.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id. at 80.
133. See id. at 85.
134. Id. at 80.
135. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 38.
136. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. OF THE AM. BAR ASS’N & THE AM. MED. ASS’N, DRUG
ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE? vii–viii (1963) [hereinafter DRUG ADDICTION] (“On the question
of how to deal with drug addiction there are two opposing schools of thought. The Federal Bureau

2010]

DRUG POLICY IN CONTEXT

279

valuable window into the complicated way that moral disapproval of narcotics
use intensified over time and came to drive public policy in this area.137 By
contrast, Duster particularly stresses a change in the class distribution of drug
use from a largely middle class profile to one centered on the poor.138 He also
points out the intensifying association between narcotics use and criminality,
which he attributes to the federal government’s interpretation of the Harrison Act
as essentially prohibitory legislation.139
The key language in the Harrison Act was a provision that permitted doctors
to prescribe narcotics as part of their legitimate professional practice.140 The
precise wording of the statute left a fair amount of room for interpretation,141 and
enforcement officials in the Treasury Department lost no time in staking out the
position that the administration of drugs by a physician to an addict in order to

of Narcotics and its supporters regard addiction to narcotic drugs as an activity that is properly
subject to police control. . . . Critics of this view regard addiction as a disease, or something akin to
it, for which punishment is inappropriate.”); NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 20
(“Not only did the legal world not adopt the medical world’s shift to psychological explanations for
addiction, it largely ignored the disease concept of addiction altogether . . . .”); MARIE NYSWANDER,
THE DRUG ADDICT AS PATIENT 1 (1965).
137. In Bakalar and Grinspoon’s formulation, the framing of a problem as a health matter
clears the way for the operation of medical expertise. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39,
at 26. Once the problem is given a medical definition, they suggest, the application of seemingly
objective medical expertise can serve the political function of bringing into play both the vocabulary
and the tools of a public health approach that legitimates the exercise of state control over the
identified subjects. See id. As Lawrence Gostin has pointed out, “the subject of public health is the
health of populations—rather than the health of individuals . . . . Consequently, public health is less
interested in clinical interactions between health-care professionals and patients, and more
interested in devising broad strategies to prevent, or ameliorate, injury and disease.” Lawrence O.
Gostin, Public Health, Ethics, and Human Rights: A Tribute to the Late Jonathan Mann, 29 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 121, 122 (2001). Increasingly, public health scholars have come to recognize that
denoting an issue as a problem of public health opens the way for the use of government authority
because “individuals acting in their own self-interest, even if fully informed and rational, will not
effectively address the problem because they do not internalize some of the major costs or benefits
of action or non-action . . . .” Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP.
BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S204 (2003). Such government authority may take the form of coercive
state measure, including criminal sanctions and isolation. See id. at S203; Richard A. Epstein, Let
the Shoemaker Stick to His Last: A Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. S138, S154 (2003).
138. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 10–11.
139. See id. at 16–17.
140. The relevant language provided: “Nothing contained in this section shall apply . . . [t]o
the dispensing or distribution of any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or
veterinary surgeon registered under this Act in the course of his professional practice only . . . .”
Harrison Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785, 786 (repealed 1970).
141. See MUSTO, The AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 124–25. Musto suggests two
reasons why Congress may have adopted this somewhat vague language. First, was a concern that
the regulation of medical practice was within the states’ reserved police powers and therefore not
within the regulatory authority of the federal government. See id. at 125. Second, he suggests that
the vagueness was required in order to garner the necessary support of medical professionals for the
legislation. See id.
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prevent the suffering of physical withdrawal was not the good-faith practice of
medicine.142 Soon, scores of doctors (and some pharmacists) who had
understood the Act to permit such treatment found themselves targeted by the
federal government in criminal enforcement actions.143 In 1915, the question
found its way to the United States Supreme Court. In United States v. Jin Fuey
Moy,144 the Court held that the Treasury Department could not obtain the
conviction of a physician under the Harrison Act merely for prescribing
narcotics to an addict.145 The Court reasoned that the scope of the Act depended
upon the constitutional power under which it had been enacted, and that the
taxing power, which was the basis of the legislation, was not a sufficient
foundation for imposing limits on the exercise of professional judgment by
doctors with respect to the care of their physically dependent patients.146
Even given this adverse decision, federal officials pressed ahead with
enforcement efforts against doctors under the claimed authority of the Harrison
Act.147 In 1919, the Supreme Court revisited the issue in a set of two companion
cases.148 In the first, United States v. Doremus,149 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a contested portion of the Harrison Act in connection with
the prosecution of a physician who had been charged with selling heroin to a
patient in order to maintain the patient’s addiction.150 In his opinion for a
majority of the Court, Justice Day concluded that the statute had a “reasonable
relation” to the taxing power, and that it would not be proper for the Court to
find the statute unconstitutional simply because “its effect may be to accomplish
another purpose as well as the raising of revenue.”151 In the second of the two
cases, Webb v. United States,152 the Court held that the legitimate practice of
medicine did not include the provision of maintenance doses of narcotics to
addicts.153

142. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 19 (citing
DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 81, at 230); EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE
PRICE OF DENIAL 69 (1996).
143. See Rufus G. King, The Narcotics Bureau and the Harrison Act: Jailing the Healers and
the Sick, 62 YALE L.J. 736, 737–48 (1953) (discussing “the furious blitzkrieg” involved with
enforcing the Harrison Act and the judiciary’s contribution to the campaign).
144. 241 U.S. 394 (1916). The Supreme Court in Jin Fuey Moy affirmed the lower court’s
decision to quash an indictment against the defendant. See id. at 399, 402.
145. See id. at 402.
146. See id. at 401–02.
147. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 19.
148. See id.
149. 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
150. See id. at 89–90, 95.
151. See id. at 93–94 (citing Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 541 (1869)).
152. 249 U.S. 96 (1919).
153. See id. at 99–100.
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In Webb, the lower appellate court had set forth three questions for the
Supreme Court.154 The first two questions were resolved in the majority’s
opinion in Doremus.155 The third question in Webb was as follows:
If a practicing and registered physician issues an order for morphine to
an habitual user thereof, the order not being issued by him in the course
of professional treatment in the attempted cure of the habit, but being
issued for the purpose of providing the user with morphine sufficient to
keep him comfortable by maintaining his customary use, is such order a
physician’s prescription under exception (b) of § 2 [of the Act]?156
It took Justice Day exactly two sentences to answer the question.157 He
provided no reasoning as such, concluding that “no discussion of the subject is
required” because it “would be so plain a perversion of meaning” to call the
doctor’s order in this case a “physician’s prescription” within the meaning of the
statute.158
The decision to define the legitimate practice of medicine either to include
or exclude maintenance therapy for narcotics addiction is as much a political
judgment as it is a medical one, as much a moral assessment as it is a technical
one.159 That the Court was able to dispose so summarily of the idea that a
physician’s provision of narcotics to an addict could be legitimate medical
treatment—an idea seemingly (if only tacitly) endorsed by the Court in Jin Fuey
Moy just a few years earlier—suggests that important shifts had occurred in the
intervening years in the broader societal understanding of drugs and addiction.
To gain some understanding of the changed social and political context between
1914 and 1919 that supported the shift in policy from Jin Fuey Moy to Doremus
and Webb, some histories have highlighted the impact of the First World War,
the fear of political instability following the Russian Revolution, and the rise of
nativism and nationalism in this period to suggest that the Court’s impatience
with the physicians in Doremus and Webb was simply a manifestation of the
growing authoritarianism and xenophobia of the era.160

154. Id. at 99.
155. See Doremus, 249 U.S. at 94–95; Webb, 249 U.S. at 99.
156. 249 U.S. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. at 99–100.
158. Id.
159. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 14–15.
160. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 19–20
(citing MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 132, 134); MUSTO, THE AMERICAN
DISEASE, supra note 56, at 132–34. Nolan quotes Wayne Morgan for a somewhat different view,
which is that the passage of the Harrison Act in 1914 “represented a popular consensus against drug
addiction and the drug experience that had been building since the 1870s. . . . It represented general
public fear of disorder and inefficiency, and the belief that society could purify individual conduct
in the name of a common good.” NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27–28 (quoting
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The range of moral judgments lurking behind the Webb Court’s summary
conclusion that the physician there was not engaged in the good-faith practice of
medicine might have included an unexamined antipathy toward conduct
(narcotics use) that increasingly was associated with ethnic and racial outsiders.
It might also have reflected an authoritarian impulse to deal harshly with those
(users of narcotics and the professionals who facilitated their continued
dependence) who were seen as flouting mainstream values. In addition, the
apparently too-obvious-for-discussion holding in Webb might have rested in part
on the same sort of Calvinist/Puritanical impulses that had played an important
role in the temperance movement and the then-recently adopted constitutional
prohibition on alcohol.161 These moral impulses—including harsh judgments
about idleness, excessive pleasure seeking, ecstatic experience, the defiling of
the human body, and the like—may also have been at work in the shifting moral
understandings reflected in the opinion of the Supreme Court majority.162
Whatever moral calculus underpinned the Supreme Court’s resolution of the
question presented in Webb regarding the unlawfulness of medically managing
addiction through individual physician prescription, the Court’s short conclusory
opinion marked an important turning point in both the positive law and in broad
lay understandings of narcotics use and addiction in the United States.163 In
1922, the Court reinforced its position by upholding a Treasury rule that
explicitly made it illegal for doctors to prescribe narcotics to treat the “disease”
of addiction.164 Even the Supreme Court’s seemingly inconsistent 1925 holding
in Linder v. United States165 failed to derail the development of a national drug
control policy that was virtually entirely directed toward prohibition and criminal

MORGAN, supra note 27, at 107) (internal quotation marks omitted). Presumably, in this
interpretation, the Supreme Court’s Jin Fuey Moy decision represents a temporary misreading by
the justices of this developing public consensus, which they corrected in fairly short order in the
Doremus and Webb decisions.
161. See generally GUSFIELD, supra note 120, at 33 (“While Temperance, as a movement,
appears much later than Puritanism or the other ascetic sects, its ethical foundations are deep in this
stream of Protestant thought and its resonance in the economic institutions of nineteenth-century
America is profound.”); id. at 123 (“In legitimating the character and style of the old middle class,
Prohibition stood as a symbol of the general system of ascetic behavior with which the Protestant
middle classes had been identified.”).
162. Cf. BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 72–73 (discussing formal and informal
institutions and the role they play in society’s views of drug use); DUSTER, supra note 1, at 90
(discussing the role of Protestant views in affecting secular society).
163. See generally MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 132 (“What had been
a respectable viewpoint by 1915, although not the dominant attitude of the public—the value of
addict maintenance by physicians or others—by 1919 and 1920 had come to seem a great danger
and folly. . . . Vigorous protests from a few physicians, congressmen, politicians, and laymen were
completely ineffective in modifying legal opposition to supplying drugs for the pleasure or comfort
of addicts.”).
164. See United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 287–289 (1922).
165. 268 U.S. 5, 22 (1925).
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enforcement measures.166 Some writers have suggested that the Linder Court’s
decision, that a physician “who acts bona fide and according to fair medical
standards” might lawfully “give an addict moderate amounts of drugs for selfadministration in order to relieve conditions incident to addiction,”167 did not
result in greater involvement by doctors in the care and treatment of addicts
because the Treasury Department’s continued threats of criminal prosecution
simply imposed too great a cost for risk adverse physicians.168 More to the
point, the failure of the Linder decision to moderate either the enforcement
policies of the federal government or the professional practice decisions of
doctors suggests just how fixed the political and moral stance of the country had
become regarding narcotics and drug addiction.169
The operation of positive legal restrictions, the political economy of medical
practice and drug distribution, and broadly shared normative understandings
about narcotics and addiction probably evolved in the United States throughout
this period according to a kind of mutually reinforcing process in which
developments in each realm effected the dynamics of change in the others.170
While changes in the legal rules and shifting public sentiments throughout this
period are important components of the story, the concrete practices by which
users obtained narcotics are also a critical element in the account of how addicts
were transferred from one moral category in the late nineteenth century to a very
different one by 1930.171
The literal language of the Harrison Act could not have accomplished this
transformative work absent the restrictive interpretation placed upon it by
officials in the Treasury Department and ultimately by the Supreme Court.172
That restrictive interpretation, in turn, may well have been driven in part by the
unintended but nevertheless distortive pressure that the new law’s registration
and prescription requirements exerted on the nature of physicians’ practices. As
Duster explains:

166. KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 21 (quoting
BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 142, at 75).
167. Linder, 268 U.S. at 22.
168. See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 184–185.
169. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 21. As
Diane Hoffmann has put it, “Addiction continued to be viewed as a ‘vice’ rather than as a treatable
disease and certain drugs were ‘stripped of their healing properties.’” Hoffmann, supra note 107, at
262 (quoting Aryeh Y. Brown, Comment, Obscured by Smoke: Medicinal Marijuana and the Need
for Representation Reinforcement Review, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 212 (1998)).
170. See generally BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 30 (discussing how “social
attitudes and legal regulations” reinforce each other “at weak points to supply reasons for stricter
controls”). Duster suggests that “[l]ogically and substantively it makes no sense to ask the question
‘Which comes first, law or morality?’ It is the nature of the relationship between them that can and
should be the subject of inquiry.” DUSTER, supra note 1, at 102.
171. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 15–17.
172. See id. at 16.
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[W]hen the physician became the only legal source of the drug supply,
hundreds of thousands of law-abiding addicts suddenly materialized
outside of doctors’ offices. It was inconceivable that the relatively small
number of doctors in the country could so suddenly handle over half a
million new patients in any manner, and certainly it was impossible that
they might handle them individually. The doctor’s office became little
more than a dispensing station for the addict, with only an infinitesimal
fraction of addicts receiving personal care.173
Understood in this fashion, it is possible that the federal government’s policy
of criminal enforcement against doctors and pharmacists was really directed
toward those actors who were in effect operating prescription mills, and the facts
of some of the most celebrated cases seem to support that interpretation.174
Under this account, Linder can be read not as a divergent data point in the legal
doctrinal landscape, but as an instance in which the Court sought to protect the
discretion of a physician who in good faith had provided individualized care to a
particular patient suffering from drug addiction.175 The problem with this
reading, of course, is that both the rules promulgated by Treasury and the
enforcement practices it undertook painted with a far broader brush, opposing all
forms of medical maintenance of addicts by physicians.176 In addition, as noted
above, the Linder decision neither carved out a safe harbor for careful physicians
nor preserved the possibility that narcotics users might receive individualized
care from any doctor in private practice.177

173. Id. at 15.
174. The certified facts on appeal in Webb, for example, included the following:
It was Webb’s regular custom and practice to prescribe morphine for habitual users upon
their application to him therefor. He furnished these “prescriptions,” not after
consideration of the applicant’s individual case, and in such quantities and with such
direction as, in his judgment, would tend to cure the habit or as might be necessary or
helpful in an attempt to break the habit, but without such consideration and rather in such
quantities as the applicant desired for the sake of continuing his accustomed use.
Webb v. United States, 249 U.S. 96, 97–98 (1919).
175. See Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5, 22 (1925).
176. See King, supra note 143, at 737–39 (“[T]he Narcotics Division succeeded in creating a
very large criminal class for itself to police ([i.e.,] the whole doctor-patient-addict-peddler
community), instead of the very small one that Congress had intended (the smuggler and the
peddler).”).
177. See Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 262 (quoting MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra
note 56, at 185; JAMES C. WEISSMAN, DRUG ABUSE: THE LAW AND TREATMENT ALTERNATIVES
118 (1978); Brown, supra note 169, at 212). An additional example of the inability of therapeutic
impulses to persist within the broader context of this punitive drug policy played out in the years
between 1915 and 1923, when a number of states and localities set up clinics to provide transitional
care to addicts who no longer had access to narcotics by way of private physician prescription. See
NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 31. “The ostensible purpose of the clinics was to
maintain addicts until they could get into some form of institutional treatment and/or to help cure
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The development of federal “narcotics farms” in the late 1920s was yet
another example of the way in which efforts designed nominally as therapeutic
measures had the practical effect of extending and intensifying the coercive
character of U.S. drug policy.178 Concerned about the growing population of
federal prisoners incarcerated for Harrison Act violations, Representative
Stephen Porter introduced legislation in the House of Representatives that was
designed to create facilities to hold and “treat” addicts.179 The bill was passed,
and it resulted in the establishment of one farm in Lexington, Kentucky, and
another in Fort Worth, Texas.180 The farms were administered by officials within
the new Bureau of Narcotics, which was located within the Treasury
Department, thus ensuring that a criminal justice perspective would inform
practice in these facilities.181 Addicts who were ordered to the farms “were
essentially treated like offenders in any other prison,” and in the end the farms
“amounted to little more than ‘additional prison space for convicted addicts.’”182
C. The Anslinger Years and the War on Drugs
The appointment in 1930 of Harry J. Anslinger as the first commissioner of
the new Bureau of Narcotics not only served to reinforce the federal
government’s unitary reliance on law enforcement and prohibition as the core
elements of its national drug policy, it also provided an identifiable spokesperson
for the increasingly embedded view that drug use was inherently wrongful and
that addicts were essentially evil.183 Anslinger would continue to hold this
position until the early 1960s, and during his decades of service both the nation’s
attitudes and its formal policies grew ever harsher and more punitive.184
In the post-World War II period, the incidence of illegal narcotics use in the
United States increased substantially.185 Congress responded in 1951 with
passage of the Narcotics Drugs Import and Export Act,186 which for the first time

them of their addictions.” Id. The federal government threatened criminal prosecution against
those operating the clinics, and they disappeared by 1925. See id.
178. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 32. See generally MUSTO, THE
AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 204–06 (discussing the creation of federal narcotics farms).
179. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 21.
180. See id. (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 221–237 (1934) (repealed 1944)).
181. See NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 32.
182. Id. (quoting MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 206).
183. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 21–22;
NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 32–33.
184. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 21–24;
NOLAN, REINVENTING JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 32–33.
185. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 23 (citing
H.J. Anslinger, The Federal Narcotic Laws, 6 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 743, 743–48 (1951)).
186. Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (codified
at 21 U.S.C. § 174 (Supp. 1952)), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
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introduced severe mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug
offenses.187 In 1956, following highly publicized hearings that had been
choreographed by Anslinger and his agents in the Bureau of Narcotics,188
Congress passed yet another provision increasing prison sentences and fines for
drug offenses.189 The legislative record was highly critical of calls by the
American Bar Association and the American Medical Association to increase the
resources devoted to drug treatment,190 and instead the Narcotics Control Act of
1956191 not only ramped up enforcement efforts, it also included a provision
permitting the imposition of the death penalty for the sale of heroin to minors.192
In 1965, Congress passed the Drug Abuse Control Amendments Act,193 which
set up the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control within the Food and Drug
Administration, and in 1968 the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control and the Bureau
of Narcotics were combined into a new agency, the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, which was located in the Department of Justice.194
As the federal drug control bureaucracy was consolidated and moved from
Treasury and the FDA to the Department of Justice, drug use in the United States
was becoming more salient in the public’s consciousness and becoming more
closely associated with broader challenges to established authority.195 These
trends drove President Richard Nixon to take a particular interest in the problem
of drug use, which he famously declared to be “public enemy number one.”196
As part of his anti-drug efforts, Nixon created the National Commission on
Marijuana and Drug Abuse,197 and in 1970 Congress passed the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,198 which entirely replaced the Harrison
Act as the basis for federal drug control policy.199 At about this time, President

187. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 23 (citing
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, Pub. L. No. 82-255, 65 Stat. 767 (1951) (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 174 (Supp. 1952)) (repealed 1970).
188. See id. at 24 (citing RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP: AMERICA’S FIFTY YEAR FOLLY
119–124 (1972)).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Narcotics Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84–728, 70 Stat. 570 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§§ 174–198a (Supp. 1957)), repealed by Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2006).
192. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 24.
193. Drug Abuse Control Amendment of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
194. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 25.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 26 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nixon has been described in one history as
“a puritan . . . [who] detested the hedonism and easy gratification of many young people.”
DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 81, at 421.
197. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 26.
198. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971
(2006).
199. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 26.
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Nixon also declared a “War on Drugs,” which the federal government has
persisted in waging, with varying degrees of intensity, ever since.200
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act was, and is,
wider in scope than the Harrison Act in that it regulates a great variety of
substances in addition to narcotics (i.e., amphetamines, barbiturates, and
anabolic steroids).201 The Act is organized so that controlled substances receive
a classification within one of five schedules.202 The schedules are based on a
given drug’s medical uses and its potential for misuse and for creating
dependency.203 As with the Harrison Act, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act requires practitioners to register with the federal
government and contains extensive record keeping requirements.204 The Act and
its attendant regulations are administered and enforced by the Drug Enforcement
Administration, created by Congress in 1973, which is located within the
Department of Justice.205
Drug policy at the federal level became somewhat more pragmatic—and the
aggressive rhetoric of the Nixon years somewhat softened—during the Ford and
Carter administrations.206 But, with the election of Ronald Reagan, a return to a
heightened level of rhetoric and a redoubling of criminal enforcement efforts
against drug sellers and users signaled a return to a full-scale “War on Drugs.”207
During the 1980s, Congress actively participated in ramping up this
enforcement-based drug policy by passing three key statutes. The first, the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,208 added new drugs to the list of
scheduled (or prohibited) substances and also conferred new powers on federal
prosecutors to seize property associated with drug offenses.209 The second, the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986210—which was passed on the strength of
widespread concern about crack cocaine and the highly publicized death of
basketball star Len Bias due to cocaine misuse—contained harsh new penalties,
including a number of new mandatory minimum sentences.211 The third statute
in the trilogy was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.212 This Act increased

200. See id.; Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 263.
201. Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 263–64.
202. Id. at 264.
203. See id.
204. See 21 U.S.C. § 823(b) (2006).
205. See Hoffmann, supra note 107, at 264.
206. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 26 (citing
MUSTO, supra note 56, at 257). Serious consideration of marijuana decriminalization was even
undertaken in this period. See id.; Richard J. Bonnie, The Virtues of Pragmatism in Drug Policy, 13
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 7, 8 (2010).
207. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 27.
208. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
209. See id.
210. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1987).
211. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 27.
212. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
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criminal penalties still further, and created the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP)213 and a position within this agency that has come to be known
as the “Drug Czar.”214
The efforts of the federal government since the declaration of the “War on
Drugs” have been heavily focused on criminal enforcement strategies, as have
efforts of the states who have acted in concert with the federal government.215
One measure of this intensive criminal enforcement focus has been the rapid
growth in the number of persons brought under criminal justice system
supervision as a consequence of drug offense prosecution.216 From the 1920s
through the early 1970s, the per capita rate of persons incarcerated for all crimes
in the United States had held steady at just over 100 per 100,000 residents.217 By
the end of the 1990s, however, that rate had grown to 476 persons per 100,000
residents.218 In 2003, more than two million people in the United States were
behind bars,219 and 1 of every 32 adults was under the supervision of the
criminal corrections system.220 In total, there were roughly 1.4 million people in
federal and state prisons.221
The central role played by the “War on Drugs” in this dramatic increase has
been well documented.222 In the last two decades of the twentieth century, while
the total number of arrests in the United States increased by 45%,223 arrests for
possession of a controlled substance or for possession for sale or sale increased

213. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 27.
214. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 280.
215. See generally KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at
27–28 (discussing “[d]rug-related enforcement activity” and the legacy of state and federal drug
laws).
216. See id. at 28.
217. JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URB. INST., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND
CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 4 (2001) (citing Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck,
Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–86, 26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 17 (1999)).
218. Id. In 1999, the per capita rate of imprisonment for African Americans and Latinos was
dramatically higher than that for the population taken as a whole. In fact, the Bureau of Justice’s
statistics for that year showed that 1 out of every 29 African-American men was sentenced to at
least a year of jail or prison, while 1 out of 75 Latino men was serving at least a year. By contrast,
the rate of imprisonment (for a year or more) for white males was 1 in 240. See id.
219. KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 35.
220. Id. (citing Lauren E. Glaze & Seri Palla, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Probation and Parole in
the United States, 2003, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2004, at 1, 1, available at http://bjs.
ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus03.pdf).
221. See id. Steven Belenko reports that the number of male inmates in the U.S. increased
229% from 1980 to 1996, while the number of female inmates increased over the same time period
by 439%. STEVEN BELENKO, NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, BEHIND BARS:
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA’S PRISON POPULATION 5 (1998), http://www.casacolumbia.org/
articlefiles/379-Behind%20Bars.pdf.
222. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (1996) (discussing the
sentencing system in the United States).
223. See BELENKO, supra note 221, at 55.
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by nearly 160%.224 According to the FBI, approximately 1.7 million people
were arrested for drug offenses in the United States in 2003, and 81% of those
arrests were for possession of a controlled substance.225 More persons were
arrested for drug-related offenses than for any other crime category.226
As with arrests, “the lion’s share of the growth in the U.S. inmate
population” is attributable to the enhanced enforcement of the drug laws.227
From 1980 to the mid-1990s the percentage of state prisoners who were “drug
law violators” increased from 6% to nearly 25%.228 In federal prisons during
roughly the same period, the rate of drug offenders increased from 25% to 60%
of the overall inmate population.229 These numbers reflect the more aggressive
policing practices and prosecutorial priorities associated with the “War on
Drugs,”230 but they also were a function of the adoption of new sentencing
policies at both the state and federal level that targeted drug offenses with
mandatory minimum sentences and other increased penalties.231 Indeed, the
amount of time that offenders served prior to their release increased dramatically
during the 1990s,232 notwithstanding a general decline in the percentage of
offenders serving sentences for violent offenses.233 In the aggregate, the amount
of time served prior to release increased 27% from 1990 to 1998.234 In addition,
the percentage of released offenders who had been in prison for five or more

224. See id. Given the dramatically higher rate of increase for drug arrests than for arrests
overall, it should come as little surprise that drug offenders also “represent the largest source of jail
population growth” in recent years. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Half of Local Jail
Inmates Were on Probation, Parole, or Pre-Trial Release at Arrest (July 18, 2004), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/pji02pr.cfm; see also Doris J. James, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Profile of Jail Inmates, 2002, BUREAU JUST. STAT. SPEC. REP., July 2004, at 1, 1, available
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf.
225. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2003, at 268, 269 tbl.4.1 (2003).
226. Id. at 268, 270 tbl.29.
227. Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing Offenders,
47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 993 (2002).
228. See id. at 993 n.18 (citing BELENKO, supra note 221, at 6–7).
229. See id. (citing BELENKO, supra note 221, at 6–7).
230. See KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 28.
231. See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MANDATORY MINIMUM DRUG SENTENCES:
THROWING AWAY THE KEY OR THE TAXPAYERS MONEY? (1997), available at http://www.
rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2006/MR827.pdf.
232. See Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980–1996,
26 CRIME & JUST. 17, 36 (1999).
233. See id. at 17.
234. TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 217, at 11 (citing Allen J. Beck, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Prisoners in 1999, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BULL., Aug. 2000, at 1, 12, available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf). In part, this trend is due to the shift toward determinate
sentencing and the abandonment of parole releases in some jurisdictions. See id. at 4.
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years nearly doubled over the same period, while the percentage of those serving
sentences of one year or less fell by half.235
The focus on prohibition and criminal enforcement in the United States has
also resulted in a public policy environment that has been extremely resistant to
other measures that have been effective elsewhere in reducing the harms
associated with drug misuse. For example, although data consistently has shown
that sterile syringe or needle exchange programs reduce the risk of blood-borne
diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C among injection drug users,236 and even
though these programs are now in operation in a majority of U.S. states, many
jurisdictions have continued to treat both the possession of syringes and the
distribution of sterile syringes as criminal offenses.237 In addition, in a number
of places, the continued operation of sterile exchange programs depends on the

235. See id. (citing James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Prisoner Reentry in Perspective, in 3
URB. INST., CRIME POLICY REPORT 6–8 (2001)). “These longer terms translate into further
detachment from the communities to which [the ex-offenders] will return.” Id. As the number of
prison admissions increased in a nearly linear fashion during this period, so too did prison releases.
See id. at 10, figs.3 & 4 (citing Lynch & Sabol, supra). This rapidly expanding class of exoffenders with drug convictions has faced a range of barriers to reentry into the community. See id.
at 1. These barriers constitute yet another dimension of drug control policy in the United States.
Some of these barriers have been explicit features of the legal regime that was put in place to fight
the “war on drugs,” while others have been an unofficial (but not necessarily unintended)
consequence of the government’s criminal enforcement strategy. A number of states impose
criminal history restrictions on particular occupations, and at least a half-dozen permanently
exclude drug offenders from public employment. Id. at 31. Beyond employment, federal guidelines
governing public housing permit public housing authorities and other federally assisted housing
providers to exclude many ex-offenders convicted of drug-related offenses. See Housing Laws
Affecting Individuals with Criminal Convictions, LEGAL ACTION CTR., 1–2, http://www.lac.org/
doc_library/lac/publications/housing_laws.pdf. With respect to welfare benefits, federal law
provides that individuals convicted of a drug felony shall be banned permanently from receiving
food stamps or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). See 21 U.S.C. § 862a (2006 &
Supp. 2010). The federal law does permit individual states to modify this position, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 862a(d) (2006), and a number have opted to waive or modify the federal ban. See After Prison:
Roadblocks to Reentry, LEGAL ACTION CTR., http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/main.php?
view=law&subaction=5. Most of these states require persons with drug convictions who are
recipients of TANF or food stamps to meet specific requirements. See id. (“[Thirty-three] states
have limited the ban in some way to enable those with drug felony convictions to get public
assistance if they [meet] certain conditions, such as participating in alcohol or drug treatment,
meeting the waiting period, having a “possession only” conviction, or satisfying other conditions.”).
Finally, laws in place in many states either prohibit or limit the ability of persons with drug
convictions from becoming adoptive or foster parents. See After Prison: Roadblocks to Reentry,
L EGAL A CTION C TR ., at http://www.lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/main.php?view=law&
subaction=1.
236. See Reducing Harm: Treatment and Beyond—Sterile Syringe Access (Needle Exchange),
DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/reducingharm/needleexchan/ (last updated May
22, 2006).
237. See id.
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willingness of local government officials to grant emergency certifications,
which must be renewed frequently.238
Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that the insistent focus of U.S. drug
policy on criminal enforcement and these allied measures that together constitute
a punitive approach may be easing.239 In the past several years, there have been
efforts to devise more effective systems to divert some offenders from prison, to
soften somewhat the collateral consequences of the criminal enforcement
approach, and to strengthen treatment and other harm-reduction strategies.240
These moves toward a more pragmatic approach may or may not accelerate and
they may or may not succeed, but even if they are implemented in some
substantial way, the system will remain fundamentally punitive for the
foreseeable future, and its target—drug users—will remain subject to intense
moral condemnation.
II. DRUG PROHIBITION AND THE SOCIAL NEGOTIATION OF NORMS
The preceding Part sketches the story of the development of drug policy in
the United States from the middle of the nineteenth century to the declaration of
the “War on Drugs” in the 1970s to the present. One theme that emerges in this
story is the steady intensification (and evolution in the nature) of moral
disapprobation directed toward narcotics use by the public generally and
reflected in the positive law.241 A second theme is the government’s increased
reliance throughout this period on legal prohibition and, more particularly, on the
use of the criminal enforcement system as the central tool in the nation’s drug
control policy. With this social, political, and legal history in mind, it is useful
to consider how prohibition and criminal enforcement might be supported on
either consequentialist or deontological grounds.242

238. A federal ban prohibiting states from spending their share of HIV/AIDS prevention
funding on syringe exchange programs that had been in place for nearly twenty years was recently
lifted by Congress. See Editorial, Righting a Wrong, Much Too Late, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2009, at
A22.
239. See infra Part IV.A.
240. See infra text accompanying notes 574–623.
241. There is a kind of circularity in this. As public disapproval increases, the political
incentives for legislators to pass harsher laws do as well. See DUSTER supra note 1, at 96–98.
Promulgation and enforcement of increasingly harsh measures, in turn, seem to stimulate more
public disapproval. See id. at 97–98.
242. The grounds upon which theorists justify the imposition of criminal punishment are
generally classified as either consequentialist or nonconsequentialist, or as a mixture of the two.
See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1–27 (1968); THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
PHILOSOPHY 162–65, 200–01 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005). Mainstream liberal theory regards
state-sponsored punishment to be “morally problematic” and in need of normative justification
because, by definition, hard treatment in the form of death, incarceration, probation, or fines limits
the sanctioned individual’s freedom and autonomy; these values are understood as central to liberal
theory. See R.A. Duff & D. Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A READER ON
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PUNISHMENT 1, 3 (Anthony Duff & David Garland eds., paperback reprt. 1998); Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1336, 1337–45 (Sanford H. Kadish ed.,
1983).
Consequentialist theories seek to justify punishment on the basis of good future results. See
Duff & Garland, supra, at 6. From this perspective, a decision to punish is morally grounded only if
its positive future effects outweigh the negative consequences associated with it—including the
incursions on individual autonomy inherent in punishment—and only if no available alternative
would achieve as much good at a lower cost. See id. at 6–7. This calculation of costs and benefits
can be figured in classical utilitarian terms as “the greatest happiness of the greatest number,” or it
can be determined according to some other good that is deemed to be central to civil society, such
as liberty, autonomy, or the welfare of the community. Id. at 6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consequentialist theories of punishment are inherently instrumental. See id. at 8. The positive
effect that punishment is meant to achieve is, in this sense, independent of the punishment itself,
and the relationship between the punitive practice and its consequences is therefore contingent. See
id. For this reason, consequentialist justifications of punishment turn on an evaluation of empirical
information about potential future costs and benefits. See id. at 6–7.
Nonconsequentialist accounts of criminal enforcement reject the notion that criminal
punishment is justified by virtue of some contingent relationship to future effects. See id. at 7.
Instead, these theories, sometimes framed in terms of retribution, seek to justify penal practice on
the basis of the wrongdoer’s past conduct, and argue that punishment is an intrinsically appropriate
response to wrongful behavior. See id. at 7–8; Greenawalt, supra, at 1338. Some commentators
categorize retributive theory as “deontological.” See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, What is and is Not
Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 811, 820 (2002) (“Retribution as an end of
punishment is emphasized in deontological and aretaic theories of punishment.”). Joshua Dressler
defines this term to mean literally the “science of duty,” Joshua Dressler, Justifications and
Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1156 n.5
(1987) (internal quotation marks omitted), and explains that “deontological moral theory holds that
certain conduct is morally obligatory whether or not it results in a beneficial consequence.” Id.
Most retributivists ground the justification of punishment on the concept of desert, the notion that
the imposition of suffering is morally justified to the extent that it redresses in some fashion the
wrongdoer’s past wrongful actions. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Cruel and Unusual
Punishments, in RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY 223, 229 (1979) (“[T]he criminal, having
engaged in wrongful conduct in the past, deserves his punishment. It would be unjust for him not to
receive it.”). They assert that punishment must be figured on the basis of past conduct and must be
proportionate to the wrongfulness of that conduct. See id. There are two central problems for
nonconsequentialist accounts. The first is that, absent the conceded authority of some generally
accepted deity or some other source of natural law, it is difficult to ground deontological notions of
right and wrong. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 23. The second problem—even if
an “accredited” source of authority can be identified—is that it is difficult to explain the intrinsic
normative link between past wrongful conduct and subsequent punishment. See Duff & Garland,
supra, at 7. Why is it that wrongdoers deserve to be punished? Why does hard treatment redress
past wrongs?
Joel Feinberg has argued that punishment is an appropriate response to crime because it
embodies a “kind of vindictive resentment” and is a “symbolic way of getting back at the criminal.”
JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 95, 100 (paperback ed. 1974). Other retributive theorists have
rejected this point of view, suggesting that “denunciatory theories of punishment” are essentially
utilitarian, and are not deontological in nature. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution,
in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179,
181 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987). Still other writers have sought to ground retributive
punishment not in theory, but on the basis of intuitions that are said to be generally shared in
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A. The Consequentialist Basis for Drug Prohibition
Attempting a consequentialist evaluation of drug prohibition by way of a
utilitarian cost-benefit assessment is a complex task, precisely because of the
subjectivity involved in assigning value to each of the variables to be weighed.243
The process can be simplified somewhat once we recognize that, in practice, few
are willing to argue that there is legitimate value to the use of pleasure drugs.244
Assuming no utility to nonmedical use, then, the calculation boils down to an
assessment of the harms associated with drug use, the potential reduction in
those harms produced by legal prohibitions on the sale and possession of illegal
drugs, and the competing harms occasioned by the effort to enforce those
prohibitions.245
There is a growing literature reporting on the efforts of social scientists to
assess the various components of harm associated with drug use, drug
prohibition, and other drug control policies. Important and interesting questions
about how to measure the harm and the reduction of harm worked by various
public policies have been raised by scholars, including the question of whether
“micro harm reduction” (measured in terms of the amount of harm produced by
each instance of drug use or by each individual user subject to the jurisdiction of
a drug control regime) or “macro harm reduction” (measured in terms of the
overall amount of harm produced by all drug use within a drug control regime)
should be the primary metric for determining the future direction for drug
policy.246 Alongside this work, other writers have entertained a broader inquiry
into the consequentialist foundations of drug control policy by offering useful
analogies to activities other than drug use that also create significant risks of
serious harm to participants.247 The point of these analogies (to dangerous sports
and hobbies, to the use of unreasonably dangerous products, and to other
unhealthy lifestyle choices) is to suggest that the policy of legally prohibiting the

society. See Jean Hampton, The Retributive Ideal, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON,
FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 114 (1988). Advocates of this position concede that there may be
no independent source for determining right and wrong outside of social practice, and also concede
that there is no answer to the question of “why suffering is suitable for wrongdoers.” Id. at 113.
Instead, they rely on what some term “bedrock intuition” to determine desert and to assess the
legitimacy of punishment. See id.
243. See Steven Wisotsky, Commentary, Drug Facts Don’t Matter: A Brief Comment on Drug
Prohibition: An Unnatural Disaster, 27 CONN. L. REV. 639, 642 (1995).
244. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 16. It is worth noting, however, that
researchers at John Hopkins Medical School have begun taking a new look at hallucinogens as a
treatment for depression. See John Tierney, Hallucinogens Have Scientists Tuning In Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2010, at A1.
245. On the framing of harm calculations in the development of public policy, see Bernard E.
Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109 (1999).
246. See Robert J. MacCoun, Toward a Psychology of Harm Reduction, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 1199, 1201 tbl.1, 1202 (1998).
247. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 14–19.
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sale or possession of narcotics for non-medical use is categorically different
from the approach taken in the United States with respect to other significant
sources of danger to the public.248 Detailed questions about the precise degree of
harm posed by various illegal drugs and by their prohibition are of critical
importance, but gaining some understanding of the basis for the categorical
distinction drawn between drugs and virtually everything else is also useful. The
initial question, in short, is “[w]hy, in societies where so many actions dangerous
to the actor and to others are permitted and sometimes encouraged, do we
impose such strong restrictions on drug use?”249
Proponents of the heavy reliance on prohibition and criminal enforcement
characteristic of American drug policy point to several features that distinguish
narcotics use from other activities often mentioned as posing an equal danger to
life and limb, including, for example, mountain climbing, high school football
playing, or motorcycle riding.250 First, risky sports and dangerous products
typically are not associated with either physical or psychological addiction.
While avid climbers or motorcycle riders do sometimes report a craving for the
euphoria produced by their hobbies and do occasionally suggest that they are
driven or compelled to engage in these activities, these feelings seem to be a far
cry from the mechanisms of denial, tolerance, withdrawal, and the like that
constitute the loss of control associated with the misuse of narcotics and other
drugs.251 Moreover, practitioners of other dangerous pursuits can legitimately
argue that the sometimes considerable risks they carry are offset by equally
considerable benefits.252 This is important on its own terms—drugs are
different, it is argued, because they have little or no legitimate utilitarian value
outside of their medicinal use—but it is also important as the basis for the

248. See id.
249. Id. at 14.
250. Id. at 14–19. In addition to the arguments set out in the text, proponents of prohibition
also argue that illicit drug use carries significant costs for users’ families, communities, and
workplaces. See, e.g., Bruce D. Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner City: Impact on Hard-Drug
Users and the Community, 13 CRIME & JUST. 9, 9 (1990) (“[T]he expansion of use of hard drugs,
. . . is both a symptom and an important factor in the continued relative decline of inner-city
communities and persons who reside in those communities.”). Aloen L. Townsend et al., Families
of Persons with Substance Use and Mental Disorders: A Literature Review and Conceptual
Framework, 55 FAM. REL. 473, 475–76 (2006) (noting the impact of “substance disorder[s]” on
families). While it is certainly the case that the misuse of illegal drugs often disrupts family
functioning, undermines community safety and cohesion, and interferes with employment
efficiency, it is difficult to parse out the degree to which these effects are a consequence of legal
prohibition and criminal enforcement policies rather than a result of the inherent risks of substance
misuse itself. To the extent that these individual and group costs are intrinsic to the abuse of
pleasure drugs, they are very much like the costs associated with the abuse of alcohol, which, of
course, is not subject to broad legal prohibition and criminal law enforcement.
251. See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA.
L. REV. 2245, 2299 (1992) [hereinafter Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility].
252. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 16.
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assumption that many (most?) narcotics users are physically or psychologically
dependent on their drugs of abuse.253 Since there is little utilitarian value to drug
use, the user must be compelled to obtain and ingest these substances for
irrational reasons; that is, because he or she is psychologically or physically
addicted.254 Framed in this way, a policy of prohibition and criminal
enforcement may be sensible—even given libertarian concerns about individual
autonomy and choice—on the grounds that dependency or addiction by
definition overcomes the capacity of free choice and rational decisionmaking
normally held by autonomous individuals.255
There are several problems with the effort to single out drugs by stressing
both the lack of utility in their non-medical use and the close association
between use and loss of control or addiction. Increasingly, experts are coming to
the view that users of narcotics, like users of alcohol, fall out along a continuum,
with those exhibiting the signs of physical or psychological dependence at one
end and others who experience little or no loss of control at the other extreme.256
There is still much to be learned about the patterns of use and misuse typical of
each of the major drugs subject to legal control, but it is clear that the assumption
of a simple correspondence between use and dependency is not likely to hold up
under close scrutiny.257 And, while few are willing to claim that there are
benefits to illicit narcotic use, it is difficult to make compelling arguments on

253. See, e.g., George F. Koob & Floyd E. Bloom, Cellular and Molecular Mechanisms of
Drug Dependence, 242 SCI. 715, 716 (1988) (“Psychic dependence has traditionally been linked to
the behaviorally reinforcing properties of drugs. Both physical and psychic dependence
characterize the addicted state.”).
254. See id. The national “Drug Czar” William Bennett made this sort of claim in his
Introduction to the National Drug Control Strategy promulgated in 1989 by the U.S. Office of
National Drug Control Policy. See William J. Bennett, Introduction to WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 1 (1989). Without citation, Bennett asserted:
There may be a small number of people who use drugs regularly—even frequently—but
whose lives nevertheless go on for the most part unimpeded. But there remain a large
number of Americans whose involvement with drugs develops into a full-fledged
addiction—a craving so intense that life becomes reduced to a sadly repetitive cycle of
searching for drugs, using them, and searching for them some more.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
255. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 16. Of course, framing the matter in this
way conflates the dynamics of choice that attend to the first use of a drug as opposed to its
continued use over time.
256. See Richard C. Boldt, Confidentiality of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Treatment
Information for Emergency Department and Trauma Center Patients, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 387,
413–14 (2010) [hereinafter Boldt, Confidentiality of Alcohol].
257. See generally STEVE SUSSMAN & SUSAN L. AMES, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DRUG
ABUSE 78 (2001) (“There are many means of studying the aetiology of drug abuse, but no clear cut
explanations as to why some individuals who experiment with drugs go on to abuse them and others
do not.”).
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this basis that successfully distinguish the use of other substances, particularly
alcohol and tobacco, which are equally prone to misuse but are not illegal.258
A slightly different approach to assessing the consequentialist basis for
narcotics prohibition derives from the field of consumer protection law. Here,
although there are frequent libertarian objections to mandatory seatbelt and
helmet laws, there are plenty of examples of either government prohibition or
regulation in the market for dangerous goods and services.259 Often, these
restrictions on individual choice are based on the premise that individuals should
not be left with unlimited discretion because they possess incomplete
information about risks and are prone to systematically underevaluate the
dangers of certain products and activities.260 Once again, however, this model of
government intervention is an imperfect analogy for thinking about drug control
policy. On the one hand, the violation of consumer protection laws typically
does not trigger the kind of pejorative moral judgment normally associated with
the violation of drug laws, including even simple prohibitions on the possession
of a small amount of narcotics. Moreover, individuals apparently do not
undervalue the risks associated with drug use at anything like the rate typical for
other products subject to consumer protection laws. Indeed, contrary to the usual
findings of behavioral psychologists who have studied the assessment of risk in
occupational settings and other areas of daily life,261 “[s]tudies show that the less
people know about the effects of recreational drugs, the more dangerous they
consider the drugs to be.”262
In the final analysis, what distinguishes the possession and use of narcotics
from virtually every other activity that is regulated on the grounds of posing
some significant risk to human health and well-being is the degree to which drug
activity is understood—perhaps by dint of the operation of the criminal
enforcement system—as deeply immoral. It may be possible to construct
dispassionate utilitarian rationales for other consumer protection measures, but
the fact that “the sale of a few grams [of illegal drugs] is often subject to the

258. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 33.
259. See generally BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 13 (“The laws that govern
building inspection, practicing medicine without a license, minimum wages, consent as a defense in
assault charges, the dispensing of prescription drugs, seat belts in cars, gambling, obscenity,
prostitution, swimming in public pools without lifeguards, laetrile, food additives, dueling, suicide,
and selling oneself into slavery have little in common.”).
260. See id. at 17. In the alternative, mandatory seat belt and helmet laws can be viewed as
consumer protection laws enacted under a state’s police powers. While it is certainly true that these
laws protect people who underestimate risks, they also have been enacted, at times, in order to
protect the public purse. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.686 (2008) (providing that the fines from seat
belt violations go to the state treasury). If these laws are viewed more as public health laws and less
as consumer protection laws, then the analogy to drug policy becomes more complex.
261. See generally Ying-Ching Lin et al., Avoiding Anxiety, Being in Denial, or Simply
Stroking Self-Esteem: Why Self-Positivity?, 13 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 464, 465 (2003) (reporting
findings that individuals tend to underestimate risks associated with daily experiences).
262. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 17.
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same punishment as rape, armed robbery, and second-degree murder,” suggests
that “more powerful feelings are at work here than those that produce the
average consumer safety law.”263 In terms that recall Lord Patrick Devlin’s
approach to the legal enforcement of public morality in England in the midtwentieth century,264 drug use is made subject to criminal prohibition because it
is perceived to be “a threat to the social fabric and the moral order,”265 and not
simply an activity or product whose costs to users on balance outweigh the
advantages that are offered.
B. Legal Moralism and Drug Prohibition
In his 1965 book The Enforcement of Morals, Lord Devlin set out a theory
of legal moralism as a partial response to recommendations made by a British
study committee (the Wolfenden Report of the Committee on Homosexual
Offences and Prostitution) to decriminalize private consensual same-sex
relations.266 Devlin’s description of the Wolfenden Report stressed the liberal
premises that had led the committee to its recommendations: “They separate
very decisively crime from sin, the divine law from the secular, and the moral
from the criminal.”267 Devlin’s position, by contrast, was that “the criminal law
as we know it is based upon moral principle.”268
Devlin’s argument addressed two fundamental questions: first, whether
society has a right to adopt a public morality; and second, whether, if “society
has the right to pass judgment, has it also the right to use the weapon of the law
to enforce it.”269 With respect to the first question, he argued that what is

263. Id. at 19.
264. See PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
265. BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 19.
266. See DEVLIN, supra note 264, at v–x.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Id. at 7.
269. Id. at 7–8. The question whether and how the law should be deployed to enforce some
particular conception of moral probity is ground that has been well-covered by serious thinkers,
perhaps most famously by John Stuart Mill and James Fitzjames Stephen in the nineteenth century
and Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart in the mid-twentieth century. See generally Harcourt, supra
note 245, at 120–34 (discussing the background of the “harm principle”). Notably, the propriety of
maintaining criminal prohibitions on drug use has been an explicit topic within the debate,
beginning with Mill’s essay On Liberty and appearing throughout. See id. The starting point in the
discussion is Mill’s so-called harm principle, which stakes out a strong libertarian position. Mill
explained:
The principle [is,] that the sole end for which humanity is warranted, individually or
collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of its members, is selfprotection. The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over members
of a civilized community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others. Their own
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Albert Anderson & Lieselotte Anderson eds., Agora Publ’ns,
Inc. 2003) (1859).
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constitutive of any society is that it functions as a “community of ideas,” and that
those ideas necessarily include both “a moral structure as well as a political
one.”270 For Devlin, the foundations of any society are made up not only of
political institutions but also of shared ideas about morality and ethics.271 Given
this organic view of the role of moral judgment in society, Devlin asserted that
without “fundamental agreement about good and evil” collective life is not
possible.272
Devlin’s treatment of the second question was more problematic. At some
points in The Enforcement of Morals, he seems to suggest that a society’s right
to enforce a common set of moral obligations through the coercive force of the
law derives from its interest in collective self-preservation. Thus, Devlin argues
that just as the obligation to protect the integrity of a society’s political
institutions may require it to use force to combat political rebellion, so too its
interest in the moral integrity of its institutions may require it to deploy the force
of the law to combat immoral or wrongful conduct.273 In both instances, he
suggests, the danger of failing to use force is the same, that of social
disintegration.274 At other points, however, Devlin’s arguments seem less
directed toward concerns about the consequential harms likely to result from a
failure to enforce a public morality and closer to the position staked out decades
earlier by James Fitzjames Stephen.275 Under this interpretation, Devlin’s
position appears to be that a society has the right to use the force of law to
punish morally deviant conduct, even if there is no likelihood that the society’s
institutions will be endangered, simply because the conduct is sinful or
wrongful.276 Even in the absence of any forward-looking reasons having to do
with social order, the suggestion is that the legal enforcement of public morals
can properly rest directly on the normative premises upon which the society is
founded.277
Once a shift is made from purely consequentialist rationales for criminal
prohibition to nonconsequentialist reasoning, an underlying problem of how to
ground legally enforceable notions of public morality must also be addressed.
Although it is possible to identify religious or religion-like objections to the use

270. DEVLIN, supra note 264, at 9.
271. See id. at 10.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 10–14.
274. See id.
275. See, e.g., JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 143 (R.J.
White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873) (“[P]ublic opinion ought to put a restraint upon
vice, not to such an extent merely as is necessary for definite self-protection, but generally on the
ground that vice is a bad thing from which men ought by appropriate means to restrain each
other.”).
276. See DEVLIN, supra note 264, at 12–25.
277. See id. at 25.
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of mind-altering drugs,278 the more likely possibility is that the criminal
prohibition regime rests on popular moral outrage or, perhaps, disgust directed
toward narcotics users. This arrangement, which is much like Devlin’s reliance
on the common-sense morality of the “reasonable Englishman, taken at
random,”279 recalls the position of those retributivists who suggest that generally
shared societal “bedrock intuition[s]” should be the basis for determining desert
and punishment.280
Liberal critics of legal moralism, including H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin,
and others, have been especially vigorous in challenging the notion that popular
moral outrage should properly serve as the basis for legal proscription.281
Dworkin in particular argued that, in order to support legal obligation, moral
judgments should be based on good reasons that are free from “prejudice (for
example, racism), personal emotion, false factual beliefs, or rationalization, and
not dependent solely on the beliefs of other people.”282 Given these restrictions
against a reliance on prejudice, false belief, and the like, the search for “good
reasons” for the moral (and legal) disapproval of drug use almost inevitably
leads back to consequentialist considerations regarding the effects of addiction
on family functioning, economic productivity, and overall physical and
psychological health.283 As noted earlier, however, while these costs are

278. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 90–91.
279. DEVLIN, supra note 264, at 15 (quoting FREDERICK POLLOCK, ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 270 (1882)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
280. Hampton, supra note 242, at 113.
281. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 20–23. In Hart’s calculation, to deploy
the coercive authority of the law “for the sake of which we should restrict human freedom and
inflict the misery of punishment on human beings,” simply to indulge the strong feelings of disgust
or disapproval held by the majority of the community is itself morally suspect. H.L.A. HART, LAW,
LIBERTY, AND MORALITY 47, 83 (1963). As Bakalar and Grinspoon put it, “the presumed outrage
of the man on the Clapham omnibus, unsupported by any broad principle, is a poor substitute for the
anger of a god or an accepted conception of public virtue based on a view of humanity’s natural
ends.” BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 23. Anita Allen’s recent work takes up the
morally suspect nature of these social judgments with regard to mental disability rights. See Anita
L. Allen, Mental Disorders and the “System of Judgmental Responsibility,” 90 B.U. L. REV. 621,
625–26 (2010). Also, Martha Nussbaum’s recent book considers morally suspect judgments in the
context of, among other things, gay rights and immigration policy. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW (2004).
282. BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 20 (discussing Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 55 (Richard A. Wasserstrom ed.,
1971)).
283. Bakalar and Grinspoon explain that:
Overdoses, accidents, and physical or mental illness caused by drugs may require the use
of public medical resources; society may be damaged by crimes committed under the
influence of drugs; drug users may neglect their families, who will require public support,
or they may become unproductive and dependent on others because of chronic drug
abuse.
BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 2–3. The negative health consequences of substance
misuse are especially costly. For example, recent research on tuberculosis cases reported to the
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significant, they cannot account entirely for the unique legal status of pleasure
drugs. In the end, it is difficult not to fall into a kind of analytic circularity at
this point, in which consequentialist accounts devolve into deontological ones
and deontological rationales inevitably import consequentialist considerations.
In evaluating the nature of the moral disapproval directed toward drugs and
drug users, and by extension the nonconsequentialist grounds for U.S. drug
policy, it may be helpful to consider the array of psychological processes that
Robert MacCoun has identified in connection with his discussion of broad public
resistance to so-called harm-reduction strategies.284 It is likely that many of
these psychological processes apply with equal force to explain the widespread
condemnation of narcotics users and the correspondingly widespread support
shown by the public for the general policy of prohibition and criminalization
against which harm-reduction policies often are contrasted.285 The first
explanation offered for resistance to harm-reduction strategies is the need for
predictability and control.286 Here, MacCoun suggests that everyday interactions
necessarily place individuals in a position in which their well-being depends on
the care and control of others.287 Whether it be a reliance on other drivers to
adhere to the rules of the road when using public highways, on teachers to
exhibit probity and good judgment when entrusted with the care of children, or
on restaurant cooks and waiters to handle food in a sanitary fashion, individuals
regularly rely on others with whom they come into contact to take precautions to
insure that they are safe and relatively free from accidental harm.288 Although

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has demonstrated that “substance abuse is the most
commonly reported modifiable behavior impeding TB elimination efforts in the United States.”
John E. Oeltmann et al., Tuberculosis and Substance Abuse in the United States, 1997–2006, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 189, 192 (2009). These researchers found that 18.7% of TB patients
reported alcohol or other drug misuse in the year before their TB diagnosis. Id. at 190. To take
another example, in 2005, 3.7% of adults seeking emergency department treatment reported using
drugs within six hours of the event, while 7% reported consuming alcohol within the same six-hour
period. See Cheryl J. Cherpitel & Yu Ye, Trends in Alcohol- and Drug-Related ED and Primary
Care Visits: Data from Three U.S. National Surveys (1995–2005), 34 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL
ABUSE 576, 578–80 (2008). Clearly, there is a pragmatic, utilitarian basis for seeking to limit the
misuse of alcohol and other drugs. The analytic problems posed in the text, however, are whether
the consequentialist case for drug prohibition is distinguishable from that which might apply to
alcohol, and whether prohibition is likely to be the most effective way to reduce the misuse of
drugs.
284. See MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1205–07.
285. Under a harm reduction approach, the goals of public policy interventions are defined in
terms of reduced drug and alcohol misuse and reduced offending, and success is measured
accordingly. See Richard C. Boldt, Introduction, Obstacles to the Development and Use of
Pharmacotherapies for Addiction, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2010) (citing James L.
Nolan, Jr., Harm Reduction and the American Difference: Drug Treatment and Problem-Solving
Courts in Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 31, 36, 38 (2010)).
286. MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1206.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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the actual impact of various illegal drugs on the ability of users to perform these
functions effectively and safely is subject to dispute, MacCoun explains that
most people judge their safety according to a robust bias in risk perceptions,
which leads them to believe that they are less prone than most to accidents or
injury, and correlatively that others they encounter are likely to be more
incautious than they are.289 This bias, and the public’s general concern with
maintaining a safe and predictable social environment, MacCoun suggests, helps
to explain the discomfort that many have with permitting others to use mindaltering drugs and may therefore be an important factor in the reluctance of
policymakers in the United States to diverge from a drug policy organized
around blanket prohibition and criminal enforcement.290
A second explanation for the public’s moral condemnation of narcotics users
and its continuing support for drug prohibition policies in the U.S. centers on the
strong association that has developed between the use of narcotics and crime,
especially urban street crime.291 Duster argues that this association was
generated in part by the creation of a black market in drugs following passage of
the Harrison Act and the withdrawal of physicians from the field of medical
maintenance for addiction.292 The association was nurtured in the post-World
War II period by the policies of Harry Anslinger and the enactment of
progressively harsher drug laws at the federal and state levels.293 It was further
reinforced in the 1980s by the government’s declaration of a “war on drugs” and
the news media’s preoccupation with crack cocaine and the resulting public
perception that the use of crack had significantly increased the level of street
violence and social disorder in American cities.294
This ramped-up scrutiny and law enforcement has had a measurable impact
on the link between drugs and crime. One measure of this link is the rate at
which persons involved with drugs have become enmeshed in the criminal
enforcement system. As mentioned earlier, from 1980 to 1995 the percentage of
“drug law violators” within state prison populations increased by a factor of four,
while the percentage within federal prisons more than doubled.295 While the
expansion in the population of drug-involved offenders in these systems clearly

289. See MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1206.
290. Id. Although this explanation for popular opposition to harm reduction or drug
legalization has clear utilitarian features, MacCoun’s discussion treats it as one of a number of
psychological processes that help to shape an inchoate but powerful moral disapproval of drug
users, which is at the core of nonconsequentialist approaches to drug policy. See id. at 1206–07.
291. See Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing Balm”: Drug Treatment
Courts in Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 45, 45
[hereinafter Boldt, Tomahawk]; Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility, supra note 251, at 2311.
292. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 16–18.
293. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 191–92; Part I.C.
294. See MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE, supra note 56, at 268–71.
295. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Integrating Substance Abuse Treatment and Criminal Justice
Supervision, SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., Aug. 2003, at 4, 4 (citing BELENKO, supra note 221, at 5).
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was driven by law enforcement and criminal sentencing policies that targeted
drug offenses, it also reflects a demonstrable relationship between drug use and
criminal conduct more generally.296 The correlation between alcohol and other
drug misuse and criminal conduct may or may not be causal, but it is clear that
there is a set of “predisposing” factors that are common to both, such as poverty
and mental illness.297
Given this association between substance misuse and crime, it should come
as no surprise that success in treatment appears to have a beneficial impact on
the rates at which participants engage in criminal offending. The research
suggests that former drug users who enter sustained periods of abstinence tend to
show a decline in criminal conduct and have less involvement in the criminal
system.298 From a purely pragmatic point of view, this data suggests that
treatment interventions that effectively reduce drug use disorders should also
have a beneficial impact on crime incidents, incarceration rates, and public
safety.299 However, because drug policy has been influenced so heavily by a
deontological perspective that conceives of drug use as wrongful or immoral
(rather than by a more pragmatic conception that views drug addiction as a
disease and drug use as a public health concern), the primary approach adopted
to respond to drug use and addiction (and the criminal conduct attendant upon
the abuse of drugs) has been to maintain criminal prohibitions on the possession,

296. The correlation between drug addiction and criminal involvement has long been studied.
See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986); William H. McGlothlin, Distinguishing Effects from Concomitants of Drug Use: The Case
of Crime, in STUDYING DRUG ABUSE 153, 153–68 (Lee N. Robins ed., 1985).
297. See Candido da Agra, The Complex Structures, Processes and Meanings of the
Drug/Crime Relationship, in DRUGS AND CRIME DEVIANT PATHWAYS 9, 9–30 (Serge Brochu et al.
eds., 2002); Duke, supra note 19, at 413.
298. See, e.g., Adele Harrell & John Roman, Reducing Drug Use and Crime Among
Offenders: The Impact of Graduated Sanctions, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 207 (2001) (discussing
graduated sanctions programs for drug felons and noting that participation appears “highly
correlated with positive outcomes”).
299. However, this conclusion should be taken with a caution. As Peter Reuter and Alex
Stevens have explained:
The most fundamental point to understand about drug policy is that there is little
evidence that it can influence the number of drug users or the share of users who are
dependent. There is no research showing that any of the tougher enforcement, more
prevention or increased treatment has substantially reduced the number of users or
addicts in a nation. There are numerous other cultural and social factors that appear to be
much more important.
Peter Reuter & Alex Stevens, Assessing UK Drug Policy from a Crime Control Perspective, 8
CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 461, 474 (2008). On the other hand, Reuter and Stevens also report
that “there is a great deal of evidence that, on average, treatment can help dependent drug users cut
down both on the quantities of drugs they use and the volume of crime they commit, even if many
treated users continue some illegal drug use and offending.” Id. at 475.
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sale, and production of controlled substances, and to rigorously enforce these
prohibitions.300
Although advocates of the prohibition approach make consequentialist
arguments in favor of a heavy reliance on criminal enforcement strategies by
noting particularly the correlation between drug misuse and street crime, the
criminal punishment approach has proven to be relatively ineffective, at least
with respect to the subsequent drug use behaviors of those caught up in the
system.301 It appears that more than 80% of drug-abusing offenders resume drug
use within one year of release from prison, and more than 90% do so within
three years.302 Some have argued that maintaining a policy centered on criminal
enforcement could yield better outcomes if more effective systems were
developed to exploit the leverage of criminal punishment to coerce drug
offenders into treatment.303 Drug treatment courts in particular have been
established throughout the United States and in other jurisdictions around the
world on precisely this rationale.304 As it now stands, the outcome data on these
experimental efforts at coerced treatment are promising for some offenders under
some circumstances.305 The jury, however, is still out on the utility of these
courts to impact the long-term conduct of most (or even a significant minority
of) drug-involved defendants, and so this variation of the consequentialist
account of current drug policy must be regarded as tentative at best.306

300. One indicator of the heavy reliance in the United States on criminal enforcement as the
primary drug control strategy is the distribution of resources in the National Drug Control Budget.
In the years from 2000 to 2009, the percentage of the National Budget devoted to “supply
reduction” has varied from 53% to 65% of overall expenditures. Weekly Facsimile, Ctr. for
Substance Abuse Research, Univ. of Md., FY2009 Federal Drug Control Budget Released;
Prevention Continues to Receive Dwindling Proportion of Funding (Mar. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/cesarfax/vol17/17-10.pdf. In contrast, the percentage devoted to
“treatment” has ranged from 22% to 27%. Id.
301. In addition to failing to reduce in a substantial way the problem of drug addiction, this
criminal punishment approach has also produced a series of additional societal costs. See KING
CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 56–61.
302. See Steven S. Martin et al., Three-Year Outcomes of Therapeutic Community Treatment
for Drug-Involved Offenders in Delaware: From Prison to Work Release to Aftercare, 79 PRISON J.
294, 307 fig.1, 310 fig.2 (1999) (comparing the percentage of released persons that remained drugand arrest-free both one year and three years after release).
303. See, e.g., Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment
Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System’s Response to Drug Abuse and
Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 527 (1999) (“[T]he treatment community’s beliefs
concerning the incompatibility of drug treatment and the criminal justice system are unfounded.”);
Marlowe, supra note 227, at 990 (“The only strategy that has produced meaningful or consistent
reductions in criminal recidivism and drug use is an integrated public health/public safety strategy
exemplified in such programs as drug courts and work-release therapeutic communities (TCs).”
(footnote omitted)).
304. See Boldt, Tomahawk, supra note 291, at 48 (citing Marlowe, supra note 227, at 990).
305. See id. at 49–50 (quoting Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts,
ADVOC., Sept. 2008, at 14, 14–15).
306. See id. at 56.
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Others rest the policy of prohibition and criminal enforcement on a
straightforward deterrence rationale.307 Even if offender relapse data is taken to
show that specific deterrence has not been (and is not likely to be) achieved
through a system of criminal prohibition, arrest, incarceration, and release, these
supporters insist that the removal of criminal prohibitions on narcotics would
undermine general deterrence and lead to an increased rate of use overall, if only
because the cost of obtaining drugs likely would decline.308 While the
possibility of some demand-reduction benefits flowing from the current U.S.
prohibition and criminal enforcement strategy may be borne out by some of the
reported data, the general deterrence claims for the system have not clearly been
established.309 Moreover, it is difficult to rest drug control policy entirely on this
explicitly consequentialist foundation given the enormous costs that the current
regime imposes both financially and in terms of lost human resources.310
Instead, the more salient feature of the drug-crime nexus, particularly given the
powerful stigma that still attaches to drug use, is the way in which it functions to
support a nonconsequentialist basis for drug prohibition.311 Essentially, drug
use, by virtue of its association with crime, is understood to be wrongful
intentional conduct demonstrative of the bad character of those caught up in drug
activity, and it is on this basis primarily that the criminal enforcement of legal
prohibitions necessarily rests.312

307. See KING COUNTY BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 32.
308. William Bennett made just this argument against drug “legalization” when he served as
“Drug Czar”: “Cheaper, easier-to-get, and ‘better’ legalized drugs would likely mean more drug
users, and more frequent drug use.” Bennett, supra note 254, at 6.
309. See Reuter & Stevens, supra note 299, at 469 (“There is little evidence that targeting
distributors and retailers of illicit drugs for arrest leads to reductions in drug use.”); cf. Carlos
Dobkin & Nancy Nicosia, The War on Drugs: Methamphetamine, Public Health, and Crime, 99
AM. ECON. REV. 324, 345–46 (2009) (“That [an] enormous reduction in the availability of
methamphetamine did not discernibly reduce property and violent crime suggests . . . that supply
interventions, no matter how successful, are not an effective way of reducing crime associated with
methamphetamine use.”).
310. See MORRIS & HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 6; Randy E. Barnett, The Harmful Side Effects
of Drug Prohibition, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 11, 22. In addition to the lost productivity of the hundreds
of thousands of persons serving prison sentences for drug offenses, and the disruption to families,
neighborhoods, and whole communities caused by the concentrated patterns of drug law
enforcement, see TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 217, at 16, 37, the King County Bar Association Drug
Policy Project identifies “racial disparities,” “impaired administration of justice and civil rights,”
“curbs on legitimate medical practice,” and “increases in drug-related harms” as other costs of the
current enforcement-based strategy. KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra
note 74, at 59–61; see also NAT’L ASS’N CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA’S PROBLEMSOLVING COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 20–21
(2009) (advocating the decriminalization of drugs).
311. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 5; DUSTER, supra note 1, at 19–20.
312. Troy Duster points out that the reasoning that drug use demonstrates weak character (i.e.,
the claim that drug users are “psychologically inadequate” and morally weak) is “circular,
tautological, or simply ‘true’ by assertion and definition.” DUSTER, supra note 1, at 66. The fact
that drug use is associated with criminal behavior and street violence helps to break the circularity
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The linkage between drugs and street crime has also become overlaid with
considerations of race and ethnicity. Although there is a long history of racial,
ethnic, and class prejudice woven into the rhetorical strategy used to support
drug prohibition policies,313 the targeting of users of color, the poor, and urban
residents in the war on drugs has further intensified the stigma associated with
drug use. This has proven to be the case notwithstanding household use surveys
suggesting that these enforcement efforts have been out of proportion to the
actual patterns of drug use in the United States as a whole. While white
residents of the United States use illegal drugs at a rate about equal to that of
Latinos and African-Americans,314 more than 70% of those in federal prison for
drug offenses in recent years have been persons of color.315 According to a
survey published in 2001, “African Americans make up about 13% of regular
(monthly) drug users; 35% of those arrested for possessing drugs; 55% of those
convicted; and 74% of those sentenced to prison.”316 These uneven enforcement
practices by definition work to create a maldistribution across racial and ethnic
lines of the burdens of criminal punishment. They also serve to skew the
allocation of other burdens, including the exclusion from employment
opportunities, public housing, and other public benefits suffered by persons with
criminal histories.
The concrete consequences of a criminal enforcement policy that falls
especially heavily on communities of color—including high rates of
incarceration, exclusion from the employment market, and the disruption of
families—are not the only outcomes worth considering. In addition, the policy
contributes to the formation of stereotypes about drug users and about the
communities in which they live.317 This process of judgment by association
likely operates in two directions. On the one hand, the perception that drug
dealing, drug misuse, and addiction are problems that primarily affect AfricanAmerican and Latino communities has served to reinforce beliefs and practices

of this reasoning by importing another basis for the judgment that drug users are persons of weak or
bad character. See BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 39, at 58. Yet another variation on this
account of the immorality of narcotics addicts accepts that the misuse of drugs may be caused by
“physical and mental ills,” DUSTER, supra note 1, at 11 (quoting TERRY & PELLENS, supra note 57,
at 499) (internal quotation marks omitted), but argues that these pathologies are themselves the
consequence of morally significant intentional choices, such as leading a life of disrepute. See id.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 120–23.
314. See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM
THE 2003 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: NATIONAL FINDINGS 18 fig.2.8, 19
fig.2.9 (2004) [hereinafter OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS].
315. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING DYNAMIC OF THE WAR
ON DRUGS 6 tbl.2 (2009). However, recent data shows a decline in the rate of African-American
incarceration and an increase in the rate of white imprisonment for drug offenses. See Solomon
Moore, Decline in Blacks in State Prisons for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A12.
316. KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 59 (citing A
Survey of Illegal Drugs: Collateral Damage, ECONOMIST, July 28, 2001, at spec. section 13).
317. See Hurwitz & Peffley, supra note 294, at 396.
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that marginalize these communities.318 On the other hand, to the extent that
white Americans continue to view members of racial and ethnic minorities (and
especially members of these groups who are young men residing in urban areas)
as social outsiders, the assumption that many within these groups are involved in
illegal drug use and in criminal conduct more broadly has served to reinforce the
stigma that attaches to drugs and to those who use them.319
Once again, Duster’s version of the history is instructive. In the period
before legal prohibition, when Americans were more likely to perceive the
typical narcotics user to be a white middle-class individual holding down an
ordinary job and undertaking ordinary daily responsibilities, the moral
disapproval directed toward drug users fell far short of the sort of engulfing or
totalizing judgment typical today.320 As drug prohibition and criminal
enforcement pushed drug use to the margins, it became easier to think of these
more socially distant users as somehow outside the mainstream, as morally
deviant, as “the other.”321 Of course, even if Duster’s description of a shift in the
class (and race) distribution of narcotics users brought about by the legal
developments of the early twentieth century is accurate, it is still the case that a
great many users of illegal drugs did not (and do not) live on the margins of
society.322 It is critical to note this gap between perception and reality with
respect to the distribution of illegal drug users across society, and to attend to the
boundary-defining effect that the criminal prosecution of drug offenders
accomplishes over time. Sociologists going back at least to Durkheim have
explained that the prosecution and punishment of criminal offenders works not
only to communicate that they transgressed societal norms, but also to define and
reinforce (“to integrate”) the collective social boundaries that those norms
construct.323 If the enforcement enterprise disproportionately focuses on
offenders who are already in socially marginalized groups, this process of
boundary marking has a double effect, influencing both the public’s moral

318. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1562–63 (2005).
319. In some sense, this stigma casts members of African-American and Latino communities
as outsiders, depriving them of a sense of citizenship and belonging to the broader community. See
R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
803, 830 (2004).
320. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 10.
321. MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1206.
322. See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, RESULTS, supra note 314 at 19–20.
323. See EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY (John A. Spaulding & George
Simpson trans., The Free Press 1951) (1897). See generally KAI T. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 4 (1966) (“[D]eviance makes people more
alert to the interests they share in common and draws attention to those values which constitute the
‘collective conscience’ of the community.”); Richard C. Boldt, Restitution, Criminal Law, and the
Ideology of Individuality, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 1005 (1986) (“To the extent that any
system of sanctioning public wrongs serves to assist a community in boundary-defining, community
members looking to the morality play of adjudication and punishment must share some
understanding of how responsibility for behavior is ascribed.”).
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disposition toward the use of illegal drugs and its understanding of where “the
drug problem” is located.324
MacCoun’s study of the psychological processes that impede public support
for harm-reduction strategies in the U.S. hints at an additional constellation of
factors that may help to explain the moral disapproval directed toward narcotics
users and the consequent persistence of drug prohibition policies.325 Edwin
Schur grounds these factors in the Puritan tradition,326 while others have argued
that they are part of a “middle class” psychology that has long dominated
American culture.327 Whatever their origin, these factors include wariness over
the use of “artificial” substances as a means of escape from psychic or physical
pain,328 disgust with actions that are seen as defiling the purity of the human
body,329 and unease regarding conduct that is understood as unproductive and
wasteful.330 A review of some of the public opinion research on attitudes toward
narcotics users reveals references to addicts as “cowards” who are prone to
“selfishness,” “idleness,” and “a desire to escape from reality.”331 Of course,
escape, defilement, and dissipation are characteristics, to varying degrees, of
alcohol abuse and alcoholism as well, and the moral objections to alcohol use
raised in the temperance movement assuredly included these concerns.332 But
the ordinary use and sale of alcohol is not subject to criminal prohibition in most
of the United States, and, although considerable stigma still accompanies
alcoholism, it is difficult to argue that this disapproval carries the same social
meanings that moral judgments about narcotics addiction do. The question, then,
is what additional elements are at play pushing illegal drug use so far to the
extreme end of the social disapprobation scale.
Perhaps the most powerful element distinguishing the use of narcotics from
other similar behaviors that do not trigger such powerful moral disapproval and

324. Although there long has been a mismatch between popular beliefs about who uses illegal
drugs and the available data on actual use patterns, in recent years more Americans have had the
experience of watching friends and family members struggle with drug use disorders. See
SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
CARAVAN SURVEY FOR SAMHSA ON ADDICTIONS AND RECOVERY: SUMMARY REPORT 1, 4
(2008), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/Attitudes/CARAVAN_LongReport.pdf (reporting the
results of a nationally representative survey in which the “target audience was a national probability
sample of 1,010 adults, 18 years of age and older living in private households in the continental
U.S.”). This changing awareness of the patterns of drug use and abuse may have an effect on public
attitudes more generally.
325. See MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1205–07.
326. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 199.
327. See MAX LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 438, 488–95 (5th prtg. 1957).
328. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 53.
329. See MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1207.
330. See DUSTER, supra note 1, at 246.
331. Id. at 113–114. (discussing common responses of 120 sociology students in 1964 to the
question of what causes drug addiction).
332. See GUSFIELD, supra note 120, at 31.
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aggressive legal prohibition is that drug use is understood to be subversive, a
direct challenge to established authority.333 MacCoun draws on the literature on
authoritarianism—“a complex trait defined as a chronic tendency to cope with
anxiety by expressing hostility toward outgroup members; intolerance of
unconventional behavior; and submissive, unquestioning support of authority
figures”—to help explain popular support for punitive drug policies.334
Importantly, this framing incorporates some of the other features that also
contribute to the unique moral and legal status of illegal drugs, including their
association with marginal social groups and with criminality. But it is the
perceived subversiveness of this conduct that sets it apart. As noted earlier, drug
use in the United States became a highly visible political issue in the 1970s,
particularly after the use of drugs for nonmedical purposes was linked with
broader challenges to established institutions and conventional cultural and
social norms.335 Some have argued that Richard Nixon’s aggressive and very
public campaign to crack down on drug users was propelled by his sense that
they represented a severe threat to mainstream values and institutions.336
The idea that the use of narcotics for pleasure is a subversive activity is, of
course, sharpened by the fact that the behavior is illicit, a violation of the
positive law.337 The legal prohibitions on the possession and distribution of
drugs, in turn, clearly reflect (and are likely encouraged by) popular moral
disapproval of drug-using activity. The illegality and the immorality of the
conduct each feed the other in a kind of ongoing feedback loop. As Duster
explains, “[t]he community’s ultimate rationale against heroin or marijuana
consumption has been that it is a felony, while the lawmaker’s ultimate rationale
for strong felonious law has been the public sentiment.”338 The law, in this
sense, both reflects and constructs public understandings about the moral
meaning of drug use and addiction.339 The interconnectedness of these

333. See, e.g., Paul M. Kohn & G.W. Mercer, Drug Use, Drug-Use Attitudes, and the
Authoritarianism-Rebellion Dimension, 12 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 125, 125 (1971) (“[M]ore
rebellious [survey] respondents are generally more permissive about drugs and more likely to use
drugs, . . . than their more authoritarian peers.”)
334. See MacCoun, supra note 246, at 1206; Daniel J. Levinson, Politico-Economic Ideology
and Group Memberships in Relation to Ethnocentrism, in THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 151,
151–221 (Max Horkheimer & Samuel H. Flowerman eds., 1950) (examining the correlation
between prejudice and various trends such as “conventionalism” and “authoritarian submission”).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200.
336. See, e.g., KING CNTY. BAR ASS’N, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL, supra note 74, at 26
(“Nixon exhibited personal anger toward drug users in America and ‘as a puritan and as a man
perennially frustrated with his circumstances . . . detested the hedonism and easy gratification of
many young people.” (quoting DAVENPORT-HINES, supra note 81, at 421) (omission in original)).
337. The criminal prohibition of narcotics use endows it “with the romantic glamour of a
rebellion against authority.” MORRIS & HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 5–6.
338. DUSTER, supra note 1, at 97–98.
339. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 157, 170 (1967). Professor Kadish has noted that:
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features—the subversiveness and the illicitness of drug activity—functions as a
powerful engine in the rhetorical practice of government officials responsible for
the promulgation and enforcement of drug policy.340
III. THE LEGAL, MEDICAL, AND SOCIAL REGULATION OF DRUGS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM
The history of narcotics use and drug control in Great Britain before about
1920 is similar in important respects to that in the United States during the same
period. Although the two countries’ legal, political, and social histories relating
to drugs diverged significantly over the ensuing decades, there has been a
convergence of sorts in recent years. Throughout, the British have been mindful
of the challenges that policymakers have faced in America and of the political
and legal commitments that United States officials have made with respect to the
enforcement of criminal prohibitions on narcotics.341 From time to time over the

It may be that the best hope for the future lies in efforts to understand more subtly and
comprehensively than we do now the dynamics of the legislative (and, it must be added,
popular) drive to criminalize. . . . A number of studies have already appeared which have
revealed illuminating insights into the process of conversion of popular indignation into
legislative designation of deviancy, the nature of the competitive struggles among rival
moralities, and the use of the criminal law to solidify and manifest victory.
Id. at 170 (footnote omitted).
340. Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have offered a careful account of this rhetorical
practice in their close reading of one nearly iconic document from the “war on drugs,” “Drug Czar”
William Bennett’s 1989 drug policy “manifesto” written on behalf of the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR
RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 4–5 (1992) (citing Bennett, supra note 254, at 1–14). Bennett’s
manifesto is a curious amalgam of utilitarian and deontological arguments against illegal drug use.
See id. at 4–10. Zimring’s and Hawkins’s reading of the manifesto identifies several features that in
combination make up its core message. See id. Most importantly, Bennett asserts that it is “use
itself” that is the “essence” of the problem. Id. at 6 (quoting Bennett, supra note 254, at 8) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Unlike explicitly consequentialist policy makers or those of a more
pragmatic bent, Bennett is not especially interested in the variety of different harms that result from
different kinds of use. See Bennett, supra note 254, at 8. His target is an undifferentiated one, it is
use in all forms, “‘casual’ use, regular use, and addiction alike.” Id. Moreover, he appears to be
equally disinterested in the wide range of different properties characteristic of different drugs of
abuse. See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra, at 340 (quoting Bennett, supra note 254, at 4, 8). The fact
that some substances more readily create physical dependency than do others or that some drugs are
more disruptive of cognitive functioning than others seems less important to Bennett than the
feature that all illicit drugs share—the fact of their illegality. See id. at 16. Bennett seems to be
saying that the harm against which U.S. drug control policy should aim principally is the harm of
lawbreaking. See id. This conflating of all types and degrees of drug use as equally bad, and the
conflating of all types of illegal drugs as equally harmful, is especially interesting given that Bennett
does draw (by inference) a distinction between illegal drugs and other drugs that are not illicit, such
as alcohol (at least when used by adults), tobacco, and prescribed medications. See Bennett, supra
note 254, at 1.
341. See PHILIP BEAN, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF DRUGS 69 (C.M. Campbell et al. eds.,
1974).
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past half-century or so, American officials and others in the United States with
an interest in drug policy have paid special attention to “The British System” for
dealing with narcotics and drug addiction.342 Given their common starting point
and the very different paths taken by these two countries, it is worth considering
the ways in which their current practices both resemble one another and yet
remain distinct in fundamental respects.343
A. Overview of the History of British Drug Policy
As in the United States, in the United Kingdom during the early decades of
the twentieth century, morphine and other narcotics were available to users
without a prescription.344 Schur suggests that “a fair amount” of addiction likely
existed in Britain at the time and notes that others have observed that “the use of
substances which we now know to be drugs of addiction was common in
England long before there existed any effective control over their use.”345 As
noted previously, the British participated actively in the Shanghai meeting of
1909, and had acceded to the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912.346
In accord with the Hague Convention, the British government drafted a narcotics
control statute, the Dangerous Drugs Act, which was passed by Parliament in
1920 “without great fanfare or controversy.”347 In a development somewhat
parallel to that which had taken place in the United States, the English decided to
place responsibility for enforcement of the new provision not in the Ministry of
Health, but in the Home Office, which also had jurisdiction over the police,
criminal prosecutions, and the prison system.348
Pursuant to the Dangerous Drugs Act, the government promulgated
regulations controlling the manufacture, distribution, and use of narcotics.349
The regulations permitted a physician to make these drugs available to patients,
but “only as [was] necessary for the practice of his profession.”350 The statute
and this regulation thus were a potential “legal handle very much like the

342. Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 107; see also HORACE FREELAND JUDSON, HEROIN
ADDICTION IN BRITAIN: WHAT AMERICANS CAN LEARN FROM THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE (1973);
Rufus King, An Appraisal of International, British and Selected European Narcotic Drug Laws,
Regulations and Policies, in DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 136, at 121, 126–39.
343. For another, more in-depth, example of comparative analysis between British and
American drug policy, see NOLAN, supra note 19, at 43–75.
344. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 70.
345. Id. (quoting Jeffrey Bishop, A Commentary on the Management and Treatment of Drug
Addicts in the United Kingdom, in NYSWANDER, supra note 4, at 149–50) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
346. See supra text accompanying notes 88–103.
347. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 70; see also JUDSON supra note 342, at 16.
348. See JUDSON, supra note 342, at 16–17.
349. Id. at 17.
350. Id. (quoting Dangerous Drugs Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 46 (U.K.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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American one” to permit the government to oppose maintenance treatment of
addicts by doctors on the grounds that this was not the legitimate practice of
medicine.351 Indeed, Sir Malcolm Delevingne, the lead official in the Home
Office on drug issues at the time, sought “an authoritative statement” from the
Ministry of Health to this effect.352 Delevingne’s position was that the ongoing
“prescription of narcotics ‘without any attempt to treat the patient for the purpose
of breaking off the habit, [was] not legitimate, and [could not] be recognised as
medical practice.’”353 As it happens, the Ministry of Health did not provide
Delevingne with the needed support for this view, and the British approach to
narcotics and the treatment of addicts was set on a course distinct from that taken
in America.354
In part, the decision not to follow the United States in prohibiting the
prescription of narcotics to addicts was due to the widely held view that the
American approach had produced significant negative consequences.355 Writing
in a professional journal in 1923, one English physician who had visited the
United States reported unfavorably on the moral opprobrium that had attached to
addiction and observed:
In consequence of this stringent law . . . the country is overrun by an
army of pedlars who extort exorbitant prices from their hapless victims.
It appears that not only has the Harrison Law failed to diminish the
number of drug takers—some contend, indeed, that it has increased their
numbers—but, far from bettering the lot of the opiate addict, it has
actually worsened it . . . .356
In addition, however, the decision to permit maintenance treatment for
addiction was a testament to the very different role played by the medical
profession in the development of drug policy in the United Kingdom as
compared to the United States. The fact that Delevingne believed it necessary to
obtain an authoritative opinion from officials in the Ministry of Health to
proceed with his preferred policy is evidence of this difference. Further evidence
is provided by the central role that physicians played in the subsequent
development of British policy, particularly through the recommendations of a
blue-ribbon committee of medical experts known as the Rolleston Committee,
assembled to advise the Ministry of Health.357 It is instructive to note that an

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
See id.
See id. at 17–18 (quoting 130 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1920) 723–24 (U.K.)).
Harry Campbell, The Pathology and Treatment of Morphia Addiction, 20 BRIT. J.
INEBRIETY 147, 150–51 (1923), quoted in JUDSON, supra note 342, at 18 (first omission in original).
357. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 71.
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equivalent panel of medical experts was not called upon to provide authoritative
guidance to policymakers in the United States on the question of medical
maintenance, and instead, the issue was resolved by officials in the Treasury
Department and by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.358 In Britain,
by contrast, the arguments were put to Sir Humphry Rolleston, President of the
Royal College of Physicians, and his medical colleagues who comprised the
departmental advisory committee he chaired.359
The Rolleston Committee met for more than a year, held nearly two dozen
meetings, and heard from numerous experts in the field.360 Delevingne’s
argument, in effect, was that a doctor’s provision of narcotics to an addict had to
be undertaken according to “a steady diminution of the dose, with a view to its
ultimate complete discontinuance” to be therapeutic and, therefore, within the
permissible limits of the regulations implementing the Dangerous Drugs Act.361
As one Home Office official put it, a maintenance regime that did not
contemplate the ultimate withdrawal of the drug from the dependent patient was
“evidence, prima facie, that the drugs were not being administered solely for the
purposes of medical treatment.”362 The Rolleston Committee rejected this view,
anchoring its resolution of the question on the realistic conclusion that most
addicts could not be “cured” by a complete withdrawal of drugs—even if
withdrawal were accomplished gradually by reducing the dose incrementally
over a fixed period—if “cure” meant that the patient would not likely relapse in
the future.363
While the committee’s relatively pessimistic assessment of the efficacy of
withdrawal therapy as a complete cure led it to conclude that the legitimate
provision of medical care could include small ongoing maintenance doses with
no fixed termination point,364 therapeutic pessimism was not the only factor that
led Sir Rolleston and his colleagues to this conclusion. Unlike policymakers in
the United States (and ultimately the American public generally), the Rolleston
Committee did not see persons who were physically dependent on narcotics as

358. See supra text accompanying notes 140–58.
359. See BEAN, supra note 341, at 59; JUDSON, supra note 342, at 19.
360. See JUDSON supra note 342, at 19.
361. Id. at 20 (quoting ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 13) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
362. Id. at 20–21 (quoting ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 13) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
363. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 78. The committee stated, “Relapse, sooner or later, appears
to be the rule, and permanent cure the exception. With two exceptions, the most optimistic
observers did not claim a higher percentage of lasting cures than from 15 to 20 per cent.” Id.
(quoting ROLLESTON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 43) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
364. See JUDSON, supra note 342, at 21 (quoting ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT, supra note 3,
at para. 18).
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either inherently morally defective or as teleologically doomed.365 One historian
of British drug policy explained the difference: in the United States the addict
was “seen through the wrong end of the telescope, separated, distanced, and
diminished, as though in the grip of a force, the drug itself, that relentlessly
destroys his body and degrades his moral independence. He is seen as an
automaton, winding down.”366 The Rolleston Committee, on the other hand,
believed that narcotics addicts were not necessarily “winding down, but
stable―and stable more than in their daily dose, but socially stable, in their daily
lives.”367
This notion of a stable addict was perhaps “the most durable contribution of
the Rolleston Committee to the British approach to narcotics.”368 Until well into
the 1960s, it informed official government policy on the legal treatment of
addicts and shaped the practice of clinicians, regulators, and others in the United
Kingdom.369 The views of the Home Office on the prescription of narcotics to
dependent persons were contained in a memorandum designed to inform doctors
of the boundaries of legitimate medical practice.370 The memo made clear that
the provision of drugs to patients “solely for the gratification of addiction” would
not be considered “medical need” for purposes of the strictures of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.371 It also raised concerns about the misuse of narcotics and about the
potential for improper diversion, cautioning doctors that “[t]he supply or
prescription of narcotics to any addict patient for self-administration is fraught
with risks.”372 All the same, the memo made clear that doctors could legally
prescribe heroin or other narcotics to patients, including patients who were
physically dependent or addicted to these substances.373 The key language,
which came directly from the recommendations of the Rolleston Committee, was
included in the Home Office’s memorandum as an appendix:
[M]orphine or heroin may properly be administered to addicts in the
following circumstances, namely, (a) where patients are under treatment
by the gradual withdrawal method with a view to cure, (b) where it has
been demonstrated, after a prolonged attempt at cure, that the use of the
drug cannot be safely discontinued entirely, on account of the severity

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See BEAN, supra note 341, at 70.
See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 75 (quoting GR. BRIT. HOME OFFICE, THE DUTIES OF
DOCTORS & DENTISTS UNDER THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT & REGULATIONS 2 (6th ed., 1956)).
371. GR. BRIT. HOME OFFICE, THE DUTIES OF DOCTORS & DENTISTS UNDER THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT & REGULATIONS 2 (6th ed., 1956) [hereinafter HOME OFFICE], quoted in
SCHUR, supra note 1, at 75.
372. Id. at 8.
373. See id. at 2–4.
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of the withdrawal symptoms produced, (c) where it has been similarly
demonstrated that the patient, while capable of leading a useful and
relatively normal life when a certain minimum dose is regularly
administered, becomes incapable of this when the drug is entirely
discontinued.374
The government’s position thus accorded physicians considerable discretion.
They could make heroin, morphine, and other narcotics available to patients,
including patients known to be addicted. They could prescribe these drugs in a
course of gradually diminishing doses to withdraw an addict from drugs entirely,
or they could choose to maintain a patient on a small stable dose indefinitely.375
Notwithstanding this broad discretion, the Rolleston Committee, reflecting a
certain unease with the practice, warned doctors to exercise special caution when
providing care to new patients seeking narcotics, encouraged them to seek the
opinion of a second doctor before doing so, and suggested providing the drugs in
an amount sufficiently small that the chances of their being diverted between
office visits would be minimized.376 The committee also considered but chose
not to recommend the adoption of procedures for the coerced treatment or
institutionalization of persons addicted to narcotics.377 Accordingly, specialized
facilities for drug abuse treatment were neither recommended nor developed
until many years later.378 Finally, Rolleston and his committee colleagues
reviewed proposals for a mandatory reporting requirement for physicians
treating patients who were physically dependent on narcotics.379 Once again, the
committee ultimately decided not to endorse such a heavy-handed approach,
preferring to leave the relationship between physician and addict somewhat less
regulated than it otherwise might have been.380
On the other hand, a central registry of addicts was developed by officials in
the Home Office and was maintained for many years, thus leading to the widely
held misapprehension that all addicts in Britain were “registered” by the
government.381 Much of the information that comprised the registry came to the
Home Office as a result of recordkeeping requirements that were set out in the
Dangerous Drugs Act and subsequent drug control statutes for physicians,
pharmacists, and others lawfully engaged in drug transactions.382 For many

374. ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at para. 51, as reprinted in HOME OFFICE,
supra note 371, at app. iv.
375. See id.
376. ROLLESTON COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, at paras. 53–54.
377. See BEAN, supra note 341, at 76.
378. See id. at 76–80.
379. See id. at 65.
380. See id.
381. See id. at 80.
382. See, e.g., Dangerous Drugs Act, 1951, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 48, § 9(d) (U.K.) (requiring
physicians who prescribe narcotics to keep records of such activity).
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years, the “backbone” of the enforcement of these provisions was the periodic
inspection of pharmacies (“chemists’ shops”) by local police officials.383
Typically, a police officer or constable would visit a shop several times a year to
“look for evidence of carelessness or fraud on the part of the chemist in
maintaining his registers or in the handling of dangerous drug stocks.”384 When
inspectors noted the repeated and regular supply of narcotics to one individual,
or if the name of a specific physician appeared with great frequency, the local
inspectors would forward this information to the Home Office, which by the
1930s had established a “Drugs Branch” to keep track of such reports.385
Occasionally, the forwarding of information would lead to a request for a
“special inquiry” by a regional medical officer, who would seek confirmation
from the prescribing physician that the drug was necessary for “legitimate
therapeutic reasons.”386 In this fashion, and through the voluntary reporting of
some doctors who treated addicts, the Drugs Branch over time developed a fairly
comprehensive listing of addicted patients who were receiving treatment from
physicians within the United Kingdom.387
No suggestion was made, however, that an inquiry by a regional medical
officer was ever intended to place pressure on a doctor to reduce the dose of
narcotics that he or she provided to a patient below that which he or she believed
was medically necessary.388 American medical observers of the British system
in 1960 reported that “[p]hysicians are not required by law to give information
to, accept the advice of, or cooperate with the regional medical officer in the
handling of a narcotic addiction problem in one of his own patients (or his own
addiction for that matter).”389 In this sense, the British approach in the midtwentieth century was dramatically unlike that in the United States. Rufus King
captured this difference by explaining that “the British medical profession is in
full and virtually unchallenged control of the distribution of drugs, and this
includes distribution, by prescription or administration, to addicts when
necessary. The police function is to aid and protect medical control, rather than
to substitute for it.”390
From the 1930s through the 1960s both the number of persons in Britain
receiving narcotics maintenance therapy from physicians and the number of
doctors providing that treatment remained small and stable.391 It appears that a

383. Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 110.
384. Id.
385. See JUDSON, supra note 342, at 24; Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 110.
386. Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 110.
387. See id. at 111.
388. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 73–74 (quoting King, supra note 342, at 129).
389. Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 111.
390. King, supra note 342, at 127.
391. Cf. BEAN, supra note 341, at 78–79 (noting that “[i]n 1961, there were 470 known
addicts” and chronicling the increase in addicts during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s).
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number of British doctors chose not to treat addicts at all, feeling that these
patients should be seen by psychiatrists or others with special expertise in the
treatment of narcotics dependency.392 Some general practitioners may have
mistakenly believed that they were not permitted to treat persons suffering from
addiction and refused them care on that basis, while others avoided such patients
out of “personal distaste.”393 Among those physicians who did treat narcotics
addicts, most sought to move the patient ultimately to withdrawal by making an
effort to reduce the prescribed dose gradually.394 Thus, it was “probably only the
exceptional case in which the doctor [concluded that the patient was] incurable
and therefore [was] willing to sustain him with a regular dose of narcotics.”395
The Drugs Branch’s index of known addicts took a characteristically British
bureaucratic form. One commentator, writing in the early 1970s, described it
thus:
The index is maintained by five government clerks in a cluttered room,
and is nothing more prepossessing than six stacks of card files, two of
them newer than the others, set on corners of a desk and a table. Each
addict’s card shows at least his name, his aliases (if any) and address (if
known), his age and physical description, the drugs he has been reported
to take, when he started taking them, and where and when he was first
reported.396
What was remarkable about the index, in addition to its informality
(especially when contrasted with the extraordinarily more complex and wellfunded drug control bureaucracy that had been established in the United States),
was the small size of the population it tracked. In the mid-1930s, a little over six
hundred addicts were listed, although the overwhelming majority (nine out of
ten) were morphine addicts and only “one in twenty was addicted to heroin.”397
Virtually all had become dependent as a consequence of medical treatment for
some other organic disease (therapeutic addiction) or were medical
professionals.398 Half were women and most were middle-aged or older.399 By

392. See SCHUR, supra note 1, at 149.
393. See id.
394. Id. at 148–49.
395. Id. at 148. Apparently, however, when the process of gradual withdrawal reached a point
of sufficient discomfort, some patients sought to “make new arrangements” with a different
physician. Id. at 149–150. For many decades in Britain there was virtually no illegal market in
narcotics, but to the extent that some small amount of illegal drug sharing did take place, it tended
to be concentrated among patients who were “between doctors.” Id. at 150 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
396. JUDSON supra note 342, at 25.
397. Id.
398. See id. at 25.
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1950, the total number of addicts listed had fallen to 306,400 and by 1957,
according to a report submitted by Britain to the United Nations Division of
Narcotics Drugs, the index contained 359 addicts, 149 of whom were addicted to
morphine and 52 to heroin.401 “About 75 of the reported addicts [were]
physicians, dentists, . . . pharmacists,” or other healthcare professionals.402 Only
45 of the 359 persons on the list were identified as “nontherapeutic” addicts.403
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of “nontherapeutic” addicts in
the United Kingdom began to increase.404 This small but perceptible change
(from 45 persons in 1957 to 72 in 1960 to 112 by 1961)405 worried some
observers and contributed to a decision by the government to appoint a new
advisory committee to review the policies derived from the Rolleston
Committee’s recommendations of nearly three decades earlier, which were still
the foundation of the British approach to narcotics addiction.406 The committee,
which was chaired by a leading British physician, Sir Russell Brain, concluded
initially that the status quo was acceptable and that the policies that had been
forged by the Rolleston Committee were still serviceable.407 In particular, the
committee found that there was “no cause to fear” that a substantial and
sustained increase in the number of addicts was likely, or that individual
physicians were incapable of adequately treating those addicts who were known
to the Home Office.408 Little by little, however, the factual foundations of those

399. See id. “Often the addiction was a secret even from the addict’s husband or wife. An
addict was known as such only to his doctor, and to two civil servants and a clerk.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
400. Id. at 37.
401. See Larimore & Brill, supra note 17, at 111.
402. Id. at 111–12.
403. JUDSON, supra note 342, at 37. Indeed, there were so few heroin addicts “whose
addiction was not an accidental result of medical treatment or who were not themselves doctors or
nurses” that one official in the Home Office, H.B. (Bing) Spear, knew most of them personally. Id.
at 26–27. It is said that in the 1960s,
when a doctor with a new case telephoned him, Spear would listen to the physical
description, ask a couple of questions, and identify the addict, giving his real name, his
previous physician, the size of his usual prescription, the particular group of addicts he
belonged to, where he lived, and, often the girl he was living with and the person who
had given him his first shot of heroin.
Id. at 27.
404. See id. at 37.
405. Id.
406. BEAN, supra note 341, at 74–75. For a portion of the government’s charge to this new
committee, see id. at 74 (quoting INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON DRUG ADDICTION, MINISTRY
OF HEALTH, DRUG ADDICTION: REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE 3 (1961)
[hereinafter INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON DRUG ADDICTION].
407. See JUDSON supra note 342, at 35.
408. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also SCHUR, supra note 1, at 162–64 (quoting
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMM. ON DRUG ADDICTION, supra note 406, at 16–18) (setting out the
twenty specific findings of the committee).
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optimistic conclusions began to erode. The objective public data made clear that
narcotics misuse and addiction were growing at an accelerating rate. By 1964,
329 “nontherapeutic” addicts were listed on the index, and by 1966 the number
increased to 885.409 Equally important, the system of relying on individual
physicians to treat―and in many cases medically maintain―what had been a
stable population of addicts was itself overwhelmed by growing numbers and
changed circumstances:
[T]he prescription system, which in the past had always kept the heroin
supply in balance with the demand, so that a black market had nothing to
feed on, had now become the only source of heroin for a black market so
virulent that over one stretch the number of heroin addicts on the Home
Office index was doubling every sixteen months.410
This steady growth in both the number of “nontherapeutic” addicts and in a
secondary illegal market for narcotics led the experts in the Drugs Branch of the
Home Office and many physicians to conclude that significant changes to the
system were required.411 The Brain Committee was pressed back into service
and in 1965 recommended the creation of a system of specialized clinics for the
treatment of narcotics addiction.412 Along with the creation of this new clinic
system, the committee recommended that general practitioners and other
physicians outside of the clinics not be permitted to prescribe narcotics to addicts
as maintenance treatment, and for the first time, they endorsed a rule that doctors
be obligated to report new cases of addiction to the Home Office.413 Although
the new specialized treatment facilities could have been created relatively
quickly by officials within the National Health Service, they were not established
until early 1968.414 Parliament eventually passed legislation adopting the Brain
Committee’s recommendations with respect to mandatory physician reporting of
new cases and the limitation on individual doctors prescribing narcotics to

409. JUDSON, supra note 342, at 43.
410. Id. at 38. Reports from the period suggest that perhaps as few as a dozen “prescribing
doctors” were the source of the diverted narcotics. Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
few apparently sold prescriptions for cash, one was a “compulsive gambler,” and another was
mentally ill. Id. at 39–40. A few were “dedicated physicians attempting to treat patients that most
doctors refused to touch.” Id. at 40.
411. See id. at 51–54.
412. See RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP: AMERICA’S FIFTY-YEAR FOLLY 204–05 (1972).
413. See JUDSON, supra note 342, at 56–57. Judson suggests that these changes to British
medical practice were the result of a “consensus” that had been reached “more outside the Brain
Committee’s meetings than in” and that the “medical profession had badly failed to discipline
itself.” Id. at 55. Interestingly, Bing Spear of the Drugs Branch had testified before the Committee
in favor of less radical changes that would have permitted general practitioners to continue treating
a limited number of dependent patients. See id. at 54–55. In the end, the committee, although it
“cleared the medical profession in general of blame,” went further and adopted the changes that it
asserted “the medical profession had already agreed were necessary.” Id. at 56–57.
414. See id. at 57–59.
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addicts.415 With these pieces in place, a period of transition in British drug
policy began that would last for another fifteen years.
During this transition period the total “number of ‘addicts notified to the
Home Office’” continued to increase, so that by 1976 the figure was slightly less
than 2,000 persons.416 Although this was a dramatic increase from the relatively
small-sized addict population measured by the Home Office from the 1930s
through the late 1950s,417 it was nothing like the explosion that was to follow. In
fact, in each of the five-year periods following 1976, the number of reported
addicts in the United Kingdom doubled, and by 1996 the list contained more
than 40,000 persons known to be addicted to narcotics.418 By the mid-1980s,
these alarming numbers combined with other political and social dynamics to
produce a fundamental shift in British drug policy. But the rate of increase in the
late 1960s and 1970s was sufficiently gradual, and the surrounding policy
context sufficiently resilient, that the new clinic system put into place in 1968
could be seen more as a modification of the Rolleston Committee’s approach
than as a sharp departure from what had come before. One observer of the scene
in both the United States and Britain in the late 1960s observed in the British
Medical Journal that “40 years of punishing the addict” had not served America
well.419 “[It] still has a large drug-addiction rate,” he explained, “a wellestablished black market, and an addict population which is forced into varieties
of criminality.”420 By contrast, the author argued:
The growing rate of drug addiction in Britain has forced revision of
the law, but the underlying philosophy which guides the British
approach remains unaltered: the thesis was and is that the interests of
treatment and prevention are best served by regarding the addict as a
patient, by giving him heroin if he so demands, by wooing him rather
than coercing him into treatment, and by keeping addiction above
ground rather than by driving it into the criminal underworld.421
Each of these features continued to inform practice in the United Kingdom
throughout the transition period.422 Nevertheless, a number of broader

415. See id. at 57. Thus, “[c]ompulsory notification of new cases was to begin February 22.
Prescribing of heroin and cocaine by general practitioners was to stop on April 16.” Id. at 59.
416. Reuter & Stevens, supra note 299, at 463, 464 fig.2.
417. See JUDSON, supra note 342, at 37.
418. Reuter & Stevens, supra note 299, at 463, 464 fig.2.
419. Griffith Edwards, Relevance of American Experience of Narcotic Addiction to the British
Scene, 3 BRIT. MED. J. 425, 426 (1967).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 428 (citation omitted).
422. Although the use of heroin in maintenance treatment was replaced in great measure with
methadone, even this modification was undertaken according to the discretionary judgment of
doctors in the clinics and not as the result of a decision made by political officials. See James L.
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developments took place during this period that ultimately set the stage for more
fundamental changes to come, the first of which was the spread of narcotics
misuse beyond London.423 Historically, the problem of drug addiction in Britain
had been limited essentially to London and its immediately surrounding areas.424
By the end of the 1970s, however, a number of other regions had experienced a
dramatic increase in the incidence of addiction, with especially significant spikes
in heroin use observed by public health officials in Manchester and Glasgow.425
A second development during this period was a shift in the way that illicit drugs,
particularly heroin, found their way into the marketplace. Prior to the mid1970s, “most of the heroin used by addicts [had been] legally produced and
prescribed, [even] if illegally traded, between users.”426 By the early 1980s,
however, “an influx of heroin into Britain following the Iranian Revolution” had
not only led to the creation of a black market but also had driven down the cost
of the drug for users.427 A third factor that contributed to fundamental changes
in the 1980s involved modifications adopted over time by the doctors who
provided treatment in the clinics or “Drug Dependence Units” (DDUs) that had
been created following the Brain Committee’s final report.428 These physicians,
especially the psychiatrists who staffed the London DDUs, had moved from a
treatment philosophy that emphasized long-term maintenance therapy to one that
relied on “a rapidly reducing course of oral methadone, with an ultimate focus on
abstinence.”429 This shift came not as a result of a formal change in the
government’s policy toward the treatment of addiction, but as a pragmatic
decision by these clinicians in order to free up needed treatment slots.430
The combined result of each of these changing circumstances was that by
the 1980s, for the first time, a significant number of addicts throughout the
United Kingdom were using narcotics outside of the context of medical
supervision and treatment.431 The spread of the drug problem beyond London
was important because sixteen of the twenty-two DDUs were located in the
Thames region, mostly in London.432 As the incidence of addiction increased in
locations removed from this concentration of medical treatment facilities, a
greater percentage of users functioned outside of the clinic system. The adoption
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425. See id.
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428. See id. at 33.
429. Id. at 34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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of an abstinence-based methadone withdrawal approach to treatment within the
DDUs also drove many addicts away from the clinics both because it was more
comfortable and easier for users to obtain relatively inexpensive heroin in the
expanding black market and because the almost exclusive focus on opiate
addiction in the DDUs did not match the growing “poly-drug” use of addicts.433
All of these trends ultimately were important in helping to produce a significant
reformulation of British drug policy in the 1980s from a purely medical model to
one that viewed narcotics abuse and addiction as a public health problem, a
social welfare problem, and eventually a problem of crime control.434
During this period of transition, the political significance of narcotics misuse
and addiction also evolved. At the time of the Brain Committee’s first
examination of British policy, it was possible for observers to say that there was
“little relationship between crime and narcotic addiction in England.”435 Perhaps
as a consequence of that fact, the problem of drug abuse was not “a front-rank
social problem” for members of Parliament, and the public showed less concern
about drug addiction than about a great variety of other social issues, such as
cruelty to children or animals.436 In addition, the class and race/ethnicity
distribution of British heroin addiction throughout most of the 1960s and 1970s
was quite unlike that in the United States.437 Although several British cities had
large concentrations of relatively poor immigrants—including communities of
Indians, Bengalis, and Pakistanis—most narcotics users during this period were
middle class and white.438 Thus, it was more difficult to argue, as some did in
the United States, that drug abuse was essentially a problem of marginal or
“outsider” groups.439 As the problem of drug addiction spread to new groups
and to new regions in the United Kingdom, and as the black market in heroin and
other drugs necessarily linked drug users with criminal activity, the political
discourse shifted from a narrative about disease to one about social risk and
deviance, and the overall saliency of the issue in the media and in the public’s
mind also increased.440
But the constellation of forces that drove the revision of British drug policy
in the 1980s away from a predominately medical model and toward a broader
multidisciplinary social welfare approach also included larger political dynamics
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characteristic of conservative welfare policy more generally in the government
of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, keen students of this period have
argued that these changes reflected the Thatcher government’s overall strategy of
turning the government from a “provider” to a “purchaser” of social welfare
services.441 This larger move to replace “welfare statism” with “welfare
pluralism” met with mixed success in a variety of areas, but it had a clear impact
in helping to reconfigure the way that drug abuse treatment services in the
United Kingdom were conceived, funded, and deployed from the mid-1980s
forward.442
In particular, this shift in the way the problem was framed and responses
were developed can be traced to a decision by the Thatcher government to fund a
multi-year program to provide community-based services for dealing with the
problem of drug abuse.443 The program, which was known as the Central
Funding Initiative (CFI), made a total of ₤17.5 million available between 1983
and 1989 to both governmental and voluntary organizations.444 Although
eighteen percent of these funds went to DDUs and other hospital-based services
for the treatment of drug addiction, nearly half of the money was allocated to
“community-based walk-in centers,” and another twenty percent went to
“multidisciplinary community drug [treatment] teams.”445 The CFI funders
made clear that this reallocation of financial support away from traditional
medical treatment providers reflected the government’s view that communitybased groups and voluntary organizations had greater “expertise, in terms of
prevention and counselling” than did the physicians in the National Health
Service and were “more flexible” in the services they provided.446
In addition to operationalizing a preference for volunteer organizations and
community-based multidisciplinary teams over traditional clinic and hospitalbased National Health Service doctors, the program also involved a transition to
a “new risk-based strategy for the governance of the ‘drug problem.’”447 This
involved a change not only in the allocation of financial resources but also in
terminology and in methodology. Thus, policymakers began to refer to persons
who misused drugs as “problem drug takers” rather than addicts,448 and
introduced a new emphasis on evaluation, accountability, and the use of social
science evidence as the basis for drug policy.449
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The move away from a pure medical model and the involvement of a “new
policy community” concerned with drugs and addiction was critical in shaping
Britain’s response to the next important development in the history of drug
policy in the United Kingdom—the spread of HIV infection in the late 1980s and
the onset of AIDS.450 A broad coalition of public health officials, voluntary
organizations working together through an umbrella group known as the
Standing Conference on Drug Abuse (SCODA), and experts from the Advisory
Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD), which had been established in the
1971 Misuse of Drugs Act to provide advice to the government “on measures to
prevent and deal with the social problems arising from the misuse of drugs,”451
had already begun to reframe drug policy as a matter of risk assessment and
harm minimization.452 But given the particular impact of the AIDS epidemic on
IV drug users, and increased mortality from the transmission of HIV infection
between drug users and through their sexual partners into the broader population,
it was only natural that both the policy discourse and the concrete measures that
were developed to deal with this crisis, including increased funding for “opiate
substitution treatment,” were explicitly framed as public health responses
designed to reduce the harm occasioned by the misuse of drugs.453 A number of
these interventions, including, for example, an extensive syringe exchange
program, were institutionalized through a “national system that bypassed the
DDUs.”454 Thus, although the traditional clinic system that had emerged out of
the Brain Committee’s report and that traced its origins to the British system and
the Rolleston Committee’s recommendations remained as one component in a
growing array of resources available for dealing with addiction, a transformation
had taken place in the nature of the “liberal pragmatism” that long had
characterized British drug policy.455
The success of these harm-reduction efforts in slowing the spread of HIV
infection among IV drug users and the reduced mortality brought about by the
introduction of anti-retroviral medications helped to change the HIV/AIDS crisis
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from an acute public health emergency to a lower intensity (at least in the
By the mid-1990s, as the health
public’s mind) chronic problem.456
consequences of drug misuse “lost some of their discursive impact,” a new
narrative linking drugs with crime emerged in media discussions and in policy
analyses in the United Kingdom.457 This new narrative was introduced by the
Conservative Government in 1995 with the publication of its national drugs
strategy, entitled Tackling Drugs Together.458 This document carried over the
pragmatic harm-minimization perspective that had dominated drug policy in
Britain since the early 1980s, but it now elevated the problem of “drug-related
crime” to the head of the list of harms associated with the misuse of drugs.459
The statement of purpose contained in the 1995 strategy endorsed “vigorous law
enforcement, accessible treatment and a new emphasis on education and
prevention” in order to protect communities, safeguard young people, and
promote public health.460 Importantly, pursuant to this strategy, the Prison
Service introduced the first mandatory drug testing procedures adopted by the
British government.461
In the run up to the 1997 national elections, the Labour Party adopted this
new narrative linking drugs and crime and put out a policy piece, Breaking the
Vicious Circle, that further developed the themes set out in Tackling Drugs
Together.462 Upon their victory in 1997, Labour officials chose to intensify both
the rhetoric and the policy innovations suggested by the prior government’s
strategy.463 Their 1998 drugs strategy, Tackling Drugs to Build a Better Britain,
once again emphasized the importance of “criminal justice involvement in drugs
issues” and proposed even more resources for treatment, prevention, and
education.464 A crucial component of the New Labour approach to drug policy
was the development of Drug Treatment and Testing Orders (DTTOs),
probation-based court orders that contained two features, drug testing and
coerced drug treatment, and that were to become increasingly important to the
overall approach to drugs pursued by the Labour government.465 Pursuant to the
1998 Crime and Disorder Act, three DTTO pilot programs were established, in
Gloucestershire, Liverpool, and South London.466 The DTTOs, which were
directed at drug-using offenders with prior involvement in the criminal system,
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were deemed to be a success, and by the middle of 2000 the government had
allocated an additional “₤60 million to roll out DTTOs in all forty-two of
Britain’s probation services.”467
The “criminalization” of British drug policy accelerated in the early years of
the next decade. The Criminal Justice and Courts Services Act of 2000
broadened the class of offenders who could be tested for narcotics to include
defendants charged with “trigger offenses” (mostly property crimes and drugs
offenses) and “those under probation service supervision.”468 And in 2001, lead
responsibility for drug policy was transferred back from the Department of
Health to the Home Office.469 In its updated drugs strategy, published in 2002,
the government proposed increased funding and enhanced emphasis on
providing drug testing and treatment to offenders at every stage of the criminal
justice system, from arrest and bail through sentencing and imprisonment or
community supervision.470 This initiative, the Drug Interventions Programme
(DIP), was extended even further in the 2005 Drugs Act, which “introduced
further testing powers on arrest and mandatory drug assessments for positive
tests.”471
If there was little relationship between street crime and drug addiction at the
time of the Brain Committee’s investigations,472 the central premise of the new
policy, well established by the start of the millennium, was that a great deal of
crime in the United Kingdom is caused by an identifiable number of offenders
who are “problem drug users.”473 This core premise, that there was (and is) a
“direct and simple relationship between drugs and crime,”474 was based on
several assumptions of questionable empirical veracity, and led to a fundamental
policy prescription that also was founded on a contested proposition. The
category of “problem drug users” has been understood throughout to be made up
almost entirely of users of heroin and crack cocaine.475 Those who misuse
alcohol have not generally been included in this grouping and have not been
targeted in either the government’s strategies or in new legislation, “despite
much stronger evidence of an association with a variety of serious and violent
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crimes.”476 Further, the drug users who are “problem users” in this narrative are
those thought to be involved disproportionately in “acquisitive offending,”
offenses undertaken “in order to feed their habit.”477 Thus, the criminal offenses
that are taken to be caused in such great measure by narcotics misuse are what
the British government has called “volume” crimes, such as “thefts from shops
and cars, assaults, burglaries, robberies and minor frauds.”478 Excluded from
this group are other serious crimes—including “domestic violence, sexual
assaults and major frauds”—which the government generally does not
characterize as linked causally to drug misuse.479
Given this construction of the category of “problem drug users,” the
animating objective of British drug policy has been to get offenders “out of
crime and into treatment.”480 The notion has been that offenders who misuse
heroin and crack cocaine cause an enormous amount of social harm in the form
of volume crimes, that the criminal justice system is a suitable site for
undertaking the screening and treatment of these offending substance abusers,
that this mandatory testing and treatment is likely to be effective in reducing
drug misuse and addiction, and that these positive clinical outcomes are likely to
translate into reduced rates of criminal re-offending.481 This series of related
ideas has supported the development and expansion of schemes in which
workers focused on drug testing and drug treatment have been relocated to police
stations and criminal courthouses throughout Britain, and in which the incidence
of court-ordered treatment for offenders under probation supervision has grown
dramatically.482
Each of the ideas embedded in this scheme is problematic. Alex Stevens has
shown that the frequency with which the concept of drug-related crime was
mentioned in the British press “increased by a factor of eight” over the course of
the 1990s.483 Although for slightly different reasons, both Conservative
members of Parliament and Labour members adopted the argument that at least
half of all crime in the United Kingdom could be attributed in some fashion to
drugs and drug addiction.484 Over time, the British government has “invested
substantially” in research purporting to establish the connection between drug
misuse and criminal offending, particularly in the form of “large-scale surveys”
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of persons interviewed in police stations following arrest and other surveys of
persons entering drug treatment.485 Notwithstanding the increased frequency
with which the drugs-crime link has been invoked by politicians, its heightened
presence in the public’s consciousness, and the release of new data marshaled in
support of this essential claim, the reality is that the relationship between drug
abuse and addiction on the one hand and criminal activity on the other is more
complex, less clearly causal, and less well-established than the dominant
narrative would have it.
Stevens and his colleague Peter Reuter have argued that—in addition to
complications stemming from the question of whether drug-related crime is
caused directly by the “psycho-pharmacological effects” of illegal drugs, the
systemic effects of “the operation of illegal markets” produced by drug
prohibition policies, or both—there are a number of other problems with the
basic claim of a correlation and/or causal relationship between drug misuse and
criminal offending.486 First, they point out that the claim that “drug motivated
crime accounts for half of all crime,”487 which was included in a recently
released Welsh drug strategy as well as numerous other reports and documents
issued by the Prime Minister’s drug policy team, is based on an extrapolation of
data taken from the various British arrestee surveys funded by the government in
recent years.488 The problem with this data is that arrestees are not a
representative sample of offenders. Indeed, “offenders who report drug use are
about twice as likely to come into contact with the police, when other variables .
. . are taken into account.”489 Thus, there is almost certainly an overrepresentation of drug users among the population of persons who have been
subject to police arrest, and an extrapolation from their patterns of use is likely to
produce an exaggerated bottom-line conclusion about the percentage of crimes
that drug users commit overall.490
A second problem with the data relates particularly to the degree of criminal
offending that patients report upon entering treatment. Here, the distortion
comes from the fact that the criminal activity of drug users “tends to peak in the
months preceding their entry to treatment.”491 Thus, estimates of the total
amount of crime committed by all drug users based on an extrapolation from the
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self-reports of users entering treatment are likely to result in a substantial overcounting of the amount of crime actually committed by this population.492
A final problem goes to the assertion of causality that is frequently included
in the drugs-crime narrative. The assumption that has fueled the claim of
causality derives from the simple observation that many people who engage in
criminal activity also use drugs. But this “jump from correlation to causality”
has not been established by the available data.493 Here, the studies paint a
complex picture. Some drug users apparently do commit acquisitive crimes in
order to pay for drugs, and some studies seem to indicate that “offending tends to
peak during periods of frequent drug use.”494 Studies also show, however, “that
offending tends to precede drug use in the life course,” and that, at least for
some, the causal arrows may run in the opposite direction.495
The claimed drugs-crime link is meant to support a drug strategy that targets
drug-using offenders in the criminal system on the theory that forced testing and
treatment of this group will dramatically reduce offending and produce safer
communities. This formula assumes a rather simplistic conception of the
relationship between drug use and crime that rests on uncertain empirical
foundations, as detailed above, and that has been challenged by recent data
tending to show that “socio-demographic variables―such as age, sex,
employment status and school leaving age―may be more important than drug
use in predicting some types of offending.”496 Even if the empirical basis for the
connection between drugs and crime is established, however, there still may be
problems with the strategy’s reliance on drug testing across the criminal justice
system and its use of coerced treatment. The programs of drug testing that began
in the prisons in the 1990s and that were expanded through the DTTO initiative
(now called Drug Rehabilitation Requirements or DRRs),497 policies mandating
the testing of arrested persons, and new requirements that drug testing be made a
condition of parole, have not, taken on their own, necessarily been effective in
reducing crime. In fact, “[t]here is no evidence that testing without effective
treatment provision is successful in terms of deterring drug use and
offending.”498 As for effective treatment, the most that responsibly can be
asserted is that “drug treatment can lead to reductions in some types of offending
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for some types of drug users.”499 Offenders with co-occurring mental illnesses
and those who are poly-drug users are especially difficult to treat, and the data
does not conclusively support the conclusion that treatment effectively reduces
their criminal involvement.500 There is reliable evidence that other drug users
often do engage in less criminal behavior upon entry into treatment, and some
research even suggests that these effects can persist over time, although at
somewhat reduced rates.501 But overall, the cost-benefit claims made by
proponents of the new drug policy likely are significantly exaggerated.502 In the
end, the evidence suggests that drug policy, and particularly the decision to
provide significant public funding for treatment, may have some effect on the
amount of criminal conduct that drug users commit, but that it has a limited
capacity to reduce the number of regular users of illegal drugs overall.503
With respect to the frequently expressed claim that enforced treatment for
drug misuse is as effective as voluntary treatment,504 the low rate of program
completion among offenders subject to DTTOs and their high rate of re-arrest
and re-conviction raise legitimate questions about efficacy.505 The government
and others supporting the use of mandatory treatment frequently cite studies
from the United States that show relatively successful outcomes for drug
treatment court participants and others who have received coerced treatment, but
at least one international literature review paints a somewhat different picture.506
It reports that studies of the effectiveness of coerced drug treatment that have
been published in French, German, Dutch, and Italian have “shown a greater
range of outcomes” than do those published in English,507 and suggests that
success in treatment may depend significantly on participants’ motivation and on
their having been coerced to enter a program.508
Regardless of the strength of its empirical foundations, there is no question
that British drug policy in the first decade of the twenty-first century was
fundamentally different than the approach to drugs and drug abuse that was
followed for most of the twentieth century. There is some uncertainty, however,
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about where on the historical timeline this shift should be located and about how
sharp this departure really was. From one point of view, the most radical shift in
policy and in practice occurred during the 1980s, when the physician-dominated
clinic system was overtaken by a broad-based social welfare approach that was
deployed first to deal with a rapidly expanding narcotics problem and then to
contain the harms posed by the spread of HIV infection among IV drug users and
those with whom they came in contact.509 Those who hold this view see the
transition from a public health focus in the 1980s to a criminal justice focus
beginning in the 1990s as an evolutionary process within a larger pragmatic
framework devoted to the management of social risk.510 There is a competing
perspective, though, which views the criminalization of British drug policy in the
1990s as a more fundamental rupture from the past.511 Adherents of this view
point out that even though the physicians in the DDUs lost some of their
dominance in the 1980s, the harm-minimization policies of that period were still
oriented toward managing the health risks of drugs and drug misuse (the
objectives that had animated the British system from the time of the Rolleston
Committee forward).512 By contrast, they argue, by the late 1990s a concern for
the health of drug users had been replaced by a far different policy objective: that
of community safety and crime control.513
The best historical account is likely to include elements from both of these
perspectives. To be sure, the current approach to drugs and addiction is heavily
focused on crime and on interventions situated in the criminal justice system that
would have been markedly out of place in the United Kingdom as recently as the
early 1980s. In fact, government officials and others who were influential in the
development of British drug policy from the Rolleston Committee to the Brain
Committee and beyond repeatedly considered and rejected calls for just the sort
of mandatory testing and coerced treatment that is now the centerpiece of the
government’s Drug Interventions Programme and its overall approach to
narcotics misuse.514 On the other hand, even though drug policy is now viewed
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through the lens of an asserted drugs-crime link, the British have placed a greater
emphasis on treatment funding than have their counterparts in the United States.
They have continued to invest in treatment, both rhetorically and in terms of the
allocation of financial resources devoted to it, to a degree far in excess of that
typical in the United States.515 Those responsible for the provision of treatment
in Britain, both within the criminal justice system and more generally, have also
been more explicitly oriented toward a harm-minimization perspective in
defining the objectives of treatment than have their counterparts in the United
States.516 Given this persistent pragmatism, it is entirely reasonable to conclude
that the most fundamental changes in British policy and practice in recent years
have not been “epochal,” but instead have been “something new taking shape
within and alongside the old arrangements.”517
B. Underlying Cultural, Economic, and Political Factors That Have
Contributed to the “Criminalization” of British Drug Policy
Whether one characterizes the criminalization of British drug policy as
incremental or epochal change, it is clear that it represents something of an
Americanization of the approach that previously had been in place.518
Meanwhile, recent events in the United States suggest that American drug policy
may be taking a turn toward the more pragmatic stance that long has dominated
thinking about drugs and drug control in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the
Obama Administration has indicated its desire to move away from the rhetoric,
and presumably some of the policies, of the “War on Drugs.”519 However,
before turning to a consideration of the ways in which drug policy in the United
Kingdom and the United States have been converging, it is worth exploring the
political and social dynamics that have contributed to the development of the
current approach in Great Britain. This background may help to put the relative
convergence of the two systems into context and elucidate the important ways in
which they are likely to continue to differ.
Observers have pointed to two specific “social facts” as central to an
understanding of how the drugs-crime link has come to dominate British
discourse and public policy on narcotics and drug addiction.520 Together, these

515. See infra text accompanying notes 569 and 634–642.
516. See NOLAN, supra note 19, at 58.
517. Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 821 (quoting NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM:
REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 173 (1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
518. See NOLAN, supra note 19, at 71–72.
519. See, e.g., Gary Fields, White House Czar Calls for End to “War on Drugs,” WALL ST. J.,
May 14, 2009, at A3 (“The Obama administration’s new drug czar says he wants to banish the idea
that the U.S. is fighting ‘a war on drugs,’ a move that would underscore a shift favoring treatment
over incarceration in trying to reduce illicit drug use.”).
520. See, e.g., Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 821 (“[T]he dynamic of late modernity has
changed patterns of drug use in such a way as to create a new drug policy predicament. This
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two features of the contemporary social landscape are said to have created a
“policy predicament” that has energized the development of a criminal justice
focus by changing the political saliency of the risks thought to be associated with
drug misuse.521 The first “social fact” is the “normalization” over the past
twenty years of drug-trying and “recreational drug use” in the United Kingdom,
especially among young people.522 The “normalization thesis” has been applied
in particular by Howard Parker of the University of Manchester School of Law
to show that the level of casual drug use and experimentation among young
Britons has grown dramatically since the early 1990s, and increasingly has come
to be regarded as “commonplace rather than exceptional” by young people
across the categories of class, ethnicity, and gender.523 There are several
important “dimensions” to Parker’s analysis, in addition to his observations
about an overall increase in drug use by adolescents and other young people in
the United Kingdom.524 Perhaps most important is the data drawn from a
number of longitudinal studies that show that “abstainers” (young people who
have chosen not to use drugs) and “ex-users” (those who report that they have
discontinued use) increasingly accept as commonplace and even “sensible” the
recreational drug use of others with whom they are in close contact.525 “There is
thus a growing body of evidence that abstainers have friendship and ‘going out’
relationships with drug-using peers and respect, if sometimes reluctantly, their
right to use certain drugs recreationally.”526 An additional dimension is the
“cultural accommodation of recreational drug use” in the broader society, as
demonstrated by its “ever more neutral and even positive” portrayal on
television, in movies, and in other public media.527

predicament has its origins in two new social facts about the drug situation in the last two decades
of the twentieth century: the normalization of youth drug experiences and the new heroin/crack
problem.”).
521. See id. at 819 (citing David Garland, Beyond the Culture of Control, CRITICAL REV.
INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 160, 171 (2004)).
522. See Howard Parker, Normalization as a Barometer: Recreational Drug Use and the
Consumption of Leisure by Younger Britons, 13 ADDICTION RES. & THEORY 205, 205–06 (2005);
Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 820. The normalization thesis is a sociological tool that has been
used to study the way in which a wide variety of stigmatized groups, including, for example, people
with learning disabilities, over time may become included in everyday life so that “their identities or
behaviour become increasingly accommodated and perhaps eventually valued.” Parker, supra, at
205.
523. See Parker, supra note 522, at 205–08; Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 821–22.
524. An important dimension is that illegal drugs, including cannabis, amphetamines, LSD,
ecstasy, and cocaine, have become much more available and more easily accessible to ordinary
casual users. See Parker, supra note 522, at 206.
525. See id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted).
526. Id. (citing MADSEN PIRIE & ROBERT M. WORCESTER, THE NEXT LEADERS? 35–36
(1999), available at http://www.adamsmith.org/images/uploads/publications/the-next-leaders.
pdf).
527. Id. at 207–08.
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A second “social fact” that has influenced the development of the new drug
policy narrative in the United Kingdom is the profound increase in number and
shift in the distribution of heroin users over the last quarter of the twentieth
century.528 As has already been noted, this increase in heroin use was linked to
the creation and expansion of a British black market for heroin, which occurred
in part as a result of geopolitical forces outside of the United Kingdom, most
specifically the Iranian Revolution of 1979.529 The general process of
globalization within which this event took place has served to facilitate the
processing, international shipping, and trafficking of drugs more broadly and has
been “a key factor behind their greatly increased availability in Britain in recent
decades.”530 Globalization has also played a role in creating the social and
economic dislocation that has especially impacted the “most deprived housing
estates and neighbourhoods” in the United Kingdom where the “mainly young
and unemployed” new users of heroin reside.531 As this “problematic” drug use
has grown in size and “become entangled with localized concentrations of
multiple socio-economic deprivation,”532 it has emerged as the basis for new
perceived social risks that have led to a demand for new policy responses from
the central government.533
The combination of the normalization of other casual or recreational drug
use and the explosion and geographic spread of heroin use has formed a
“dangerous political ‘cocktail.’”534 The normalization ingredient has contributed
to a sense that drug use is pervasive and that drugs are everywhere.535 The
expansion of an illegal market for heroin, the rapid growth in the number of
persons who abuse this drug, and their concentration among the poor and
marginal have all contributed to a public perception that drug addiction is
dangerous, that it poses a threat to the stability and safety of communities, and
that it is thus “deeply problematic.”536 This “cocktail” emerged during a period
in which both policymakers and the public were already well-accustomed to
thinking and speaking about drug policy within a risk management and harmminimization framework. The Central Funding Initiative of the Thatcher years
and the HIV-motivated drug policy activism later in the 1980s prepared the
ground for politicians, the media, and others to begin addressing this new

528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

See Mold & Berridge, supra note 423, at 31.
See supra text accompanying note 427.
Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 823.
See id. at 822 (citing GEOFFREY PEARSON, THE NEW HEROIN USERS 4 (1987)).
Id. at 820.
See id.
Id. at 824.
Id.
Id.
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“cocktail” in terms of the new risks to communities that drugs were thought to
present.537
But determining which risks are the most pressing and which harms are the
most important to minimize is a complex task involving considerable social and
political negotiation. The fact that risk selection is an open and contested
societal enterprise is inconsistent with a “‘realist’ view [which] holds that risk
selection is a neutral and rational process, involving an objective assessment of
Instead, good work both in
probabilities and of the scale of harms.”538
anthropology and in legal scholarship has shown that societies actively “choose
the classes of dangerous events and harms that [they] worry about,”539 and that
public debates about which risks governments should attend to and which harms
they should seek to minimize are deeply normative.540
In an important article entitled The Collapse of the Harm Principle, Bernard
Harcourt shows that arguments based on the need to avoid harm have changed
over time, and along the way their normative dimension has become more
apparent.541 Originally the exclusive province of “progressives” or “liberals”
concerned with limiting the reach of government enforcement efforts into
activities that did not threaten harm to others,542 arguments about harm are now
deployed both by those seeking to limit the reach of criminal enforcement and by
those pushing for its expansion.543 Nominally, these competing harm-based
arguments sound in consequentialist terms. Thus, in contemporary debates over
the question of drug prohibition, advocates for strong criminal enforcement point
to the negative consequences that drug abuse causes to individuals’ health, to the
stability of families, to economic productivity, and to community cohesion,544
while those seeking to limit prohibition policies cite the harms associated with
enforcement efforts, including the direct and indirect costs imposed by the war
on drugs.545
At an earlier point, arguments about harm and about risk were exclusively
consequentialist tools used against the effort of legal moralists to enlist the
coercive power of the state to enforce a particular set of values or norms.546

537. See id. at 825.
538. Id. at 826.
539. Id. (quoting Ian Hacking, Risk and Dirt, in RISK AND MORALITY 22, 22 (Richard V.
Ericson & Aaron Doyle eds., 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
540. See Harcourt, supra note 245, at 185.
541. See id. at 185–86.
542. This is the “harm principle” that has characterized libertarian thinking at least since Mill.
See supra note 269.
543. See Harcourt, supra note 245, at 112–13.
544. See Bennett, supra note 254, at 1–2.
545. See Harcourt, supra note 245, at 175 (citing Ethan Nadelmann, Learning to Live With
Drugs, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1999, at A21; Ethan A. Nadelmann, Perspective on Legalizing Drugs:
Don’t Get Carried Away, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1999, at M5).
546. See id. at 192–93.
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Now, says Harcourt, the concern about minimizing harm runs in both directions,
and this has changed how the arguments operate.547 In particular, because both
sides in policy debates now often make harm-based arguments, and because the
harm principle on its face does not provide any guidance on how to weigh
competing claims of harm, recourse must be had to other sources of social
meaning to determine the comparative importance of identified harms and the
This recourse to normative
comparative danger of potential risks.548
considerations beyond the concrete consequentialist claims of the disputants
necessarily leads back to a nonconsequentialist discourse.549 As Harcourt puts it:
Once non-trivial harm arguments have been made, we inevitably must
look beyond the harm principle. . . . We must access larger debates in
ethics, law and politics―debates about power, autonomy, identity,
human flourishing, equality, freedom and other interests and values that
give meaning to the claim that an identifiable harm matters.550
The “debates beyond the harm principle” that Harcourt has in mind involve
just the sort of social and political negotiation that cultural theorists of risk
selection contemplate. This normative dimension has not, however, been made
explicit. Instead, the move from “objective assessment of probabilities and of
the scale of harms”551 to a subjective process of assembling a dominant “risk
portfolio”552 according to a set of contested values and interests is neither
acknowledged nor, for the most part, discussed by those engaged in the
enterprise. If anything, the public conversation has become more concerned
with social science data, with empiricism, and with insuring that policy decisions
are “evidence based.” Indeed, an important contribution of the Central Funding
Initiative in the early 1980s was precisely this turn toward empiricism, to ensure
that drug policy decisions were made on the basis of scientific evidence, careful
assessment, and objective measurement of outcomes.553
At the same time, though, it appears that the claims of the British
government with respect to the link between drugs and crime have been
“exaggerated,”554 perhaps even reckless, and the “jump from correlation to
causality” has been insufficiently supported by the available data.555 An

547. See id. at 193.
548. See id.
549. This point is related to the analytic circularity discussed in Part II. See supra text
accompanying notes 337–339.
550. Harcourt, supra note 245, at 183.
551. Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 826.
552. Id.
553. See Mold & Berridge, supra note 423, at 41, 43.
554. Stevens, supra note 440, at 78.
555. Id. at 82–83.
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explanation for this apparent mismatch between the rhetoric of evidentiary rigor
and the reality of a pattern of persistent empirical over-claiming may be found in
work that seeks to show how “facts” find their way into policy discourse. This
work demonstrates that evidence is strategically selected, assembled, and
deployed by coalitions of advocates, government officials, and others who make
up competing “discourse coalitions.”556 In the case of British drug policy
debates over the past ten or fifteen years, the broad universe of evidence that
might have been treated as relevant to the formulation of strategies and
initiatives has selectively been narrowed due to the formation and ultimate
ascendancy of a discourse coalition that joined those with a health focus and
those with a criminal justice focus.557 As in the United States, the health
narrative and the crime narrative often have been understood as inconsistent
conceptions. In fact, however, they have coexisted and reinforced one another in
recent years. It appears that the treatment community has joined the crime
coalition in part because the central government’s policy, which has included a
commitment to expanding funding for drug treatment by more than 300% within
a seven-year period, has funneled most of that money through the criminal
justice system and has targeted drug-related offenders.558 Thus, because the
drugs-crime linkage has supported a policy that has “emphasized expenditure on
drug treatment as an investment in crime reduction,” those most concerned about
the health consequences of drug misuse have found themselves in coalition with
those inclined to stress the criminal justice aspects of drug policy.559
The “structuration” of the drugs-crime discourse and its
“institutionalization” in a variety of statutes and funding initiatives has tended to
obscure a competing discourse and the attendant data upon which it relies. This
alternative conception acknowledges a relationship between the misuse of drugs
and criminal offending, but argues that causality between the two is more
complex and likely mediated by a series of “underlying social factors, including
inequality and deprivation, which produce both problematic drug use and

556. See id. at 84–85 (quoting and citing Maarten A. Hajer, Discourse Coalitions and the
Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain, in THE ARGUMENTATIVE
TURN IN POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 43, 45–46 (Frank Fischer & John Forester eds., 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted). In discussing the operation of “discourse coalitions” in the
formulation of contemporary British drug policy, Alex Stevens uses the methodology of Maarten
Hajer. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Hajer’s basic point is that coalitions of individuals
and groups who share a common conception or vision, and consequently, a common discourse, tend
to compete in the public sphere with other coalitions that are organized around competing visions
and discourses in order to accomplish what he terms “[d]iscourse structuration,” which is a kind of
conceptual dominance, and eventually “[d]iscourse institutionalization.” Id. at 84 (quoting and
citing Hajer, supra, at 45–46) (internal quotation marks omitted).
557. See id. at 92–93.
558. Id. at 88.
559. Id.
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crime.”560 The predominance of the crime discourse over this alternative has led
the ascendant coalition to “ignore methodological caveats and [to] present drugs
as the major cause of crime.”561 It has also resulted in the institutionalization of
that discourse in the form of mandatory drug testing regimes and the
development of DTTOs and other coerced treatment requirements throughout the
criminal justice system.562
IV. THE INCOMPLETE CONVERGENCE OF DRUG POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The convergence of British and American approaches to drugs and drug
misuse can be documented in a variety of ways. From the British side, two
components of the government’s policy have stood out over the past two decades
as marking a significant departure from Britain’s previously distinct past. First,
as noted above, both Conservative and Labour Party leaders have shown an
intensifying concern for what has been labeled “drug-related crime” and have
identified the reduction of that kind of criminal conduct as “a central aim of drug
policy.”563 This evolving focus on criminal offending as the primary social risk
posed by the misuse of drugs, and the relegation of other health-related concerns
to a distinctly secondary position, has aligned the British approach both
rhetorically and practically much more closely with that of the United States than
had been the case for most of the twentieth century. The second component has
been a move toward “the embedding of drug treatment within the criminal
justice system.”564 This commitment of substantial new resources devoted to
drug screening and drug treatment of criminal offenders has led to “the
construction of an entire infrastructure for drug interventions” in the various
component parts of the criminal system, from police stations to courthouses to
prisons.565 Thus, just as the criminal justice system long has been the principal
front in the United States assault on drug abuse, the shift in British drug policy
has now made the criminal system in the United Kingdom a central location for
its efforts to combat the problem of drugs and drug addiction.
These two related features of the new British approach can readily be
measured. One metric is the dramatic increase in the use of imprisonment in the
United Kingdom in recent years, especially for offenses involving the illegal
distribution of drugs.566 From 1994 to 2004, the total “number of years of
imprisonment handed out by courts” in England and Wales increased by slightly

560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.

Id. at 92.
Id. at 87, 92.
See id.
Seddon et al., supra note 19, at 820 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 821 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
See Reuter & Stevens, supra note 299, at 470.
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less than 50%.567 Crucially, however, during this same ten-year period the
number of years of imprisonment handed out in drug offenses went up by nearly
200%.568 A second measure is the commitment of resources to treatment, both
within the criminal system and more generally. Overall, the government has
funded a “massive expansion” in the number of drug treatment slots in the
United Kingdom, more than doubling the total capacity of the system between
1998 and 2007.569 More to the point, though, the number of people ordered into
drug treatment by criminal courts increased more than five-fold in roughly the
same period.570
In the United States, the trend lines have moved from an active war on drugs
in which criminal enforcement and punishment have been the primary rhetorical
and practical targets of policy to an evolving approach, at least at the federal
level, characterized by a somewhat more pragmatic tone and a more balanced set
of interventions that mix enforcement, treatment, and prevention.571 Although
the Obama Administration and its allies in the U.S. Congress have adopted a
number of positions that move American drug policy away from the belligerence
of a full scale war on drugs, evidence of the shift toward pragmatism was
reported even before the November 2008 election.572 In fact, according to a
Zogby poll conducted in September of 2008, three-fourths of likely voters said
they thought that the drug war was failing, and a significant minority urged
legalization or increased treatment and prevention.573

567. See id. at fig.4.
568. See id.
569. Id. at 473 (citing Statistical Release, Nat’l Treatment Agency for Substance Abuse,
Statistics for Drug Treatment Activity in England 2006/07: National Drug Treatment Monitoring
System (Oct. 18, 2007), available at http://nta.shared.hosting.zen.co.uk/media/media_releases/
2007_media_releases/statistics_for_drug_treatment_activity_in_england_2006_07_statistical_releas
e_181007.aspx).
570. See supra note 482.
571. Indeed, the Obama Administration’s 2010 National Drug Control Strategy takes as its
organizing theme the idea of striking a pragmatic balance between treatment, prevention, and law
enforcement efforts. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY iii (2010) [hereinafter DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY 2010]. Office of National Drug Control Policy Director R. Gil Kerlikowske states that
the “balanced approach of evidence-based prevention, treatment, and enforcement presented in this
Strategy will effectively address the serious drug problem faced by our Nation today.” Id. at v.
572. See Fields, supra note 519.
573. Zogby/Inter-American Dialogue Survey: Public Views Clash with U.S. Policy on Cuba,
Immigration, and Drugs, ZOGBY INT’L (Oct. 2, 2008), http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews2.
cfm?ID=1568 (citing Zogby Interactive Likely Voters 9/23/08 thru 9/25/08, ZOGBY INT’L, 43, 46
(Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.zogby.com/news/x-iad.pdf); see also Weekly Facsimile, Ctr. for
Substance Abuse Research, Univ. of Md., Three-Fourths of Likely Voters Think War on Drugs is
Failing; Legalization, Stopping Drugs at Border, and Reducing Demand Cited as Top Three
Strategies (Nov. 3, 2008), available at http://www.cesar.umd.edu/cesar/cesarfax/vol17/17-44.pdf
(summarizing the results of the Zogby poll).
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A. Recent Developments in United States Drug Policy
In the first two years of the Obama Administration, a number of concrete
steps have been taken to effectuate this new approach.574 Evidence of the new
pragmatism can be found in efforts to reform the criminal justice system and in
proposed policy changes elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy. One example is
the decision of the U.S. House of Representatives in September of 2009 to pass
the Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act,575 which included language that
would partially repeal the so-called aid elimination penalty that has been a part
of the Higher Education Act since 2000.576 Pursuant to the aid elimination
penalty, more than 200,000 students with drug offense convictions have been
deemed ineligible for federal loans, grants, and work-study support.577 In 2006,
Congress softened the law so that only those students convicted while in college
would lose their aid eligibility.578 Under the most recent House-passed
provision, the law would be pared back even further so that students convicted of
drug possession offenses (as opposed to drug distribution crimes) would once
again become eligible for federal student loans and other educational financial
support.579
In December of 2009, President Obama signed a bill repealing a twenty-oneyear-old ban on federal funding for programs that supply clean needles to
intravenous drug users.580 For a number of years, needle exchange programs in a
wide variety of locations across the country have provided clean needles as a
way to reduce the transmission of HIV and Hepatitis C.581 Although the
programs had relied solely on state and local funding because of the federal

574. In October of 2009, for example, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum to
federal prosecutors in fourteen states allowing for the medical use of marijuana and establishing a
new policy not to prosecute under federal criminal laws those who use medical marijuana in “clear
and unambiguous compliance” with state laws. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, U.S. Deputy
Att’y Gen., to Selected United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/medical-marijuana.pdf; see also David Stout & Solomon
Moore, U.S. Won’t Prosecute in States that Allow Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2009,
at A1.
575. Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2009, H.R. 3221, 111th Cong. § 123(d) (as
passed by House, Sept. 17, 2009) (amending 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1)).
576. See id.; Campaigns: The Higher Education Act, STUDENTS FOR SENSIBLE DRUG POLICY,
http://ssdp.org/campaigns/the-higher-education-act (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
577. See id.
578. See Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 8021(c), 120 Stat. 4, 178
(2006) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2010)).
579. See H.R. 3221 (rendering student convicted of crime involving the sale of a controlled
substance ineligible for aid for two years on a first offense and indefinitely on a second offense).
580. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 505, 123 Stat.
3034, 3279; Righting a Wrong, Much Too Late, supra note 238.
581. See Lawrence O. Gostin, The Legal Environment Impeding Access to Sterile Syringes and
Needles: The Conflict Between Law Enforcement and Public Health, 18 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE
DEFICIENCY SYNDROMES & HUM. RETROVIROLOGY S60, S60–61 (1998).
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funding ban, their numbers and geographic reach had expanded over time so that
in 2009 more than thirty million clean needles were distributed in more than
thirty states.582 Nevertheless, as of the date of the repeal, a number of states and
cities still did not have needle exchange programs, and enactment of the repeal
sent a strong message of federal support to those seeking to establish additional
programs in new locations.583
A third example of the new pragmatism is the decision of the U.S. House of
Representatives in the fall of 2009 to remove an eleven-year-old amendment
barring the District of Columbia from implementing a medical marijuana law
approved by District voters in 1998.584 The decision to abrogate this
amendment, known as the Barr Amendment, after its original sponsor
Representative Bob Barr,585 was contained in a District of Columbia
appropriations bill.586 Congress had reenacted the Barr Amendment in every
District of Columbia appropriations bill it had passed since 1998.587
Interestingly, Barr—who was defeated in his reelection bid in 2002 and has since
become a libertarian—supported the repeal of the ban that bore his name.588
Additional evidence of this new pragmatism is provided by the bipartisan
decision of Congress to reduce the well-publicized sentencing disparity under
federal law between crack and powder cocaine. Under longstanding federal law,
a conviction for possession of 5 grams of crack cocaine and 500 grams of
powder cocaine triggered the same five-year sentence.589 Fifty grams of crack
cocaine and 5 kilograms of powder cocaine triggered the same ten-year
sentence.590 The House Judiciary Committee in July of 2009 approved the
Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2009, which would have changed the
100-to-1 ratio and eliminated the five-year mandatory minimum sentence for

582. See Susan Sharon, Ban Lifted on Federal Funding for Needle Exchange, NPR (Dec. 18,
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121511681.
583. See id.
584. See Tim Craig, Swift Action Sought on Medical Marijuana, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2009,
at B2.
585. See Valerie Richardson, Marijuana Project Parties with Barr: Libertarians Open
Convention, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 2008, at A1.
586. Compare Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, § 813, 123
Stat. 3034, 3224 (reflecting absence of Barr amendment) with Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 819(b), 123 Stat. 524, 700 (“The Legalization of Marijuana for Medical
Treatment Initiative of 1998, also known as Initiative 59, approved by the electors of the District of
Columbia on November 3, 1998, shall not take effect.”).
587. See Richardson, supra note 585, at A1.
588. See id.
589. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(8) (2009) (defining both as
“level 24” offenses); Cocaine/Crack/Coca, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, http://www.drugpolicy.org/
drugbydrug/cocainecrack/ (last visited Dec. 11, 2010).
590. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c)(5) (2009) (defining both as
“level 30” offenses); U.S. News Library Staff, Crack vs. Powder Cocaine: A Gulf in Penalties, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://politics.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2007/10/01/
crack-vs-powder-cocaine-a-gulf-in-penalties.html.
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simple possession of crack cocaine that was put into place in 1986.591 The final
bill,592 which was supported unanimously in the Senate and on a voice vote in
the House and signed by President Obama on August 3, 2010,593 reduces but
does not completely eliminate the crack-powder cocaine sentencing disparity.
The new law decreases the 100-to-1 ratio to 18-to-1 and raises the trigger
amount of crack cocaine for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence from 5
grams to 28 grams.594
Members of the House and Senate have also launched broader reform efforts
focused on drug policy in the criminal justice system. Representative Barney
Frank of Massachusetts has been especially active. He is the lead sponsor of the
Medical Marijuana Patient Protection Act,595 “which would prohibit the Federal
government, in a state that allows marijuana to be prescribed by a physician for
medical use, from preventing the prescription, possession, transportation, or
distribution of marijuana for that purpose.”596 Frank is also sponsoring the
Personal Use of Marijuana by Responsible Adults Act of 2009,597 “which would
prohibit the imposition of any penalty under an Act of Congress for the
possession of marijuana for personal use or for the not-for-profit transfer
between adults of marijuana for personal use.”598 On the Senate side, Jim
Webb’s proposed legislation, the National Criminal Justice Commission Act of
2010,599 was approved by the House of Representatives on July 28, 2010.600 The
bill, which is supported by a broad array of organizations, including the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, “creates a blue-ribbon bipartisan
commission charged with undertaking [a] comprehensive review of the nation’s

591. H.R. 3245, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
592. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified at 21
U.S.C. § 801).
593. Peter Baker, Obama Signs Law Narrowing Cocaine Sentencing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES
CAUCUS BLOG (Aug. 3, 2010, 12:55 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/obamasigns-law-narrowing-cocaine-sentencing-disparities. The Senate acted under unanimous consent,
after Senators Richard Durbin (D-IL) and Jeff Sessions (R-AL) reached a compromise on the trigger
amounts. See Editorial, The House Should Listen and Learn, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at A22.
594. Id.; see also § 2, 124 Stat. at 2372.
595. H.R. 2835, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
596. Letter from Barney Frank, U.S. Congressman, to Constituents (2009), available at
http://house.gov/frank/letters/constituents/2009/marijuana-decriminalization-letter.pdf; see also Press
Release, Barney Frank, U.S. Congressman, Frank Introduces Bills to Prevent Federal Criminal
Prosecution for Medical and Personal Marijuana Use (June 19, 2009), available at
http://www.house.gov/frank/pressreleases/2009/06-19-09-marijuana-bills.html.
597. H.R. 2943, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).
598. Letter from Rep. Barney Frank to Constituents, supra note 596.
599. S. 714, 111th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, Jul. 27, 2010).
600. Press Release, Jim Webb, U.S. Senator, Webb’s National Criminal Justice Commission
Act Wins Approval in House of Representatives (Jul. 28, 2010), available at http://webb.senate.
gov/newsroom/pressreleases/07-28-2010-02.cfm.
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criminal justice system” at the federal, state, and local levels.601 After
conducting the review, the commission is to make “specific, concrete
recommendations for reform.”602
The impulse to moderate drug policy in the United States has been evident,
albeit unevenly, at the state level as well. Given the high volume of drug offense
prosecutions in the states, it should be possible to discern the effects of
significant drug policy reforms in the overall functioning of state criminal justice
systems. A recent report by the Sentencing Project notes that twenty states
experienced “modest declines” in their prison populations during 2008,603 and
legislatures in nineteen states enacted new provisions in 2009 “that hold the
potential to reduce prison populations.”604 At the heart of these reforms are a
series of measures designed to eliminate or scale back mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenses, to lower other drug offense penalties, and to offer
more mechanisms for diverting drug offenders into treatment in the
community.605 These reforms have been driven by fiscal concerns intensified by

601. Press Release, Jim Webb, U.S. Senator, Webb’s National Criminal Justice Commission
Act Gains Momentum with Introduction in House of Representatives (Apr. 27, 2010), available at
http://webb.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2010-04-27-03.cfm.
The National Criminal Justice Commission Act, S. 714 was introduced in the Senate
on March 26, 2009. The bill’s 37 cosponsors in the Senate, include: Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Crime and Drugs Senator Arlen Specter (D-PA) and Ranking Member
Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Judiciary Committee member Senator Orrin G[.]
Hatch (R-U). The legislation was voted out of the Judiciary Committee January 21, and
awaits a vote on the Senate floor.
Id. Senator Webb has noted that effective criminal justice reform must deal with “the central role of
drug policy in filling our nation’s prisons,” and has made it clear “that our approach to curbing
illegal drug use is broken.” ONDCP’s Fiscal Year 2011 National Drug Control Budget: Are We
Still Funding a War on Drugs?: Hearing Before Domestic Policy Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Ethan Nadelmann, Executive
Director, Drug Policy Alliance) [hereinafter Nadelmann Testimony] (quoting Sen. Jim Webb)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/
Hearings/Domestic_Policy/2010/041410_ONDCP/041210_111th_DP_Ethan_Nadelmann_041410.
pdf.
602. Jim Webb, Why We Must Reform Our Criminal Justice System, HUFFINGTON POST (June
11, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-jim-webb/why-we-must-reform-our-cr_b_214130.
html; see also Press Release, Jim Webb, supra note 600.
603. NICOLE D. PORTER, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2009: DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND
PRACTICE 2 (2010).
604. Id. at 1.
605. See Deborah Hastings, States Pull Back After Decades of Get-Tough Laws, HUFFINGTON
POST (Apr. 4, 2009, 12:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/04/states-pull-back-afterde_n_183200.html.
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a nationwide economic downturn606 and by a growing recognition that the
punitive approach characteristic of the “War on Drugs” has not been effective.607
The states that have eliminated or reduced mandatory minimums for drug
offenses include Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Island.608 A number of other
states have revised sentencing, probation, or parole provisions in order to reduce
the number of incarcerated drug offenders.609 For example, Kentucky has
“expanded parole eligibility for persons convicted” of identified felonies,
including some drug felonies; Louisiana has amended its provisions governing
offenders “serving life sentences for heroin offenses;” Maine has eliminated jail
sentences for low-level marijuana possession convictions; and Nevada has
“[a]mended sentencing provisions for controlled substance offenses.”610
Perhaps the most striking example of this new approach can be found in
New York. Between 1999 and 2009, while the total number of prisoners
increased nationwide, the overall prison population in New York declined by
20%.611 This significant reduction in state prisoners was the result of refocused
policing priorities, an increased emphasis on the diversion of drug offenders into
treatment, and a rolling back of sentencing provisions for drug offenses that
originated with the Rockefeller drug laws passed in the early 1970s.612 Under
the Rockefeller-era laws, the possession of as little as four ounces of narcotics
(or the sale of two or more ounces) was a Class A felony, triggering a “minimum
sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life.”613 A related provision, the Second
Felony Offender Law, “mandated a prison sentence for a person convicted of any
two felonies within [ten] years.”614 Together with intensified drug enforcement
by local police departments in the 1980s and 1990s, these sentencing provisions
had led to an enormous increase in the absolute number of New Yorkers who
were sentenced to state prison time for drug offenses, and in the relative
percentage of these prisoners in the total prison inmate population.615

606. See PORTER, supra note 603, at 1; Hastings, supra note 605.
607. See JUDITH GREENE & MARC MAUER, DOWNSCALING PRISONS: LESSONS FROM FOUR
STATES 1 (2010). For example, the Kansas Sentencing Commission recently sponsored a public
opinion survey, which found that “the vast majority of Kansans (more than 85 percent) believed that
drug users could and should be given a chance for rehabilitation. Seventy-two percent of state
residents favored treatment over prison for people convicted of drug possession.” Id. at 51.
608. See PORTER, supra note 603, at 4–5.
609. See id. at 3.
610. Id.
611. See GREENE & MAUER, supra note 607, at 5–6.
612. See id.
613. Id. at 6.
614. Id.
615. See id. (citing N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., 1999 CRIME AND
JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT (1999); Factsheet, Correctional Ass’n of N.Y., The Campaign to Repeal
the Rockefeller Drug Laws, (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.correctionalassociation.org/
publications/download/ppp/factsheets/DTR_Fact_Sheet_2009.pdf).
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Beginning in 1999, police enforcement priorities shifted in New York City
and throughout the state.616 Felony drug arrests declined sharply, reflecting a
growing recognition by some government officials and the public generally that
the all-out “war” on drug use was not working.617 Also in the 1990s, Brooklyn
District Attorney Charles Hynes began a highly effective and well-publicized
program to divert a significant number of defendants with serious drug problems
away from prison and into treatment.618 Over time, other prosecutors around the
state started similar programs.619 Then, in 2003, New York Governor George
Pataki instituted reforms to permit a limited number of offenders serving lengthy
sentences under the Rockefeller laws to “receive a merit time reduction of their
minimum sentence,” and to “move[] up the parole eligibility” of others who had
served more than ten years in prison.620 More significant changes were adopted
in 2004 and 2005, when the legislature and the Governor agreed to “double[] the
drug amount thresholds that trigger[ed] the harshest mandatory prison
sentences,” and to shorten prison time for virtually all drug offenses by adopting
“determinate sentences” and additional “good time” reductions.621 Finally, in
2009, Governor David Paterson signed into law legislation that fundamentally
reformed the Rockefeller-era drug laws.622 This bill “eliminated mandatory
minimums for certain first- and second-time drug offenses,” “expand[ed]
treatment [and] alternatives to incarceration,” increased judicial discretion, and
“provid[ed] for the resentencing of about 1,500 individuals who were
incarcerated under the original Rockefeller Drug Laws.”623
The data at the state level, however, does not support the conclusion that the
United States has turned a corner in its war on drugs. The new pragmatism
evident in New York’s Rockefeller drug law reforms has not been uniformly

616. See id. at 9.
617. See id. at 9. As reported by the Sentencing Project:
In 1999 a widely-publicized poll of New York State voters conducted by Zogby
International revealed that twice as many said they would be more inclined to vote for
state legislators who would reduce sentences and give judges greater discretion in drug
cases than the number who said they’d be less inclined.
Id. (citing Results for Zogby International Poll (New York), DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE (April 28,
1999), http://www.drugpolicy.org/library/publicopinio/zogby.cfm).
618. See id. at 10–11.
619. Id. at 11.
620. See id. at 16–17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
621. See id. at 17–18.
622. See id. at 24.
623. PORTER, supra note 603, at 4–5. Notwithstanding the importance of the 2009 legislative
reforms prospectively, it is crucial to note the dramatic decrease in the rate at which persons
convicted of drug offenses were committed to New York state prisons in the period between 2000
and 2008. In fact, while commitments to prison for all offenses declined by 15% during this period,
the number of offenders committed to prison for drug sale offenses declined by an eye-catching
54%. See GREENE & MAUER, supra note 607, at 13–14.

2010]

DRUG POLICY IN CONTEXT

345

adopted either in that state or around the country.624 Thus, “the drop-off in
felony drug arrests [in New York] was associated with an increase in
misdemeanor drug arrests” over the same period,625 and the 2009 drug law
reform statute also includes “sentencing enhancements and restored life
sentences” for so-called drug kingpins.626 Recent Rhode Island legislation that
eliminates mandatory minimums for some specified drug possession offenses
also leaves in place the possibility of lengthy prison sentences for offenders
convicted of other drug crimes, including sales offenses.627 And nationwide,
between 2000 and 2008, the total number of persons serving time in prison
increased by twelve percent.628 Despite the promising green shoots of reform in
some states, others have experienced dramatic increases in their prison
populations and in drug offender commitments to prison over the past decade.629
An increased interest in public health approaches to drug misuse is apparent in
many state and local drug policy debates, but a persisting attachment to criminal
prohibition and criminal enforcement is also a dominant component of the legal
and political landscape.
A similarly mixed picture characterizes the Obama Administration’s
approach to drug policy. In his transmittal notice to Congress accompanying the
2010 National Drug Control Strategy developed by the White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), President Obama called for “a new
direction in drug policy” and declared that his Administration is “committed to
restoring balance” between “prevention, treatment, and law enforcement” efforts
in the drug policy arena.630 The President and ONDCP Director R. Gil
Kerlikowske have said that drug policy “should be guided by examining the
evidence of what works,” and that “drug abuse should be treated as a public
health issue instead of a criminal justice issue.”631 In his public statements,
Kerlikowske has declared an end to the use of the rhetoric of a “war on
drugs.”632 At the same time, however, both the 2010 National Drug Control
Strategy and the proposed Federal Drug Control Budget for fiscal year 2011 (the

624. See GREENE & MAUER, supra note 607, at 23, 60–61.
625. Id. at 9.
626. PORTER, supra note 603, at 5.
627. See id.
628. GREENE & MAUER, supra note 607, at 1.
629. See id.
630. DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2010, supra note 571, at iii.
631. ONDCP’s Fiscal Year 2011 National Drug Control Budget: Are We Still Funding the
War on Drugs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight
and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Kucinich Statement] (statement of Rep.
Dennis J. Kucinich, Chairman, Subcomm. on Domestic Policy) (describing statements made by
ONDCP Director Kerlikowske and President Obama).
632. See Fields, supra note 519.
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first developed by the Obama drug policy team),633 read not as dramatic
departures from similar policy statements and budgets prepared during the Bush
Administration, but as evolutionary improvements and as refinements of the
longstanding approach to dealing with drugs and drug misuse that has dominated
United States policy for a very long time.
The proposed fiscal year 2011 budget does signal a “new direction in drug
policy” in some respects. As compared to the Bush Administration’s last drug
control budget (for fiscal year 2009), the amount of revenue devoted to treatment
in the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget increased from $3.477 billion to $3.883
billion.634 This represents a substantial increase in the amount of money
allocated to early intervention and other treatment initiatives.635 Moreover, the
proposed funding is targeted in ways that suggest more of a public health
approach.636 Thus, substantial new funding is focused on increasing the capacity
of emergency departments and primary healthcare providers to engage in
screening and brief early intervention for substance abuse in emergency rooms
and other community-based health care settings.637 In addition, the proposed
budget calls for “expanding addiction treatment in community health centers,”
“within the Indian Health Service,” and among other especially vulnerable
populations.638 Finally, the budget contains new expenditures for communitybased recovery support programs, post-incarceration re-entry efforts, and other
programs designed to divert drug abusers from prison.639
On the other hand, in terms of the overall allocation of resources between
supply-side and demand-side expenditures, the fiscal year 2011 drug control
budget proposed by the Obama Administration and the fiscal year 2009 budget
prepared by the Bush Administration are largely indistinguishable. The
proposed fiscal year 2011 budget still spends more than two-thirds of the total
drug control expenditure on law enforcement, interdiction, and other supply-

633. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL
YEAR 2011 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION (2010) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET
SUBMISSION].
634. ONDCP’s Fiscal Year 2011 National Drug Control Budget: Are We Still Funding a War
on Drugs?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2010) [hereinafter Pacula Testimony] (testimony of Rosalie Liccardo
Pacula, Co-Director RAND Corp. Drug Policy Research Center).
635. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET: FY 2011 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS 5–8 (2010) (“The FY 2011
Budget dedicates nearly $3.9 billion in Federal funds for early intervention and treatment services
for individuals with drug problems. This represents a 3.7% increase over the FY 2010 funding
level.”).
636. See id.
637. See id. at 5–7. See generally Boldt, Confidentiality of Alcohol, supra note 256, at 390
(“[S]ome emergency departments and, especially, trauma centers have taken the lead in integrating
[substance use disorder] diagnosis and treatment services into their broader agendas.”).
638. See DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2010, supra note 571, at 2.
639. See id. at 103–04.
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reduction programs.640 As a percentage of the overall budget, the amount
allocated to treatment in the Obama plan is 25%, while the amount devoted to
treatment in the last Bush drug control budget was 23.3%.641 If anything, the
real world effects of the budgeting decisions reflected in these documents may
end up with even more resources being directed toward supply-side efforts than
might at first appear to be the case because the proposed fiscal year 2011 budget
does not include billions of the dollars the federal government will spend on
prosecuting and incarcerating drug offenders.642
The 2010 National Drug Control Strategy is a “mixed bag” in other respects
as well. On one hand, the Introduction to the National Drug Control Strategy
prominently identifies the spread of HIV as a direct consequence of IV drug use
and links substance abuse with other social costs, including automobile
accidents, increased healthcare expenditures, and disrupted families and
communities.643 On the other hand, the primary measure of drug policy
performance in the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy remains drug use—the
total number of persons who report using illegal drugs within the past year in the
annual survey.644 As one expert has pointed out, however, “[d]rug use rates tell
us surprisingly little, . . . about our nation’s progress toward reducing the actual
harms associated with drugs. If the number of Americans using illegal drugs
decreases, but overdose fatalities, new HIV/AIDS infections, racial disparities,
and addiction increases,” then the policy is not a success.645
This overreliance on the rate of drug use as the principal measure of policy
performance is not a superficial shortcoming of the 2010 National Drug Control
Strategy, but rather an indication of the persistence of an underlying premise that
has animated United States drug policy consistently since William Bennett
articulated the idea several decades ago.646 The premise is that the use of illicit
drugs is inherently harmful, perhaps because of the very illegality of these
substances. This perspective remains woven throughout the 2010 National Drug
Control Strategy and helps to explain why the Obama team’s budget proposes
allocating 64% of available drug control resources to law enforcement,
interdiction, and other supply-reduction efforts, and only 36% for demand
reduction.647 These allocations were made despite repeated government-funded
studies that have demonstrated that demand reduction is much more effective

640. See id. at 109 tbl.1.
641. Id.
642. See Kucinich Statement, supra note 631.
643. See DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 2010, supra note 571, at 5.
644. See Nadelmann Testimony, supra note 545; FY 2011 BUDGET SUBMISSION, supra note
633, at 56.
645. Nadelmann Testimony, supra note 545.
646. See supra note 340.
647. See DRUG POLICY STRATEGY 2010, supra note 571, at 109 tbl.1.
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than supply-side efforts.648 And it helps to explain Director Kerlikowske’s
repudiation of Tom McLellan’s (formerly Deputy Director of the ONDCP)
earlier endorsement of some harm-reduction strategies.649 The rhetoric may be a
pragmatic call for balance and for evidence-based decisionmaking, but the
federal government has continued to resist experimenting with the kinds of
harm-reduction efforts—including supervised injection facilities—that have been
subject to carefully controlled studies and been found promising elsewhere.650
In his opening remarks at an oversight hearing for ONDCP’s proposed fiscal
year 2011 drug budget, Domestic Policy Subcommittee Chairman Dennis
Kucinich pointed out that “it will take time to reverse the course of the last
decade of failed drug policy.”651 Among the factors identified by Representative
Kucinich as contributing to the relatively slow rate of reform apparent in the
Obama Administration’s most recent Drug Control Budget and National Drug
Control Strategy (and presumably in drug policy reform at the state level as
well) are “institutional inertia, and the entrenched interests of stakeholders in the
current approach.”652 It may well be that the resistance to change inherent in
many public institutions and the simple self-interest of those who have benefited
from an enforcement-based policy paradigm in this area account for the
resilience of the prohibition approach notwithstanding the increasingly pragmatic
rhetoric of leaders both inside and outside of government. But the slow rate at
which U.S. drug policy is converging with approaches being taken in Great
Britain, and the likelihood that such convergence will not be complete is also
subject to a related but different explanation. The United States, unlike the
United Kingdom, has maintained a long history of moral disapproval of drug use
that has been supported by legal prohibition and criminal enforcement. This
moral and legal disposition toward narcotics has fostered a social understanding
of those who misuse these substances that is totalizing.653
B. Moral Anchoring
To be sure, it is not just the weight of this history that drags down the engine
of pragmatic reform in the United States. Instead, it is the present anchor that
this total moral understanding provides that is likely to be determinative. The
idea of “anchoring” as a distorting feature of human judgment was first proposed
by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, who published a classic

648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.

See Nadelmann Testimony, supra note 545.
Id. at 4–5.
See id. at 5.
Kucinich Statement, supra note 631.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 34–36.
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paper in 1974 on the “anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic.”654 In essence,
Tversky and Kahneman sought to explain why individual judgments under
conditions of uncertainty “tend to be excessively influenced by an initial
impression, perspective, or value.”655 Thus, in a standard example of the
phenomenon, study subjects who were asked whether the population of Chicago
is more or less than 200,000 and then asked to provide an absolute estimate
tended to estimate considerably lower than other subjects who were first asked
whether the population of Chicago is more or less than five million and then
asked to provide an absolute estimate.656 Although it would be a misuse of
Tversky and Kahneman’s theory about the ways in which individuals make
everyday judgments to attempt to map their anchoring hypothesis directly onto
collective societal judgment formation, their insights and those of others who
have developed the thesis do provide a metaphor for understanding the
persistence in the United States of a punitive, criminal justice-focused drug
policy.
The anchoring heuristic as elaborated by Tversky and Kahneman is made up
of a set of secondary theories relating to observable cognitive biases.657 More
recently, psychologists working on the anchoring thesis have suggested that
anchoring effects may be the product of other predictable cognitive processes
beyond insufficient adjustment and the like.658 These revisions have focused
particularly on the “enhanced accessibility of anchor-consistent information”659
and on the tendency of individuals to attend actively to information that
conforms to their anchor value and to tune out information that is dissonant with
their starting point.660
In an analogous sort of way, the extreme moral disapproval that has been
fixed for most of the past century on narcotic drugs and on those who use them
in the United States may serve as a kind of anchor that filters the complex array
of information a pragmatist would want to consider in formulating sensible
public policy in this area. In this sense, it is not just the inertia of long history

654. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
655. Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic: Why the
Adjustments Are Insufficient, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 311, 311 (2006).
656. Id. (citing Karen E. Jacowitz & Daniel Kahneman, Measures of Anchoring in Estimation
Tasks, 21 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1161, 1163 (1995)).
657. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 654, at 1128–30. These secondary theories
include “biases in the evaluation of conjunctive and disjunctive events,” biases with respect to the
“assessment of subjective probability distributions, and biases in terms of the range of adjustment
from an anchor value necessary for an accurate prediction. Id.
658. See, e.g., Epley & Gilovich, supra note 655, at 312 (“[R]esearch suggests that people
adjust from values they generate themselves as starting points known to be incorrect but close to the
target value.”).
659. Id.
660. See id.
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that determines the path of public discourse and government decisionmaking, but
rather the particular way in which our fixed moral understanding of drug
addiction shapes the very universe of data made available for consideration. In
effect, information that is consistent with the moral disapproval of drugs and
drug use is accorded greater salience in public policy discussions, while data that
is inconsistent with this pejorative moral characterization is undervalued or
excluded altogether.
Maarten Hajer’s work on “discourse coalitions” helps clarify how this
collective anchoring dynamic functions. In Hajer’s terms, “systems of
representation that rely on shared narratives and symbolic constructions” often
come to “dominate the way a society conceptualizes the world,” and eventually
661
The United States may
become institutionalized “in rules and organizations.”
not be committed fully to the stance adopted by Harry Anslinger many years
ago, but the “shared narratives and symbolic constructions” associated with drug
use that became embedded in the American perspective during the Anslinger
years have persisted and have continued to restrict our vision of the range of
possible policy choices to a narrow, pinched array of options for dealing with the
real harms that the misuse of drugs entails.
All societies engage in persistent and ongoing social and political
negotiation over how to evaluate competing risks of many kinds, and even
whether to attend to certain risks through the use of coercive governmental
instrumentalities. The fact that discourse about drugs in the United States is
anchored by a moralistic perspective that has been embedded in our positive law
and governmental institutions for decades necessarily biases the way in which
the problem of drug misuse is located on the nation’s risk profile. There is no
doubt that a similar struggle is taking place in the United Kingdom over the
place of drugs and drug misuse in the British risk profile. The important
difference between the two societal negotiations is that the former is anchored by
a longstanding totalizing moral depiction of drug addiction while the latter is not.
It is important to document the moral meanings associated with drug misuse
in the United States and to contrast them with the somewhat different moral
context that surrounds the problem in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere), in
part because understanding the contingency of our moral stance opens up
possibilities for change. The overwhelming moral opprobrium we associate with
drugs and those who misuse them may inhibit our capacity to renegotiate this
issue into a lower rank on our societal risk profile and may limit the distance we
are able to travel toward a more pragmatic, balanced drug policy, but bringing
this moral anchor into our active consciousness is a good first step in that
process. At the least, this attention to the moral dimension has the potential to

661. Maarten A. Hajer, Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The
Case of Acid Rain in Great Britain, in THE ARGUMENTATIVE TURN IN POLICY ANALYSIS AND
PLANNING 43, 46–48 (Frank Fischer & John Forester eds., 1993).
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make policymakers more aware that the field of information on which they base
public policy need not be as limited and distorted as it has been in our recent
history.
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